
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CONTENTS

Tatsiana Elavaya, Ryhor Miniankou

"GRASSROOTS SOCIETY " AS A PROBLEM OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY

Abstract

Radical social changes of the last decades detect more and more a failure of the established conceptual frameworks of knowledge in humanities and social sciences to "cope" with new social realities. In particular, the concept (and metaphor) of "grassroots society" draws a considerable amount of attention. While the obvious closeness of this concept with the concepts of "everydayness" and "privacy" is clear they are not identical. This articles treats "*grassroots society"* as a multi-dimensional plexus of practices in private sphere, which in the situation of a multilayer structure of contemporary societies operates on the level of "hidden sociality" and has a number of distinctive features, above all, its projective orientation. In other words, grassroots society can be described as *a kind of a gap between everydayness and social institutions*. Summarizing the ideas of a number of leading social theorists the article describes characteristics that would allow defining specific features and functions of the phenomena of grassroots sociality in the context of interaction of the political and social in the contemporary world. The authors make an attempt to approach the problem of grassroots society from "negative" (social implosion) and "positive" (life politics and individualization) points of view. The article discusses specific features of forming new forms of sociality in the framework of the development of a network society. The authors look at the features of the "social imaginary" in the context of grassroots sociality and detect the strengthening of value (ethical) regulatives associated with grassroots sociality in order to make generalizations.

Keywords: grassroots society, everydayness, privacy, liquid modernity, consumption, simulation, individualization, life politics, reflexivity, solidarity, network society, tribes, globalization, social imagination, work of imagination, ethical dimension.

Radical social changes of the last decades put on the agenda the issue of the fundamental revision of the established conceptual structures and notions of social and human knowledge, which, if one is to use U. Beck’s suitable metaphor, turned into a zombie concept, that is, empty concepts in Kantian sense, and this leads to the blindness of social sciences in relation to rapidly changing social realities.[1] New objectivities require appropriate new analytical languages. At the same time it becomes obvious that former disciplinary practices which used to set “acceptable” social forms both politically and institutionally no longer work. In the situation when boundaries and accepted normative regulators are blurring and state and other traditional social institutions are weakening “spontaneously” created social forms and “grassroots society” (“grassroots sociability”) arouse more and more interest. The goal of this study is to provide a preliminary theoretical description of “grassroots society” in the contexts of a number of areas of modern social theory.

While not denying the presence and power of the “official” ordered society-system manifested through a symbolic universum of the authority maintained in a stable condition with the help of successful strategies of democracy (including de-politicization, production of social regression, paternalism, etc.), we would like to address the conceptual explication of meanings of “hidden economy” (P. Bourdieu) of social practices. This will allow to clarify the success/failure of social contracting in social dynamics and to understand why in Belarus the social contract proposed to the people by the public authority was accepted (and the population began actively “consuming the state”) but the social contract offered by the opposition got rejected. At the same time we will try to foresee the prospects of other social contracts with the “masses” when the current political regime becomes a thing of the past and the country finds itself in the depths of a severe socio-political and economic crisis.

The term “grassroots society” is new for the field of social knowledge. To make the logic of our analysis clearer we will attempt to define yet without arguing the key features of the corresponding concept. Within the framework of our study we view “grassroots society” as a multidimensional plexus of practices of the private sphere which in the situation of a multilayer structure of modern societies operates on the level of “hidden sociality” and has a number of distinctive features, particularly, its explicit projective orientation. In other words, we are neither “inventing” this “new society” nor are we revealing a new “layer” but rather we propose to change the perspective view of the “society” from the traditional view from the “top” to the view from the “bottom”.

Obviously, when referring to this concept, we are inevitably reminded of the terms of everydayness and privacy. It is hardly necessary to prove that all three concepts are closely related and “prop up” each other. This relationship should be constantly kept in mind. Yet the content of these concepts is not identical. We believe that the main difference between the concepts of everydayness and grassroots society lies in the degree of their discursive expression. Everydayness is originally a discourse, even if it is just tacit knowledge.[2] Grassroots society, however, is still “preparing for the pronouncing” literally finding itself at the “grassroots” (“grassroots society”). Thus, everydayness is a subjectively meaningful and

basic reality taken for granted; it is being continuously interpreted and reproduced as a plane of life, attitudes, values, and naive knowledge embedding the man in the already existing structures.[3] Grassroots sociality presupposes an element of routinization; however, it is not completely absorbed by the power of institutions and distances itself from them. Therefore, grassroots society can initially be described as *a kind of a pre-gap between everydayness and social institutions*. Moreover, the projective direction of grassroots society also presupposes a potential to create new institutions at the grassroots level. In its turn, privacy is hidden, while the scope of the open sociality (a formally manifested "façade") is the sphere of the public. H. Arendt believes that privacy is a sphere (spheres) that for whatever reason avoids transparency and accessibility; here the exclusion prevails over the inclusion.

Undoubtedly, it is impossible to draw a clear distinction between grassroots society, everydayness and privacy. Therefore, in our study we will to a great extent use a conventional "hyphen" between these concepts. "Grassroots society," everydayness and privacy are in a constant intertwining and interaction of perspectives, but a significant difference in the operating of the "grassroots society" concept lies in its projective direction, i.e., how in future something may "grow from grassroots" and perform an active social role, thus, possibly changing the entire social world.

Hence, based on the dynamic understanding of the social and given the multi-layered structure of society, we assume that an adequate conceptualization of the contemporary sociality demands a shift of the theoretical framework from the public "façade" to the level of "hidden sociality" which can be conceptualized with the help of the metaphor "grassroots society". Moreover, we should note that the study of hidden sociality does not involve its reduction of it to its particularity as an irrational social balance; on the contrary, we consider it on a general social scale as a full "reality" along with the official "façade".

The study is based on a number of interpretations of social processes made by the contemporary social theory and which came closest to the problematics of "grassroots sociality". As part of the contemporary social theory the problematics of "grassroots society" found their certain clarification in the works of A. Appadurai who offers to use the concept "grassroots globalization".[4] It was specifically Appadurai's theoretical developments that served as a starting point of the desire to start developing the concept "grassroots society". The methodological orientation of the study is related to a number of conceptual structures mapped out sequentially, beginning with J. Baudrillard's concepts of "consumer society" and "silent majority", Z. Bauman's "individualization", A. Giddens's "life politics", U. Beck's "institutionalized individualism", and M. Castells's "networks" along with "new tribalism" offered by M. Maffesoli, "works of imagination" by A. Appadurai, and "social imaginary" and "moral order" of Charles Taylor. These approaches are very diverse but they have a common starting point, namely, the criticism of a "strong concept of society", i.e., understanding the latter as a natural (essential) framework of social life, which coincides with the boundaries of the nation-state within which the social is included.

1. Prospective directions of conceptualization of grassroots society

2.1. "Negative view": the "end of social" and/or "liquid" modernity (J. Baudrillard and Z. Bauman)

We shall start the explication of the conceptual elements of "grassroots society" with an analysis of the views of French social theorist Jean Baudrillard, the author of one of the most radical interpretations of social transformation in the last decades. We believe Baudrillard literally opens the door to the "roots of grass" profusely "watered" today with all kinds of global flows. Accordingly, the social construction of the social "bottom" is all the more diverse while new forms of nascent local are emerging continuously. Here we discover the role of the political in its most original Aristotle's understanding, namely, new forms of relations define new forms of sociality. It corresponds to Baudrillard's concepts of simulacrum and hypersimulation, consumption, "silent majority", etc. Without setting a goal of a systematic reconstruction of Baudrillard's social theory, we intend to present a general picture of what the social theory "after Baudrillard" was in the context of the opening by it of "real" grassroots of society. This theory contains at least three elements which we believe are very important including mass consumption as a defining phenomenon of the daily life of the contemporary (Western) society, the transition from a symbolic exchange to a total simulation of human life; and the implosion of the social and political as an effect of hypersimulation resulting in life being placed in the thick grassroots sociality.

Consequently, according to Baudrillard, modern society is *a consumption society*. In the condition of the disintegration of former ranking categories the source of social differentiation and individualization is the signs used by people. Consumption as such is a systematic act of the manipulation of signs: the consumption of goods is always the consumption of a sign; thus, the power of the code is not limited to things, but also to consumers. The choice of the product is somehow controlled by the established code of signification accepted in the group, i.e., consumers want to buy only those things that are usually approved of in their social circle, even if they do not actually need them. However, we should not understand Baudrillard's consumer society only as some subjective process between an individual and things consumed by him or as an idea learnt by collective representations.[5] Consumption should be considered more fundamentally, namely, as something that is woven into the scheme of reversible material practices of people while the exchange of "gifts" takes place not between specific individuals A and B, but is inscribed in the general circulation of gifts within social groups turning into a determining motive of behavior and life. The thing is consumed as a sign; the whole system of social differences, communication and exchange is built on this. The replacement of the use value with a symbolic one turns the freedom to choose into fiction. The consumption of similar signs inevitably leads to a group unification; in consumer society "the individual is missing, he is dead, he is swept out from our functional universe".[6] The individual becomes a destination, a "terminal" in the network of the general exchange of information and communication. There is

no death; however, there is a simple termination of the exchange. The logic of a symbolic exchange is determined not so much by affection as by reversibility. Using the language of our study, we could say that Baudrillard speaks about a new organization of the sphere of the private specifically at the level of grassroots sociality. In this case we are dealing with a decline of Western individualism, for such a symbolic exchange is foreign to its nature, not being rooted in the uniqueness of "I", but in the "Eastern" logic of "we", or the community.[7]

Baudrillard offers to divide the sphere of everydayness theoretically into two parts, namely, the "transcendental" (the political, social, and cultural) and the "immanent" (everyday life and the private). The sphere of the private is traditionally considered to be negligible, secondary, and even primitive, but according to Baudrillard, it is the privacy of the consumer society that provides a kind of autonomy of the individual in a situation of conflict with a "big world". Closing up in privacy, people perceive the signs from the external environment non-reflexively while the "transcendental" turns out to be redundant for consumption. Therefore, we speak both about the total politicization of the sphere of everydayness and the disappearance of the "transcendental" from human life negated by consumer practices.[8] In other words, consumption is on the "other side" of the objective and the subjective, and is a major social practice today.

The reference to Baudrillard's concepts of simulacra and simulation is crucial. It is important to understand that the purpose of the simulation is not to distort the reality. It is its virtual nature that matters. Signs of reality gain self-sufficiency and replace the reality itself. Instead one has to deal with a total autonomy of values, a transition to the stage of full simulation, a "complete lack of attachment, obligation, and trust".[9] All signs can be exchanged for one another but will not be exchanged for anything real. As a result, the reality is no longer ontologically founded and becomes a "simulative hyperreality of simulacra", a seeming semblance, a reaction to its own simulation, and a system of frames similar to Heidegger's Gestell. The symbolic capital is expressed in the aggregate of accumulated signs while the latter frame everyday life. Is it possible to win over such a system? Baudrillard believed that the only possible strategy of resisting the system is to deceive it using its own tricks. This is when the emancipatory task can be performed by potential 'unaccounted' institutions of grassroots sociality due to the existence of a gap between the system and people trying to hide in the thick of privacy.

In his book "In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities" Baudrillard offers an eschatology of the "end of the social". We shall specify that we are dealing with the end of the old familiar social in the system of traditional contracts. The replacement of the modern with the postmodern means *the replacement of the category of the social contract with a temporary social contract*, i.e., rational "social relations" which used to be considered obvious get destroyed. The social loses its main function, namely, the referent disappears, and the social is being increasingly absorbed by the masses. The emergence of the masses is not accidental, since the resistance to the social was present throughout the whole human history appearing as echoes of barbarism. The emergence of new communication technologies contributed to the rise of relations protesting the social; it became crystallized in the

phenomenon of the masses. The embodiment of the mass is *the "silent majority"* which is not a social strata or community, and is more of a static category. The mass is not a subject, because it has no autonomous consciousness; it cannot be given a specific predicate. But at the same time it is not an object because it cannot be understood in terms of elements, relationships and patterns and does not take information processing. As a result, the social keeps the referent of the "silent majority" but it has no representation. The representation of the masses becomes a simulation.

Yet Baudrillard calls the mass the most formidable force of our time, the whole reality of which is in action. The question arises: what kind of action can we talk about when we talk about "silence"? In essence, the mass represents an effective and actual force of neutralization, a force of inertia, i.e., it is an empirical reality but not a semblance where "silence" and indifference only serve as the effect of force. We deal with *a mutation of the social world, and this new state is characterized by its own organization*. The social took over the political and became all-consuming. As a result, together with the disappearance of the social signified its satellite political signifier disappears too; *in other words,* the political has nothing to rely on in order to legitimize itself (Baudrillard believes that the modern concept of class, nation, and nationality, are now becoming empty signifiers). Thus, as a result of the impact of any new media the proposed meanings are perceived by the masses as a show; the social and political become goods for individual consumption. If before the authorities tried to silence the voice of the masses, in which they saw a danger, now, on the contrary, they organize "information bombings" in order to encourage people to participate in social activities. As Baudrillard aptly noted, "the political adviser gave way to the referendum".[10] The government is again seeking to regain the subject, but to no avail as the masses "swallow" the meanings, and thus, keep growing.[11]

So, classical meanings disappear. But are other meanings possible? Baudrillard's answer is not quite clear. Obviously, the catastrophe of the social brings us a new geometry of social space. Baudrillard believes that the masses can act as a protagonist of history stopping for a (short) time to be "silent"; however, they don't have their own history; their strength is always actual and is administered "here and now". The whole life moves from the pole of the historical and political to the practices of everydayness where the masses act out of inertia following the medium and simulacra. Now the reality is not a constant; it is a variable among others, where the evolutionary perspective is only one of the possible events. But then what happens at these "roots of grass"? Is a new "ethics of everydayness" possible? In order to find answers to these questions already clearly stated by Baudrillard as a symbolic exchange is a key measurement of the forms of everydayness we shall turn to the ideas of Zygmunt Bauman, who proposed a peculiar project of postmodern sociology that includes a system of fruitful metaphors for the description of contemporary social processes.[12]

Although we would not find an example of Bauman directly using the grassroots society concept almost in all of his works grassroots sociality is still a central motif seen as *a reproduction of the system in the context of everyday practices with a social uncertainty*

typical of them. In this respect Bauman's metaphor of "liquid modernity" marking the final stage of his work is especially important. This metaphor is used to describe the "remoteness and unreachability of the systemic structure, coupled with an unstructured, fluid state of immediate circumstances of the immediate setting of life-politics".[13] "Liquidity" is not just some new social phenomenon that needs to be studied; it is also an existential dilemma calling for practical solutions for the purpose of acquiring a new security and morality. Bauman believes that modern society is very different from previous forms of sociality for today "we have entered the territory which has never before been inhabited by people, namely, the territory that in the past culture used to consider uninhabitable".[14] This "uselessness" is, first of all, associated with the loss of the old social order, its moral reasons, rationality, and the balance between the public and the private. The process of individualization is growing. We believe it is this concept that allows to penetrate and see what is happening at the "roots of grass". Individualization means the rejection of "prescribed inherited and congenital predetermination ... of the social role"[15], of identity transformation from the "given" to the "problem".

Bauman states that at the heart of the strengthening of individualistic tendencies lay the negative effects of globalization leading to the reorientation of interests and attitudes of individuals to implement personal life projects. If modernity fought the ambivalence, then in the situation of postmodernity one has to deal with its "privatization". The man torn away from modern "roots" needs to have enough time to realize himself as an individual today, for tomorrow there may be no possibility at all due to increasing social dynamics. In other words, individualism in the form of the construction of new borders was a defensive reaction to the challenges of the world of social uncertainty. It was a form of a favorable settling in this world taking different forms depending on social and cultural circumstances. For instance, a very interesting example of this is an apparent sharp growth of individualization in the post-Soviet space.

Contemporary man constantly has to juggle between two extremes, namely, a risky "freedom to become someone" and an established "freedom to be someone". The absence of higher authorities determining what is right and what is wrong turns the world into a huge supermarket of options. In this situation, the easiest means to get away from the burden of responsibility is through the transformation of choice into entertainment with practices of individual consumption becoming just that. Bauman draws attention to the correlation between the growth of individualization and the increase of the importance of consumption practices in society which then give rise to a new type of irrationality.

Earlier life was organized around the role of the producer. That presupposed the existence of a set of minimum requirements for the survival and the defining of the maximum level of needs unreachable for the absolute majority. It was assumed that the individual would seek a balance between these two extremes, to live "like everyone else" even if it meant the use of disciplinary power practices. On the contrary, life organized around the act of consumption, does not tolerate standards of compliance and is adjusted constantly by changing desires concentrating around "I". The desire to meet the needs gave way to the

desire to consume. If earlier the choice of goods was imposed on the consumer through a limited number of offers now the consumer makes the seller real. At the time, J. Habermas warned about the consequences of the invasion of the public sphere into the sphere of the private. Bauman also points to the opposite trend of our time, that is, *the "colonization" of the public sphere with issues that were previously considered private*. We face not just a revision of the boundaries of the private and the public but a new definition of the sphere of the public.[16] The most serious consequence of this is the death of "politics as we know it", Politics with a capital letter. Today authorities act more like hired consultants rather than leaders; they are not "translators" between the individual and the common good; rather they serve as assistants helping to solve individuals' private problems. Prescriptions of "good life" issued by consultants are not permanent, because "in the consumer race the finishing line always moves faster than the fastest of runners".[17] As a result, consumption turns into a never-ending process that changes the shape of the collective and individual imagination that defines the practices of the construction of living standards and their evaluation.

The desire to obtain social definition leads to the search for a stable identity, but in fact this identity turns out to be "solid" in appearance only. This is when the help of the fashion factor becomes handy as the factor of fashion like nothing else meets the requirements of modernity creating a sort of a "supermarket of identities". Following fashion means finding success and stability, even if they are illusory. Bauman emphasizes the impossibility of rejecting the permanent selection of identity thus removing the modern problem of the contradistinction of freedom and necessity. That is why we cannot simply speak of the massovization of life (like Baudrillard); it is more a question of what can be called "associative individuality". When opportunities grow the risk of conflict and fragmentation increases. Consequently, rather than seeing the harmonization of the conditions of life and solidarity we come across a tough individualized competition between people. Thus, the mobility and flexibility of identity in a consumer society are not so much liberating forces but an instrument of the redistribution of freedoms.

Here we go directly to *the moral and ethical horizon of grassroots society* absent in Baudrillard's conception (in his works morale imploded together with politics and sociality). Bauman believes that contemporary ethical issues are determined by two fundamental features of the postmodern that is, the pluralism of authority and the emphasis on the personal choices of individuals.[18] In the absence of stable moral imperatives ethical conflicts cannot be adequately resolved on a personal level moving into the sphere of politics, economy, etc. So one should not be surprised at an increasing interest in ethical arguments and institutions of moral examination in the context of various contractual practices. In addition, the concept of choice itself always means taking responsibility, and for this reason has the character of a moral act. Therefore, morality in no way disappears from people's lives; one just needs to see its new status and new challenges in today's society.[19] If one refers again to Baudriallard's language similar to that of Bauman (in fact, this approach is now the leading one in contemporary interpretations of the foundation of moral order), then

we can talk about the "aestheticization" of ethics, the ethics of reversibility of individuals completely integrated in the forms of life and in Dasein.[20] The downside of individualization is the erosion of collective social and political institutions, the crisis of citizenship and the "emptying of the agora". Of course, it would be naive to think that up to now most of them have been concerned with the implementation of the idea of the "common good" but, nevertheless, the sense of ontological belonging played a key role. The traditional family, nation state, church, etc. constituted a stable social system in which everyone was guaranteed a place; they gave people the meaning of life. Today, the power is increasingly globalized and de-territorialized; institutes of power expelled from cyberspace are locally fixed and cannot adequately respond to the challenges of today. People do not believe that an active civil position can somehow improve the situation and prefer to deal with their private problems, rather than sacrifice themselves for the sake of high social ideals ("to waste time", "be used"). Endurance towards the inability to control the conditions of their lives leads to *the disappearance of social autonomy*. It is specifically the fear of "disorder" masked by slogans such as "For a stable Belarus!" that may legitimize authoritarianism in some locales. In this case, the social contract between citizens and the government provides for a "voluntary-compulsory" limitation of the horizon of thought and actions of people by the sphere of everydayness.[21] Bauman warns, however, that the stronger the desire to establish an order to counter the alien incomprehensible social other is, the more uncertainty and anxiety come into our lives.

The erosion of modern ideas of civic consciousness, collectivism and politics necessitates the formation of their new forms. What "medicine" is offered by Bauman? Obviously, society cannot be autonomous without autonomous citizens just like citizens cannot be autonomous outside of an autonomous society. One should find a way to involve real political institutions again in real management in contemporary conditions, and secondly, it is necessary to increase the influence of individuals on public life and give them back the status of responsible citizens. The solidarity of society can only be brought about by a new ethics, and this is a political task. Thus, the issue of the moral responsibility for the fate of the individual at the level of the initial state of the private choice and original localities becomes central. However, Bauman does not directly answer the question of how to establish solidarity in a changing environment. Rather he speaks of the need to approve such conditions in which solidarity is possible: "The key to solving the problems that afflicted modern political life and researchers analyzing it should be looked for (and found) in the elimination of problems causing the impotence of the existing institutions of collective political actions".[22] This means that we should develop such political associations which would combine moral responsibility and difference and that will be the basis of a real political and public liberty.[23] In other words, current processes at the level of grassroots sociality require the formation of a new system of making social contracts at all levels of society in order to achieve a new synthesis of freedom and community.[24]

2.2. "Positive view": "politics of life" and practices of individualization (A. Giddens, U. Beck)

So, Baudrillard and Bauman present us with a pessimistic picture of the implosion of the contemporary sociality. It is true though that Bauman tries to identify certain trends of its positive movement, but the prospects of the development proposed by him are outlined rather vaguely. Is a "positive view" of the processes occurring at the roots of "social grass" possible? Let's refer to the ideas of British sociologist Anthony Giddens. It appears that Giddens is "useful" for our study as almost the whole language of the author used by us can be interpreted as a description of grassroots society, especially with regard to its *projective orientation* and the fixing of attention on the phenomena of *security and trust* defining everyday actions of people. Giddens, just like Baudrillard and Bauman, talks about the destruction of old forms of social integration, the growing controversy, the end of politics with a capital letter and the escape of the masses into the depth of privacy. However, he also states that with the death of the old there emerge new (alternative) forms of sociality, solidarity and politics, both at the individual's level and at the level of institutions. In his work "Modernity and Self-Identity" Giddens draws attention to serious transformations that are taking place in people's lives. The key moments are changes of *everyday behaviors*, *the transformation of the sphere of the private* leading to a new representation of sociality as a germination of *a different behavior* and *a different state of mentality*, with the help of which the potential for the change of public social institutions is being opened. If Bauman talks about the possibility of a new individualism, then Giddens sees individualism as a series of specific practices of everydayness. We can see the example of the democratization of the private sphere that is defined by new "life politics" and affects the reorganization of society on a macro level.

Giddens believes that when describing the contemporary society, we must, first of all, pay attention to a high degree of its reflexivity which is manifested in constant doubts regarding the available knowledge (including the knowledge of experts) and its revision. "I" becomes a reflexive project, i.e., "we are not what we are but what we ourselves make from ourselves."[25] At the same time reflection is not usually a conscious subject and is imperceptibly woven into daily social practices. It is interesting to note that although Giddens sees de-traditionalization as a peculiar feature of modernity the hyperreflexivity of contemporary society does not lead to the disappearance of the tradition.[26] Only its status changes as it is no longer a "natural" given but a mechanism for social integration deliberately designed by people in a particular cultural and temporal context. In other words, reflexivity while destroying the old traditions is creating the new ones as well. In this sense Baudrillard's "society which has become its own myth" can be with a certain degree of freedom interpreted as a "society that has become its own tradition". Continuing the argument, we can assume that Giddens could treat social implosion not as the "end of the social" but only as its natural transformation (the deformation of a "strong" concept of society) in the perspective of modern evolution where *the social moves beyond the "container" of the*

nation-state to the global arena. Society is no longer an organizing framework for the social and acts as an institutionalized "superstructure" *above the multi-dimensional interplay of social practices*.[27] Giddens comes to the conclusion that this new social dynamics must ultimately be determined from the "bottom" and through the concept of everyday practices and specific contexts of the interaction that determine the nature of social structures.

The specifics of contemporary social processes are defined by an increasing interrelation of institutional and personal relationship processes: "for the first time in human history "self" and "society" are interrelated in a global milieu".[28] On the one hand, we see a clear development of transnational forms of social practices, while on the other, challenges of the "big world" lead to the growth of the need in community and a stable identity. The production of the situation of the need to make a daily independent choice along with the unpredictability of the future as well as the development of science and technology lead to an increased risk. Contemporary risks with a global impact (problems of ecology, etc.) unite people as a natural desire for *ontological security* brings to the fore the issue of *trust between people*.[29] Trust allows to reduce "anxiety"; self-identification is impossible without trust for identity is always defined by setting boundaries with others. One should not forget that risks are connected not only with dangers but also with *chances* as open possibilities for personal development.

In this situation *interpersonal relationships change* dramatically, or, more precisely, *the transformation of the ethics of private life takes place*. These changes are particularly evident in family or sexual relationships among younger generations.[30] They free themselves from external influences of economy, the state, the tradition, kinship relations, and increasingly take the form of "pure communication"; they become self-sufficient by creating their own unique intimacy. Transformations on a personal level change rules and institutions of grassroots sociality, for instance, sexual relations are increasingly losing the correlate of a reproductive function and are associated with pleasure.[31] Giddens offers to look at this situation not only as some compensatory mechanism in the psychological situation of atomization, but positively; in fact, in relations based on trust and an open dialogue there are more opportunities for the disclosure of the project of the self. It is important to emphasize that the reflexivity of "I" does not mean personal self-sufficiency, but, on the contrary, requires some creative work with the social context, and its integration into one's own identity. This stimulates the emergence of new horizontal relations of solidarity. Thus, today we can talk about *the democratization of everyday relations*. They are characterized not by the collapse of the old configuration (the disappearance of loyalty to the local under the influence of global impact) but by *an ambivalent interplay of relationships of the near and far surroundings*.

We can see obvious parallels between the idea of the transformation of intimacy offered by Giddens and Bauman's postmodern ethics who talks about the transformation of a single moral system of coordinates into the ethics of the local level of interpersonal interactions. The increased need to find a safe "home", "community", where one does not need to wear a public mask leads to the actualization of the existential question of life

with the Other and life for the Other.[32] The political dimension of Giddens's new ethics of everydayness is also obvious as the "rules" of the disclosure of the project of the self are determined by "politics of life".

Although the self is constituted through protective denial politics in favor of the private sphere, yet the self cannot be fully separated from the political sphere. Politics is no longer concentrated in the sphere of public administration and conventional public practices. It is "spread out" across the social, thereby politicizing everydayness. If we radicalize this thesis of Giddens, we can say that today any phenomenon of social life is a political one as there are no non-political problems. Life politics is *a kind of response "from below" to the new challenges of our time*; it is a way of finding one's place in the global world.

Life politics in the era of late modernity replaces emancipatory politics. The dynamism of modern institutions was stimulated by the ideas of the liberation of the subject while the essence of emancipation politics focused on the concept of a hierarchical authority, is to consolidate social imperatives of justice, equality, and participation. However, Giddens points to the inadequacy of such understanding of politics. Emancipation policy is aimed at creating conditions for freedom within a limited social context, thus being the politics of freedom and choice in the true sense of the word. This politics is rather freedom "from" rather than "for". Giddens notices that the issues of life politics ("who I am", "how to live") are becoming more interesting for those individuals who have reached a certain level of emancipation. So, if we define emancipatory politics as the politics of life chances, then life politics is the politics of *lifestyle*. "Life politics concerns political issues which flow from processes of self-actualisation in post-traditional contexts, where globalising influences intrude deeply into the reflexive project of the self, and conversely where processes of self-realisation influence global strategies".[33]

Life politics works with the concept of *transforming power as the politics of self-actualization*, where power and ethics are used as generative notions. But it would be wrong to assume that the destruction of "grand narratives" leads to a general pluralization, fragmentation, and a moral chaos. Today, moral issues are being actively put forward and being brought back to the realm of public debates as ethics is becoming a pressing political task and such it should be. We can identify self-actualization as the expansion of mentality as a normative guideline of life politics; this implies an increasing tolerance towards different lifestyles. Accordingly, the ethics of life politics is connected with the problem of combining one's individual autonomy with the contexts of global interdependence of individual and shared interests. Giddens associates the re-moralization of everydayness happening today with the emergence of *the reflexive project of the self*. The quest for security in the society of risk provides for the avoidance of such areas of experience that can shake it, since they exceed the limits of the "protective cocoon" of the individual. Ultimately, existential dilemmas of "I" lead to the feeling of meaninglessness of existence. We obviously can establish a direct connection between morality and reflection, but it is not necessarily true that more reflection means a larger volume of morality in social relations. In the context of global risks both politics and ethics take a fairly conservative form as the "throwing

themselves under the bus" to overcome (or at least restrain) a rapid growth of risk may only cause an intensified uncertainty in society. In other words, it is not worth "pulling the grass" to ensure its rapid growth.

Giddens's language used by us to describe grassroots sociality can be specified with the help of ideas conceptually close to those of Giddens. They are the ideas of German sociologist Ulrich Beck who proposed the project of *institutionalized individualism*. Some other ideas we rely on belong to Bauman. We believe that institutionalization proposed by U. Beck allows to introduce a clear concept of grassroots society as distinct from the concept of everydayness and to register its projective and constructive (the possibility of new institutions) component.

Beck *describes* contemporary social processes as a transition from the classical to reflexive modernity, and this determines new configurations of social macro-and micro-levels, prompting to concentrate on the phenomena that we attribute to grassroots sociality.[34] The product of reflexivity is the growth of *individualization*. The process of individualization is due to the fact that in a new social reality life trajectories of the individual and social structures are no longer the same, and take on new configurations.[35] The generalized model of individualization includes three dimensions: liberation from connections and forms of domination and security set by the tradition; liberation from dogmatism in relation to awareness and standards ("disenchantment"); and a new type of social integration in the spirit of tolerance, democracy, and mobility. These dimensions are supplemented by an increasing attention to the construction of personal identity and self-affirmation.

Traditional life rhythms are overlapped by *institutional biographical patterns* as the category of a "normal biography" today less and less corresponds to social reality.[36] Beck believes that a particular case of the social contract as a general trend of our time is the type of "a contract family for a certain period of time" which is a curious ambivalent situation as individuals still focus on family life as forms of emotional exchange, but at any time they can "sell" them to suit their individual situation. As a result, the life project of the individual is increasingly dependent on his personal decisions and becomes *"auto-reflexive"*. Social crises and global risks are perceived as individual. Risks do not simply increase; they undergo a qualitative change for they become associated with the category of "guilt distribution". People when becoming liberated from the forms of life and thinking previously considered "natural" lose the ability to rely on traditional forms of the suppression of fear as old defense mechanisms are no longer valid. However, problems do not disappear, in fact, they aggravate. Positive aspects of individualization belong to the active (creative) type of self-realization while the negative ones belong to the passive (adaptation) type.

Since new institutional norms require an independent organization of the individual's own life, the individual is both relieved and experiences a new compulsion. The latter is seen as a new form of consciousness, implicitly imposed on by the media, fashion and market conditions. Television is especially unique in this context as it implicitly constructs an average individual or "the standardized collective existence of isolated mass hermits".[37] Not only tastes, style or political preferences but also weekly and daily routines of the fam-

ily are being formed. Thus, it becomes almost impossible to separate the private will and choice from the institutional sphere, political control and influence. This again prompts us to address the question of constructing moral and ethical foundations of human society while Beck sees new ethics in the context of the forming of the project of cosmopolitan democracy.[38]

Beck, like Giddens, shows that new risks are bringing to life *new forms of social solidarity at the grassroots level.* Beck believes that globalization is "something that changes our everyday life with a compelling force and makes everyone to adapt and respond to these changes".[39] As a result, there is an increase in the spontaneous construction of localities or glocalization, not only at the level of political elites, but especially at the grassroots level of specific social practices.[40]

Displaced collective relations emerge again if they find a common ground with the private sphere. The realization of *the "collective destiny"* can occur even in connection with the laying of the street not far from one's own yard. But we should have no illusions about the reincarnation of the lost modern solidarity as forms of perception are, on the one hand, private, but on the other they are ahistorical. Eventually events shift to the horizon of "here and now". Temporary communities are formed under the influence of a non-linear synthesis of various risks while the degree of integration of these individuals into them is not a constant value associated with the desire to satisfy individuals' own needs. Society and "common problems" become a part of the biography that is not at all decisive. Its side effects include desocialization, growing alienation, political apathy, and the closing of interests within the boundaries of everyday life. All this leads to the formation of a serious political dilemma in modern society. Beck notes, that on the one hand, risks and challenges of the globalized world are clearly revealed in the sphere of politics. Accordingly, government institutions should be engaged in strengthening the social dimension of the democratic state, and should be able to provide a relevant mode of its operation amplified by transnational influences. On the other hand, individualization creates problems for collective identities and the political consensus on the whole as while contradictions intensify and activity increases at the level of grassroots society they decrease at the level of the public. This misbalance makes society change from below. Therefore, the question about the potential of grassroots society institutions remains open.

2. Prospects of new forms of social organization: network society and new tribalism (M. Castells and M. Maffesoli)

The reference to the concept of the network society within the frame of our research is essential for *the social network structures are that specific substrate through which a new sociality "sprouts"*. In this connection, we shall focus on the ideas of Spanish sociologist *Manuel Castells*, who, through the use of the metaphor "network" offers to conceptualize modern society and its particular form of organization as an open and dynamic structure, which includes a "set of interconnected nodes".[41] The emergence of the network society is

associated with qualitative changes in the systems of stratification, communication and knowledge transfer, with the advent of information labor that led to the redefinition of social entities and relations of power as well as to the new forms of political and other mobilization.[42] *Network structures replace the former modern forms of personal and thing dependence*; this change of the social order based on information technology, is so significant that, according to Castells, it leaves behind the historic transition from the agrarian to the industrial and from the industrial to the service economy.

Today, the network form of the organization of human activity is acquiring a global meaning incorporating into all spheres of society and creating *a new culture* of relations while requiring a maximum daily flexibility from individuals wanting to achieve success. The scope of everydayness, the relationship between the individual and the collective, politics, economics, and the boundaries of time and space are changing. The main feature of the network society is not the emphasis on knowledge and information, but a fundamental change of their role. Today, users do not only consume goods or symbols; they can affect the technologies of their production. Moreover, Castells says, we may speak about the emergence of a social determinant of a higher level for *the power of the network structure is becoming stronger today than the power (authority) itself*. Belonging to a particular network provides access to certain information; if we recognize the latter as our main resource, then belonging to the network (figuratively speaking, the status of "on-line") provides "access to life". Thus, social morphology becomes dominant to social action.[43] Politics is being more and more played out in the media and on the Internet, because traditional social and political institutions have not kept pace with social dynamics. The institute of traditional expertise as a prerogative of elected "experts"[44] is falling apart.

The crisis of legitimacy of traditional government institutions means that *the government is moving to another level, namely, the level of grassroots society*, for here the network organization as the one setting the tone of modern society, has manifested itself most clearly. At the level of grassroots sociality today one can observe *an active generation of new individual and collective identities*. As Castells notes, "It is on the outskirts of society, be that alternative electronic networks or the same grassroots networks of community resistance, I see the embryo of a new society".[45] Actually, the grassroots society can be called a fertile soil that is turned freely into the "grooves" (flows and nodes having the function of power) of network structures allowing the projective potential of grassroots sociality to be revealed keeping in mind that the vertical corporatism is increasingly replaced by the horizontal one. Today's unfolding global network morphology allows to talk not only about the potential of new configurations in relation to the individual and the local, but also to go to the transnational level. Moreover, today we can speak about the formation of the concept and practice of a "global civil society". This concept is both descriptive and normative as in this case on the one hand, we deal with a growing number of non-state actors across national societies, political structures and economy, while, on the other, we can talk about the formation of new global norms and values registering local differences of these subjects and features of their interaction.[46]

The problem is that in reality the life of contemporary society is *at the junction of interaction between the network society and the identity of the "self".* In the network society "resistance identities", "segmented local networks which are often ethnically based" which "consider identity their main resource defending their interests and, ultimately, their very essence" have no less meaning than individualistic tendencies.[47] These kinds of communities arise in response to the system's annexing attempt and are characterized by self-sufficiency and hostility towards external environment (for example, local migrant communities and religious fundamentalist groups). The activity of such structures is not reconstructing but fragmenting society (its institutions and values). Castells believes that only two categories of actors have a possibility to radically change the current social situation. First of all, it is the "prophets" or symbolic charismatic personalities acting on behalf of the discontented. The second and more effective category includes "new social movements" which succeeded the old rigid class structure and which were organized on the principle of decentered networks and are now carriers of *a "projective identity"* and new identity politics. They grow out of the identities of resistance, are aimed at changing the institutions of society and are always associated with a specific institutional and cultural context.[48] A classic example of their work is an earlier unprecedented protest activity among young people in 1968 in the West.

Today the network logic has become the basis of civil mobilization during the preparation and holding of "color revolutions" or the so called "Arab Spring". In the conditions of the dictatorship the activity of associations operating on the basis of the network principle ("autonomous cells") is perhaps the only relatively safe and effective way to neutralize it. The adoption in a number of "problem" countries of Internet censorship laws[49] and criminal punishment for participating in activities of unregistered organizations[50] is a clear indicator of the value in the political struggle of horizontal networks and new media technologies (SMS-mailing, blogging, social networking, etc.) used by them. It is important to remember that *the social logic of this kind of structures was originally an alternative to the static logic of existing social institutions* and, therefore, has the potential to change the latter.[51] If Baudrillard spoke about the "silent masses" then within the limits of the conceptual apparatus of the network society, we can talk about the emergence of the phenomenon of "smart masses".

French social theorist Michel Maffesoli offers a similar version of perspectives of grassroots sociality, though in a different language. Like Baudrillard, Maffesoli talks about the implosion of the social and the political that means the destruction of old forms of institutionalization and schemes of the analysis of social reality. Maffesoli, however, does not speak about the end of the social but is interested in the search of new non-modern forms of the social and political organization using a new methodological tool. The tragedy of the "silence of the masses" is now a defense and liberation from totalizing discourses of modernity.[52]

In Western societies of the 1980s one could already observe an ambivalent situation of stepping away from global values defined by society, and at the same time finding *new*

meaning grounds of co-existence, this time in a particular locality within the immediate vicinity. The social and political body in this case does not disappear but is "transformed" reorienting into something "really important" such as everydayness organized according to clear, stable and familiar routine rules.[53] Maffesoli emphasized the fact that postmodern society in general cannot be considered public in a traditional sense, because today it is a mosaic of social and individual practices of interaction.[54] Fragmentation leads to the transformation of society into formations of communities, small groups, "tribes" in which individuals create new forms of the lost solidarity. In this respect it is similar to the concept of "tribal culture" of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, who in their study of the phenomenon of marginality also come to the conclusion that there is a trend towards the fragmentation of modern society into smaller local formations. These new communities produce certain cultural stereotypes which eliminate the traditional delineation of the spheres of science and magic, of the profane and expert knowledge and that lead to the "carnivalization" and vitalization of life. At the same time Maffesoli stresses that since tribes are created on the basis of common emotional feelings (without any reflection and irrationally), the solidarity within them is unstable, "dispersed" and depends on the circumstances (one can see obvious parallels with the "liquid" postmodernity of Bauman).

When offering to look at the sociality of the inner circle, Maffesoli *reviews the correlation of the individual and the collective, which should be read in the light of the social imaginary*. It is the latter that is the cement ("divine social") that does not allow society to become finally atomized. "Tribalism ... is based both on the religious spirit and localism (being close to the center, nature)."[55] Logical reasons and utilitarianism cannot explain the tendency of the people to unite, just like selfishness does not destroy the desire to co-exist together. In the form of "folk memory" or of the collective unconscious it is actualized when society feels unstable and tends to support the image of reality. On this basis, individuals are able to organize social reality and restore a sense of ontological security. The quest for the lost solidarity is evident in the contemporary dehumanized culture of the city (hence the emergence of various subcultures, etc.).

In the modern era everything was simple: first, there was politics or everything was politics. Democracy became the logical end of politics for the belief in rational terms does not achieve its goals today. Such a degradation of the formal institutional framework is negative for the modern understanding of the individual as an active participant of public life, but for Maffesoli it contains a particularly positive connotation. He sees it not as regress but as a *"homecoming"*. New configurations of the political are characterized by the emergence of lower classes as an institutionalized power that broke away from traditional institutions of power. Tribalism, thanks to its internal pluralization, blurs the boundaries of the imposed schemes of reality interpretation. The emphasis on the imaginary entails a major shift in the paradigm: instead of the domination over the world we can see *reconciliation with the status quo and integration through the aesthetics of contemplation and inactivity*.[56] *The meaning of life is reoriented from the idea to change the world to the idea of the fulfillment of one's life as it is.* However, Maffesoli believes that non-participation,

indifference, and hedonistic values are not a vice but rather a sort of "people's stoicism". The masses do not participate in public politics and do not show any civic engagement, as they are separated from them and are hardly affected from the "outside" but at the same time, institutions of politics cannot function without the involvement of people. Only the astheticization of consciousness prevents people from being confined to their individuality and helps them to understand the need to strengthen the team spirit "from below".

3. Social imaginary in the perspective of grassroots sociality (A. Appadurai, C. Taylor)

The prerequisite for social constructivism is the understanding of the individual as a free and autonomous being, capable of creative rethinking and of the transforming of the existing social reality, oneself, and cultural codes of society which are not given once and for all but which change along with the development of mankind.[57] Accordingly, social reality is not a closed deterministic universum; it is a field initially open to interpretation. At the same time, it would be naïve to attribute the change of social configurations only to voluntarism of certain individuals, and that is why the concept of the "social imaginary" which has been mentioned before in a somewhat different context (M. Maffesoli's "divine social") becomes relevant.

The issue of the social imaginary occupies a significant place in modern social theory and is considered by a number of researchers - from postmodernists to communitarians.[58] A schematic description of the social imaginary as understood by K. Castoriadis can set the general tone of our deliberation. Expanding J. Lacan's understanding of the imaginary Castoriadis defines the social imaginary as a creativity that is always present in any society, that contains an alternative project of the social order and that cannot be reduced to the current state of affairs. The social imaginary is "something invented"[59] or a kind of *absolute creativity* ("magma"). The units of social imaginary are meaning-images which form socially imagined significations. One important aspect that should be noted, concerns the direct connection between the imaginary and the symbolic: the symbolic materializes imaginary meanings in social reality giving them a concrete form of incarnation (in things, institutions, etc.), thus replacing the reality with its image.

The key importance of the social imaginary for contemporary societies is obvious. It is specifically the mechanism of the social imaginary that may offer an alternative social order in the situation of the erosion of old institutions and identities and the emergence of the new ones. The social imaginary offers us *some sample according to which reality will be changed*. At the same time it gains its "emancipatory" value not only in terms of its tasks (such as the construction of an alternative world view), but also due to the specifics of the internal organization. As we have said before, the social imaginary appears "out of nowhere", i.e., from below, "from grassroots", from the scope of the unseen and unreported. As a rule, at the beginning it is materialized in the slogans and actions of a narrow circle of intellectuals, seeking the potential for the development among various grassroots organi-

zations and communities, and only then, if the support is provided, it gets embodied in the institutions of society. The explosion of the youth protest activity in 1968 that represented a final farewell to the ideals of a bygone era, can be considered one of the best examples of the change of the version of the social imaginary, along with the project of the Enlightenment, communist utopia, modernism, and postmodernism.

Let's refer to the ideas of Indian social theorist Arjun Appadurai, who analyzes the problem of social imagination in perspective transformations of the modern discourse. Appadurai focuses on the concept of the "work of imagination"[60] where the gap in modernity is due to the joint impact of electronic media and mass migration on the practices of social imagination. The latter serve as a determining factor in the formation of modern subjectivity. In order to understand the new role of social imagination in the modern world, Appadurai proposes to synthesize the ideas of B. Anderson's "imagined community", "mechanically produced images" of the Frankfurt School and the French interpretation of the "imaginary" as a landscape of collective aspirations (imaginaire) based on the ideas of Emile Durkheim.

Technological changes of the 20th century led to a qualitative shift (a "turning point") in living conditions with the imagination turning into a social fact as a result. Appadurai identifies a number of features which the modern era introduces into the process of imagination. *First of all*, if earlier the imagination was mainly the domain of art, today it is included in the logic of everyday life and becomes a part of the daily mental practice of people. *Secondly*, we must admit the failure of the simplistic critique of mass culture by representatives of the Frankfurt School and the view of the modern world as an "iron cage" according to which imagination is inhibited by the forces of commercialization, industrial capitalism, and the general regulation and secularization of the world as offered by Weber (N. Elias, D. Bell, and others). Appadurai believes that there is no real evidence of the disappearance of religions, nations, and the triumph of rationalism, but rather we can see their mutation and the redefining of the relative ratio of the global and the local. Moreover, the media are not the only tool of the "Big Brother" used to stupefy the masses. In addition to "indoctrination" and unification they produce irony and a critical attitude to reality and everyday creativity. Housewives, trying to build their own lives following soup operas they watch serve as a clear evidence of just that. So we have to separate the concept of social imagination from fantasy as an escape from reality. If the imagination has a potential to create collective identities then fantasy concerns mostly the individual. *Thirdly*, collective imagination is acquiring more importance initiated primarily by the media. Even though in various kinds of transnational communities (online communities, etc.) different local experiences merge participants still feel their belonging to the whole. As a result, social imagination becomes a kind of space for people to fight for the inclusion of the global into the experience of everyday life.

Here we face the problem of the language description of the role of the imagination in social life without its reference to a particular locality in a situation of an ever-increasing globalization and de-territorialization. Appadurai suggests using metaphors of scapes, i.e.,

original landscapes of different levels of length which interact with each other and create organizing frameworks for global cultural flows.[61] Global flows function in the interaction, crossings and gaps between scapes. The latter are not objective realities but peculiar perspectives of the perception of reality constructed by various social actors (states, diasporas, individuals, etc.). Scapes serve as building blocks of imaginary worlds and permeate social imagination at the grassroots level of society. Appadurai identifies ethnoscapes, mediascapes, financial scapes, and techno- and ideascapes while the contemporary world is characterized by an ever deeper division of global flows in relation to the frames of perception of individual scapes. Scapes specifically have an ability to consolidate and institutionalize the imagination at the grassroots level of perception.

The downside of the strengthening of global transnational processes is a new location, when huge numbers of people are re-assigned to a certain territory and are denied access to world's goods; their "voices" are not heard and this results in the aggravation of social contradictions. We could play with a new social dynamic to the benefit of all by referring to the concept of "globalization from below". In his "Grassroots globalization and the research imagination" Appadurai writes that during the period of the shortage of consolidation mechanisms in a situation of the weakening of the power of nation states and the influence of traditional hierarchical organizations social imagination is the key factor that contributes to the emergence of social control on a new level. "While the global capital and the system of nation-states set the conditions of the emerged world order, the world order of institutions shows what we can call "grassroots globalization" or "globalization from below"[62] which is a kind of a conceptual alternative to the neoliberal understanding of the globalization discourse (as globalism).

The central motif of Appadurai's work is the production of knowledge in the contemporary world. Today we can see an obvious dissonance between the knowledge about the world offered by the academic scientific community, and their local variations, as well as between the "globalization of knowledge" and "knowledge of globalization". The provided knowledge and social structure are inseparable from each other because cognitive schemes construct our perception of reality.[63] This problem requires special attention. The claim of the academic community to universality and objectivity *cannot give voice to the knowledge "from below"*. However, it is not only naïve but also hypocritical to talk about a successful construction of a global civil society without this voice. Appadurai identifies three "gaps" in the approaches of most modern researchers working with the theme of globalization and education. These gaps include the lack of critical spatial analytics; alternative knowledge, and knowledge of the subordinate (subalterna); the lack of research reflection on the changed landscape and politics of the democratic representation of global processes. Obviously, there is a need to connect visions from various regions of the world, which is also a condition for the internationalization of research. Therefore, the main task of the scientific community today is to create a new research landscape of globalization, which should take into account *the mechanisms of accepting globalization at the grassroots level of society*.

If we define intellectuals as those who are able to "be the first to smell something important" (in Habermas's sense) then there is no place for them in modern society as the once adopted rational truth does not need to be interpreted and criticized for reflection can destroy its legitimacy. The entire European colonial discourse was connected with such knowledge status, but global changes of the past century completely undermined such ideas.[64] With the development of mass education, the improvement of its quality, and the spread of various types of multimedia and distance technology knowledge is no longer the prerogative of the elite and has become accessible for everyone (that is why contemporary society is called the *"society of knowledge"*). Knowledge is acquiring more and more connections with everyday practices and is constructed "from below" by ordinary people. Many researchers pay attention to the fact that these processes have not only positive but also negative aspects. Because all recognized authorities disappear knowledge and ignorance increase exponentially, and, respectively, the level of risk increases as well; risks become global. Appadurai calls attention to the fact that the problem of the regressive globalization is becoming more acute when the processes of globalization in particular localities can be turned in the opposite direction (under the excuse of the choice of the "third way" of development, "return to basics", and "preservation of sovereignty" which we can see in the post-Soviet space.) Refocusing the attention of the academic community on the institutes, horizons and vocabularies of globalization at the grassroots level will allow to conceptualize the problem of adaptation of certain localities to the realities of the dynamic world in a new way.[65] Appaduarai believes that this will limit negative effects of globalization.

We would like to mention U. Beck's project of building cosmopolitan sociology. He believed that globalization is a non-linear dialectic process in which the global and the local co-exist not so much like cultural contradictions but more like interconnected mutually implicit principles.[66] In this case cosmopolitanism can be treated as a starting point for the empirical research of the internalized globalization ("globalization from within") that develops within the frames of specific localities and to a great extent transforms everyday consciousness and identity. This allows looking at reality from a new still unlimited angle and this may allow seeing problems and phenomena which have not been yet publicly actualized.

Again we have to deal with the ethical dimension of grassroots sociality. Let's consider some ideas of Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor who when offering his version of the concept of the social imaginary raises and thoroughly studies the issues of ethics and construction of a new world order in a modern globalized world through the prism of the social imaginary. Using Taylor's conceptual apparatus we can generalize the meaning of the contemporary social theory addressing the ethical dimension of the imaginary and the constructed social structure. We should emphasize that the ethical dimension is one of the central themes of the functioning of grassroots society. In general, institutions in grassroots society have not yet been formed while the rules and regulations are already being designed and manifest themselves in practice. Grassroots society turns out to be a

substrate for the formation of some primary communities in the context of contemporary globalization identifying new forms of individualization which are primarily regulated by morals.

Largely relying on the ideas of Benedict Anderson, Taylor notes an unprecedented increase in the importance of the social imaginary in contemporary societies. Taylor bases his opinion on the presence of three levels of understanding. The most abstract is the level of philosophical and other theories including detailed doctrines about society, the divine and cosmos. On the other hand, the level of habitus or "embodied understanding" is closer to practice; it is a non-explicate understanding of how to act in certain situations. Imaginary is located between these levels. Expressed in rituals, symbols and works of art, it is more explicit than habits and encourages imitation. Cultivated by the habitus, the social imaginary becomes a form of expression, giving meaning and legitimacy to our common practices. Taylor believes that the social imaginary suggests something much broader and deeper than the intellectual schemes if one is to interpret social reality: "I use the term imaginary, (i) because I am rather interested in the way in which ordinary people "imagine" their social environment and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms but is embodied in visual images, stories and legends. In addition, (ii) theory is a prerogative of the minority, whereas what is interesting about the social imaginary is that it is shared by large groups of people, if not by the whole of society. This leads to the third difference: (iii) the social imaginary is a common understanding that makes common practices and a general sense of legitimacy possible."[67] In other words, Taylor, like Appadurai, focuses on *the practice of collective representations, which are performed in local and everyday experiences*. If Appadurai pays most of his attention to the work of imagination, mediated media and mass migration, then Taylor is trying to penetrate "closer to the roots" focusing on the regulatory adjustments of social imagination the purpose of which is to offer a "better explanation" (best account) of the meaning of our lives.

The social imaginary is complex and at any given time includes a range of meanings and expectations enabling us to perform collective daily practices. The individual cannot but has social imagination. He cannot leave "it"; beliefs, stories, and rules are passed on from generation to generation creating a certain habitus (in Bourdieu's sense). The construction of social reality as such is always an intertwining of ideas, practices, and the social imaginary, where each element, according to Taylor, is important. But history shows that without the consideration of varieties of the social imaginary of a specific locality the development of society may slow down (a positive example of this is the institutionalization of democracy in the United States). We should note that without the involvement of social imagination the legitimating of anything is not possible, and so the state, which is usually the most powerful social agent, always strives to influence the construction of a particular variant of the social imaginary.

The reference to the concept of the social imaginary has a special practical importance for the realities of Belarus. The model of the social imaginary that is definite and deliberately designed by power is one of the key aspects of a successful functioning of a

formal symbolic universum. The legitimation of the existing institutional order is due not only to the imposition of "state ideology" (coupled with cost-effective provisions of the social contract, etc.), but also implies the acceptance by citizens of this order on the pre-reflective, pre-theoretical level. This logic is more or less common to all communities, but in the situation of non-free countries it acquires utmost importance. This is not just a simple agreement with a proposed political course; rather it is an unconscious acceptance of it as a natural given, and, therefore, the basis of social landscape that cannot be challenged, "the Republic of Belarus is a country for the people". This creates an illusion of objectivity of that version of reality that is offered by the authority. The construction of an alternative project of the social imaginary will undoubtedly reveal the secret of the imaginary of the power that constructs Belarusian reality. Only in this case the claim to success of an alternative political project could be potentially realized. In all other cases, actions of the opposition will be considered in the logic of the official version of the social imaginary by the majority, i.e., from the very beginning they will be considered anti-popular and bear the risk of destabilizing the natural "order". Finally, since social practices are based on the social imaginary, the change of power in the country, initiated by citizens "from below" can only happen in the event of the acceptance by the majority of the alternative project of the imaginary (which must be pre-designed and this is particularly relevant for Belarus!).

Taylor focuses on the definition of the social imaginary as a non-theoretical understanding for which we can offer no boundaries and once and for all set rules, namely, "the ways by means of which people imagine their social existence, how they suit one another, what expectations they have and what deeper normative notions and images are built into these expectations".[68] This understanding of the imaginary is both actual and normative: we have a sense of how things usually happen, but it is interwoven with the idea of how things should happen. An example of this is the general election where the "background understanding" that is the essence of the very act of voting finds its expression in the confidence in the joint activity of all citizens, where each individual makes a choice among the same set of alternatives, and in the end, these individual choices together turn into one collective decision. In this case we can deal with our ability to identify actions which can be in appropriate for the compliance with norms (falsification , etc.). The ability to recognize the "ideal case" does not seem to be obvious in this understanding of norms; in our example it is an election in which the voices of all voters could be heard.

Here, in this broader understanding outside of the given ideal case, the notion of the moral order as a certain meaning which makes norms and ideals feasible is actualized.[69] The imaginary is actually a certain understanding of the moral order conferring normative meanings to our practices; these meanings imply verbal and imaginative articulation. If we radicalize this idea, then without a moral order serious social transformation [for the better] is impossible. People do not participate in protests for the sake of utopia or for the impossible. Taylor gives an example of people who went to Tiananmen Square during the events in Beijing who believed (knew) that they can live in a democratic society, and de-

spite the skepticism of the majority, can overthrow the dictatorship. And it is unthinkable without the understanding of a wider context and without references to ethical standards.

The essence of Taylor's hypothesis is that *"a new concept of the moral order of society is central to the Western version of modernity"*.[70] This new vision of the moral order arises in the 17th century in Locke and Grotius's theory of natural law as a response to the disorder caused by the changing role of religion in society. The idea of a new moral order in time became an integral component of the modern social imaginary spreading to all Western societies. The normative moral order of modernity is based on *mutual respect and emphasis on the interdependence of all members of society*. If we talk about the forms of the modern version of the social imaginary then we can say that it is based on three components: economy, public sphere and people's sovereignty. Individuals complement each other, supporting common security and engaging in an economic exchange. This point was included in the older moral order: the clergy prayed for the uninitiated, but the uninitiated worked for the clergy. The main difference of the moral order of modernity is that the functional structure of the differentiation of contemporary societies has no ontological status of the hierarchy. The mobility, both vertical and horizontal, increased. profession Earlier one could be called a moral citizen perhaps only if one was included in the hierarchy of a larger social whole, which was beyond the competence of the individual (the order was already present "in things"). Today we are talking about the possibility of the realization of the moral order of *"here and now" in the context of communication.*

Changes in the social configurations of recent decades lead to the need to update the moral order of modernity taking into account the new conception of man and a new understanding of the social. Taylor believes that the main "diseases" of modernity are individualism, instrumental thinking, and the individual's loss of real freedom. The result of individualism is that people no longer feel a "sense of higher purpose, of something that is worth dying for"[71] concentrating on the individual's inner circle; that results in "ethical entropy". The predominance of the instrumental thinking in society leads to the evaluation of life in terms of effectiveness and efficiency and loss of the spiritual component. The maximum atomization of society leads to the loss by citizens of the real freedom and that once again actualizes the important issue of the existence of a paternalistic government. Taylor believes that in order to reduce the impact of these phenomena on human life we should restore the lost status of ethics while ethics should be viewed in a modern, "communitarian" sense of the word.

Today the moral order changes the traditional ways of interdependence, increasing the role of "individualism" at the expense of "community". If before the rules of the collective seemed to be the only guarantee of survival, now the project of individualism is so ingrained in the social imaginary, that we cannot even imagine the existence of other possible options. The political community, as it is seen by the contemporary liberal theory, should serve the interests and rights of people; however, in reality the neutral doctrine of the "general welfare" turns into individualism and utilitarianism.[72] "Exclusive humanism" as a product of the modern process of secularization creates morality that does not require

a reference to the transcendent but is wholly centered on the "buffered" individual capable of personally changing social configurations.[73] However, the freedom to be yourself can have another side, namely, the feeling of loneliness and alienation from the world. That is why it is crucial to revive the importance of religion, ethics, and community values. Taylor believes that personalization and return to spirituality are consistent with each other; one should only correctly identify the point of contact. It is true though that this is where the main problem is hidden, and therefore, the question of how to practically implement these ideas requires further serious research.[74]

According to Taylor, the main advantage of community solidarity and, consequently, the advantage of the communitarian moral order, is to provide more opportunities for individuals in the development and manifestation of their "I". It is not enough to have an ability to independently choose life's landmarks as authenticity can completely define itself only in a dialogue and is always ontologically associated with the recognition of the Other[75], which implies an element of comparison and difference.[76] Thus, we can speak about the presence in every society of supra-individual values; the possibility of self-realization of the subject is realized in respect to these values while they must appeal to the dialogic manner of our existence in the social world.

Conclusion

Based on the research results, we can identify essential characteristics and structural elements of "grassroots society".

1. Grassroots society is in constant interaction and interweaving with the concepts of *everydayness and privacy* redefining the importance of the latter. The peculiarity of this concept operating is in its projective orientation as something that in future can "grow from the roots of grass" acquiring its activity through the creating of new identities, communities, and institutions at the grassroots level.

2. The starting point in the discussion of the concept of grassroots society is the recognition of the destruction of former modern institutions and identities at all levels of social organization as a result of which life moves from the historical and political poles to the practices of privacy and everydayness. This leads to the need to move the analysis of society to the level of grassroots sociality and opens up a prospect for the construction of *new forms of social and political solidarity "from below"*.

3. Today, consumption practices are the matrix of the conceptualization of social life. If earlier the first task of the individual was to "live like everyone else", then life organized around the act of consumption is regulated by constantly changing desires. This leads to a particular closeness of the sphere of everydayness and the reduction of the invidivual to the needs.

4. The growth of individualization in society is due to the intensification of globalization processes which result in an increase in uncertainty, insecurity, and risks. The paradox of "institutionalized individualism" is that people concentrate on their personal life

projects while the national government also produces individualization in the form of its standardization.

5. Social regression leads to the emergence of the phenomenon of the masses ("silent majority") in grassroots society. The masses do not participate in public politics and do not show any civil engagement; politics is isolated from them. The meaning of life is reoriented from the idea to change the world to the idea to live life as it is. However, hyperconformism is not just an agreement with the government meaning an agreement with the strong, but rather is a model of autonomy or sovereignty as a form of active resistance to political manipulation. Social fragmentation leads to the emergence at the grassroots level of new forms of organization in the form of various communities or *"tribes"* in which individuals create a new form of solidarity on the basis of an affective unity principle.

6. The erosion of citizenship, collectivism, and politics leads to the need to establish their new forms resulting in the emergence of a new ethics. *The democratization of the private* sphere is connected with the transformations of intimacy seen as a growth of different behaviors and mentality; it is defined by new *"life politics"* and affects the reorganization of society on a macro level. If the modern "emancipatory politics" was the politics of life chances, then the "life politics" concerns the lifestyle itself and works with the concept of the transformative power as the politics of self-actualization.

7. The defining phenomena of our time are the issues of security and trust. Collective relations have been driven out, but they re-appear if they find common ground with the private sphere. While at the level of grassroots society contradictions become more intense and activity increases at the level of the public, they decrease at the public level. This "bias" leads to the fact that society is literally beginning to change from below. Subpolitics of grassroots society limits the claims of the national state to legitimacy, and therefore, the question about the potential of grassroots institutions of society is open.

8. Society acquires a specific form of organization the morphology of which can be determined through the metaphor of a "network". It is through the networks of the social structure that the new sociality "is growing" today. The authority moves to the level of grassroots society because the network organization manifests itself most clearly on that particular level. At the grassroots level, there is an active generation of new identities. It turns out to be its primary institutionalization allowing hidden sociality to move from the shadow to the public arena. The importance of "projective identities" (new social movements, etc.) that do not grow out of the traditional civil society increases for their social logic was originally alternative to the logic of social institutions, and therefore, has a potential to change the latter.

9. Today's society is characterized by a global *change of forms of the social imaginary* as a specific understanding that makes common practices and a general sense of legitimacy possible. Electronic media and mass migration produce a major influence on the modern social imaginary. "The work of imagination" becomes part of the daily mental practice of ordinary people. Scapes are designed prospects of the perception of the existing reality and

permeate social imagination securing and institutionalizing the imagined at the grassroots level of society.

10. Ethics is one of the central themes of the functioning of grassroots society and may have good prospects for a separate study, because institutions in grassroots society still do not work, but norms and regulations are being designed and manifest themselves in practice. Grassroots society acts as a substrate for the forming of primary communities in the context of contemporary globalization, identifying new forms of individualization regulated primarily by morality. Old forms of sociality got destroyed but people have not had time to adapt to new conditions having generated an updated version of the social imaginary. Reducing the influence of negative effects of dynamism of modernity can restore the lost status of ethics as a normative regulator of social life.

Summarizing, we can state that grassroots society has an ambivalent logic characterized by the breakdown of traditional forms of communities and institutions and the emergence of the new ones; the prevalence of consumption practices; the rise of individualism as a reaction to the risks of globalization; the democratization of the private sphere; hyperconformism along with creating their own "life politics"; the network morphology and the availability of one's own version of knowledge about "reality"; the rise of the importance of the social imaginary, and the need for new ethical regulators. The dynamism of the globalizing world leads to a change in the balance between the private and the public, the collective and the individual, ethics and politics, and thus, opens opportunities for "stepping into the light" and actualizing the potential for emerging communities and institutions of grassroots sociality.

We believe that the use of the concept of grassroots society for the study of social reality, in spite of its rather weak development at the moment, has good prospects as an important means of an adequate conceptualization of contemporary social dynamics. This is especially true for the post-Soviet context where classical instruments of social sciences and humanities often do not work (e.g., the failure of the transitory concept of democracy or of the concept of publicity); these instruments sometimes also interfere with relevant social research for they do not take into account regional specifics.

Let's identify *the perspectives of the consideration of these issues in relation to the situation in Belarus*. They concern the ethical dimension of grassroots sociality, the theory of social contracting, and a projective potential of grassroots society as the place of origin and processing of alternative institutions (online community and various grassroots organizations) in the case of a weakly developed civil society. In an ethical respect the interest is aroused by the reconstruction of values of grassroots society in the conditions of the growing uncertainty and risks of the globalizing world which will inevitably have a continually increasing impact on closed localities like "The Republic of Belarus". On the other hand, it is important to study the official "symbolic universum" as a social and moral resource of power that legitimizes the regime by including most of the population into the official project of the social imaginary. The concepts of Jean Baudrillard and M. Maffesoli showed that social life today hidden behind the official facade has an involutional perspective of

development; however, it can be described not only negatively as passivity and apathy, but also positively. In Belarus grassroots society can be articulated through the categorical apparatus of the theory of social contracting that keeps gaining popularity. "Captive" population enters into a kind of an unspoken social contract with the government, using it for its own benefit ("consuming the state") and ends up with the status of an autonomy at its grassroots. If we accept the idea that the system of management relies on reproductive economies of grassroots practices that either give to or take away from power legitimacy then it is possible to make a conclusion about a serious political potential of grassroots society.

Notes

1 Beck, U. The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies // Theory, Culture & Society, 2002, Vol. 19(1–2). P. 24.

2 See, for instance, Collins, H. Tacit Knowledge, Trust and the Q of Sapphire // Social Studies of Science. 2001. Vol.31 (1).

3 Berger, P., Lukman, T. Sotsialnoe konstruirovanie realnosti. Traktat po sotsiologii znanija. M.: Medium, 1995. P. 38.

4 Appadurai, A. Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination. Public Culture. 2000. Vol. 12 (1). P. 1-19.

5 Furs, V. Kontury sovremennoj kriticheskoj teorii. Minsk. EGU, 2002. P. 119.

6 Bodrijar, Zh. Obshchestvo potreblenija. Ego mify i struktury. M.: Respublika, 2006. P. 199.

7 See: Lash S. // Dead Symbols: An Introduction, Theory, Culture and Society. 1995. Vol. 12 (4); Lee, L.R. M.: The Tao of Exchange – Ideology and Cosmology in Baudrillard's Fatalism, Thesis Eleven, 1998. Vol. 52 (1).

8 Compare with H. Marcuse's thesis that in the epoch of "a one-dimensional man" there can be no alienation and utopia as the man is lost in the society of consumption; there can only be a dynamics of fashion but not a system re-organization. Markuze, G. Odnomernyj chelovek. V kn.: Amerikanskaja sotsiologicheskaja mysl'. Teksty / pod. red. V.I. Dobren'kova. M.: Izd-vo MGU, 1994. P. 121-146.

9 Bodrijar, Zh. Simvolicheskij obmen i smert'. M.: Dobrosvet, 2000. P. 52.

10 Bodrijar, Zh. V teni molchalivogo bolshinstva. M., 2002. P. 26.

11 See: Merrin, W. Television is Killing the Art of Symbolic Exchange: Baudrillard's Theory of Communication. Theory, Culture and Society. 1999. Vol. 16 (3).

12 See: Jacobsen, M.H., Marshman S. Bauman's Metaphors: The Poetic Imagination in Sociology // Current Sociology. 2008. Vol. 56 (5).

13 Bauman, Z. Liquid Modernity. London: Polity, 2000. P. 8.

14 Bauman, Z. Individualizirovannoe obshchestvo. M.: Logos, 2005. P. 316.

15 Ibid. P. 139.

16 To learn more about the Ukrainian experience of the transformation of relations between public and private spheres read: Kobets, R. "Intimizatsija" publichnosti – postsovetskij put' "raskoldovyvanija" politiki v Ukraine. V kn.: Postsovetskaja publichnost': Belarus, Ukraina: sb. nauch. statej / pod red. V. Fursa. Vilnius: EHU, 2008. P. 76-91.

17 Bauman, Z. Liquid Modernity. London: Polity, 2000. P. 74.

[18] Bauman, Z. Sociological Theory of Postmodernity // Readings in Contemporary. Political Sociology. Oxford, 2000. P. 238-249.

[19] See: Bauman, Z. Postmodern Ethics. Oxford, 1993. Bauman, Z. Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.

[20] Lash, S. Dead Symbols: An Introduction // Theory, Culture and Society. 1995. Vol. 12 (4). P. 76-77.

[21] To learn more about power strategies of production of a pathogenic regression of an individual read: Furs, V. Belorusskaja "realnost'" v sisteme koordinat globalizatsii (postanovka voprosa) // Topos. 2005. N 1 (10).

[22] Bauman, Z. Individualizirovannoe obshchestvo. M.: Logos, 2005. P. LXIII.

[23] See: Marotta, V. Zygmant Bauman: Order, Strangerhood and Freedom // Thesis Eleven. 2002. Vol. 70 (1).

[24] Within the framework of our research we find it very interesting and important to look at the analysis conducted by Bauman of directions of changes of city space during post-modernity when a peculiar interrelation of global and local processes, the opposition of "space of flows" and "space of place" set very unique contours of grassroots social processes, "Contemporary cities are the battlegrounds on which global powers and stubbornly local meanings and identities meet, clash, struggle and seek a satisfactory, or just bearable, settlement – a mode of cohabitation that is hoped to be a lasting peace but as a rule proves to be but an armistice, an interval to repair the broken defences and re-deploy the fighting units." (Bauman, Z. City of Fears, City of Hopes. London: Goldsmith's College, 2003. P. 21). Modern cities which have become a "mass industry of strangers" leading to the most unexpected "grassroots" social forms are torn by "mixofobia", i.e., a negative reaction to a striking variety of human types and images that can be met on the streets of these cities. They arouse in people an aspiration for "islands of similarity and sameness amidst the sea of variety and difference" as an "insurance against risks" and "mixophilia", i.e., an aspiration for a charming variety of a city life that creates space for the realization of most various opportunities (Ibid. P. 31-33). "The city is the dumping side for anxieties and apprehensions generated by globally induced uncertainty and insecurity; but the city is as well the training ground where the means to placate and disperse that uncertainty and insecurity can be experimented with, tried out and eventually learned and adopted" (Ibid. P. 38). See also: Sennet, P. Kapitalism v bolshom gorode: globalizatsija, gibkost' i bezrazlichie // Logos. 2008. N 3.

[25] Giddens, A. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1991. P. 75.

[26] Furs, V. Kontury sovremennoj kriticheskoj teorii. Minsk: EGU, 2002. P. 156-157.

[27] To learn more about the critique of methodology notions of classic sociology and the need of a new understanding of the social: Giddens, A. Nine Theses on the Future of Sociology. In: A. Giddens. Social Theory and Modern Sociology. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987, ch. 2. P. 22–51; Giddens, A. The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. L: Polity, 1984; Furs, V. Sotsialnaja teorija v menyajushchemsya mire: k dinamicheskoj kontseptsii sotsialnogo // Problemos. Vilnius. 2004. N 66 (1). P. 23-39; Touraine, A. Sociology without Societies: Pressures for Continuity in the Context of Globalization, Current Sociology. 2003. Vol. 51 (2). P. 123-131.

[28] Giddens, A. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991. P. 32.

29 To learn more about the issue of trust in society read: Fukuyama, F Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. Free Press, 1995; 2004. Seligmen, A. The Problem of Trust. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton. University Press, 1997.

30 See: Giddens, A. The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies. Cambridge: Polity. 1995; Giddens, A. Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives. London : Profile, 1999.

31 See also: Fuko, M. Ispolzovanie udovolstvij. Istorija seksualnosti. 2004. T. 2. SPb.: Akademicheskij proekt.

32 See: Bauman, Z. Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001.

33 Giddens A. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991. P. 214.

34 See: Beck, U., Bonss, W., and Lau, C. The Theory of Reflexive Modernization: Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme. Theory, Culture and Society. 2003. Vol. 20 (2); Elliott, A. Beck's Sociology of Risk: A Critical Assessment, Sociology. 2002. Vol. 36 (2).

35 Beck, U. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. L.: Sage, 1992.

36 The example of this is the ideal of a "regular female biography" that gets transformed into a forced task of a modern woman to lead a double life, that of a housewife and of a professional at work.

37 Beck, U. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. L.: Sage, 1992. P. 132.

38 See: Beck, U. The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies // Theory, Culture & Society, 2002, Vol. 19 (1-2).

39 Bek, U. Chto takoe globalizatsija? Oshibki globalizma – otvety na globalizatsiju. M.: Progress-Traditsija, 2001. P. 42-43.

40 See: Robertson, R. Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity. In Featherstone, M., Lash, S. Global Modernities. London: Sage, 1995.

41 Castells, M. Stanovlenie obshchestva setevyh struktur. V kn.: Novaja postindustrialnaja volna na Zapade. Antologija. M.: Academia, 1999. P. 492-505.

42 See: Halcli, A. Webster F. Inequality and Mobilization in The Information Age, European Journal of Social Theory. 2000. Vol. 3 (1).

43 See: Castells, M. The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 2008. Vol. 616 (1).

44 To learn more about the role of experts in modern society read: Bauman, Z. Zakonodateli i tolkovateli // Neprikosnovennyj zapas. 2003. N 1.

45 Castells, M. Mogushchestvo samobytnosti // Novaja postindustrialnaja volna na Zapade. Antologija. M.: Academia, 1999. P. 308.

46 See, for instance: Anheier, H., Glasius, M. and Kaldor, M. Global Civil Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2001. Chandler, D. Constructing Global Civil Society: Morality and Power in International Relations. Palgrave-Macmillan. 2004. J. Urry's ideas are also interesting: Urry, J. Mobile Sociology. British Journal of Sociology. 2000. Vol. 51 (1). P. 185-203; Urry, J. Sociology Beyond Societies. London: Routledge, 2000.

47 Castells, M. The Informational City: Information, Technology, Economic Restructuring and the Urban-Regional Process. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989. P. 228.

48 See: Smart, B. A Political Economy of New Times?: Critical Reflections on the Network Society and the Ethos of Informational Capitalism, European Journal of Social Theory. 2000. Vol. 3 (1); Westenholz, A. Identity Work and Meaning Arena: Beyond Actor/Structure and Micro/Macro Distinctions in an Empirical, American Behavioral Scientist, 2006. Vol. 49 (7).

49 See the statement of the international law protection organization "Reporters Without Borders" from 6.01.2010 regarding the project of the Decree of the President of the Republic of Belarus "O merah po sovershenstvovaniju ispolzovanija natsionalnogo segmenta globalnoj kompjuternoj seti Internet": Government tightens grip on Internet. <http://www.rsf.org/Government-tightens-grip-on.html>

50 According to art. 193.1 of the Penal Code of the Republic of Belarus, "illegal organization or activity of public organizations, religious groups or foundations as well as participation in their activities" can be subject to imprisonment from six months up to two years: <http://pravo.kulichki.com/vip/uk/index.htm>

51 See, for instance: Juris, J.S. The New Digital Media and Activist Networking within Anti-Corporate Globalization Movements // The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2005. Vol. 597 (I). Without getting into details we should also mention A. Melucci's analysis of specific ("grassroots" in our language) practices of new social movements which go beyond the borders of traditional civil society and which are a challenge to traditional political and other codes (For more details see: Melucci, A. Social Movements and the Democratization of Everyday Life. Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives. London: Verso, 1988. Melucci, A. Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age. Cambridge, UK, 1996).

52 See: Maffesoli, M. The Social Ambiance // Current Sociology. 1993. Vol. 41 (2).

53 See: Maffesoli, M. The Sociology of Everyday Life (Epistemological Elements). Current Sociology. 1989. Vol. 37 (1). P. 1-16.

54 See: Deleuze, G., Guattari, F. Kapitalizm i shizofrenija. Anti-Edip. M.: INION, 1990.

55 Maffesoli, M. Okoldovannost' mira ili bozhestvennoe sotsialnoe. M.: Progress, 1991. P. 277.

56 Maffesoli, M.: The Social Ambiance. Current Sociology. 1993. Vol. 41 (2). P. 9.

57 Dougiamas, M. A journey into Constructivism. [cited December 5, 2009]. 1998. <http://dougiamas.com/writing/constructivism.html>

58 See: Kenway, J., Fahey, J. A Transgressive Global Research Imaginitation. Thesis Eleven, 2009. Vol. 96 (1).

59 Castoriadis, C. The Imaginary Institution of Society. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987. P. 127.

60 Appadurai, A. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996. P. 2.

61 Appadurai, A. Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Culture Economy. The Phantom Public Sphere. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.

62 Appadurai, A. Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination. Public Culture, 2000. #12. P. 17.

63 According to the methodological idea of social constructivism. See, for instance: Berger, P., Lukman, T. Sotsialnoe konstruirovanie realnosti. Traktat po sotsiologii znanija. M.: Medium, 1995.

64 Milliken, Dzh. Postmodernizm i professionalism v vysshem obrazovanii // Vysshee obrazovanie v Evrope. T. XXIX. N 1, 2004.

65 Eisenstadt's concept of "multiple modernity" also arouses a lot of interest and has a potential for analysis within this frame. For more details see: Eisenstadt, Sh. Multiple Modernities. Daedalus. 2000. Vol. 129 (1). P. 1-29; Eisenstadt, Sh. Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and Revolution: The Jacobin Dimension of Modernity. Cambridge, 1999. Eizenshtadt, Sh., Shluhter, V. Puti k razlichnym variantam rannej sovremmenosti: sravnitelnyj obzor // Prognozis: zhurnal o budushchem. 2007. N 2 (10). P. 213-214.

66 See: Beck, U. The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies // Theory, Culture & Society, 2002, Vol. 19(1–2) .

67 Taylor, Ch. Modern Social Imaginaries. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004. P. 19.

68 Ibid. P. 19.

69 It is interesting to look at the correlation between the arguments of Taylor and "background practices" of L. Wittgenstein. The latter believed that in every specific society there is always a hidden normative cultural layer, a certain number of concessions regarding the life style and specifics of interaction with others. Unconsciously addressing these first primary discourses individuals build their own original project of identity. However, there is no simple correspondence between our language and reality just like there is no single right language for the reflection of reality. That is why Wittgenstein offers to conceptualize social practices through the concept of a "language game", i.e., a mobile game of contexts of perception and usage. Words studied in isolation have only hidden meanings and receive their real meaning and embodiment in the original "forms of life" only in a specific context of usage. For more details see: Vitgenshtein, L. Logiko-filosofskij traktat. M.: Nauka. 2009.

70 Taylor, Ch. Modern Social Imaginaries. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004. P. 3.

71 Tajlor, Ch. Etika avtentichnosti. K.: Duh i Litera, 2002. P. 7.

72 See: Tajlor, Ch. Nerazlozhimo sotsialnye blaga // Neprikosnovennyj zapas. 2001. N 4.

73 Taylor, Ch. Modern Social Imaginaries. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004. P. 591-592.

74 See: Levy, N. Charles Taylor on Overcoming Incommensurability // Philosophy and Social Criticism. 2000. Vol. 26 (5); Morello, G. Charles Taylor's. 'Imaginary' and "Best Account' in Latin America // Philosophy and Social Criticism. 2007. Vol. 33 (5).

75 Taylor, Ch. The Politics of Recognition. Multiculturalism: Examining of Politics of Recognition. Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1994. P. 32-33.

76 In this respect Taylor's ideas are very similar to A. Honneth's theory of intersubjectivity. See, for instance: Honneth, A. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. MITPress, 1996.

Anatoly Pankovsky

IN THE SHADOW OF SOCIAL CONTRACT

Abstract

The content of the paper is the reinterpretation of research of social contracts (implicit agreements between the state and social groups) carried out by the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies. Subject area is the limits of applicability of contract stories to describe the Belarusian reality in the aspect of stability of the political regime and social circumstances in general. The hypothesis underlying the study treats social contracting as hypocrisy, while the Belarusian social contract in its actual incarnation is not the system of conditions, but a set of conventions, on the other side of which operate "shadow" social practices. The study also analyzes the political implications of the main presumptions of contract theories. The basis of the research strategy are hypothesizes proposed by P. Rozanvallon, P. Bourdieu and Q. Skinner.

> According to Hippocrates's tradition real medicine begins with a real knowledge of invisible diseases, i.e. facts that the patient does not speak about, either because he is not aware of them or because he forgets to bring them out. Social science is similar in that it attempts to realize and understand the true causes of social evil which manifests itself in the form of social signs that are difficult to interpret due to the fact that they seem too obvious.
>
> *Pierre Bourdieu, "Sociology and Democracy"*

If we define the limits of the adequate application of social contract theories in present circumstances then it is, rather, the field of the imaginary and utopia rather than the sphere of the real. Any uto-

pia lives until new historical conditions that can invalidate it emerge. Historical conditions for an effective and active social contract in Belarus have not developed yet, but that does not mean that this idea has a bad future. In other words, the idea of a social contract is good in its statutory embodiment, since it can form a basis of a promising political strategy needed for a positive transformation of reality while in its "realistic" incarnation used to identify the logic of the "shadow" processes of condensing the "stability" of the socio-political system it is, in general, not so effective.

Stability or sustainability is the most obvious and yet most mysterious phenomenon of Belarusian circumstances (or in a wider sense of post-Soviet circumstances) supported by the fatalism of "explanatory" contractualism. We could ask ourselves paraphrasing T. Gurr, "Why men don't rebel?"[1] People do not protest because they agree "with the state of affairs in the country determined by the authorities".[2] Why do they agree to such a state of affairs? – Because they are committed to the social contract that registers the calculus of consent. This self-sufficient tautology behind the research conducted under the auspices of the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies initially contains all answers regarding the "puzzle of stability" but is coyly silent about the issues that might be raised in relation to the conditions of occurrence of the "negotiation process" concerning the exchange of basic public goods including citizens' freedom. There is a wide range of ways how the state can deal with social transfers such as a total removal of pensions in Turkmenistan, monetization in Russia, or an unreformed pension system in Belarus. The system did not even "move" in these countries and this circumstance makes one look differently at the role of the contract in post-Soviet conditions.

I would like to be understood correctly for I do not deny the existence of a social contract, or, better, a differentiated system of implicit agreements between the state and "core" social groups; however, the problem of the stability of the political system does not directly correlate with this. The question concerns the applicability of the social contract theory in an authoritarian state. The hypothesis underlying the following arguments relates to social hypocrisy, and in this sense, indeed, "social contract" is a concept that is hard to underestimate in present circumstances, for the simulation of the performance of contractual agreements by agents is at the very heart of social and political life in Belarus. An explicit example of such a simulation is the attitude of the ruling class represented by Lukashenko regime the highest embodiment of which is the Constitutional Treaty. The Belarusian social contract in its current incarnation is not *a system of conditions, but a set of conventions.* It is a pretty simple statement but one will need to do some intellectual work to come to this conclusion.

Elements of historical reconstruction: contract, market, political market

The research strategy of social contracting does not have a potential of universal applicability, and in this sense it is advisable to look at its roots, basic presumptions, and, finally,

to evaluate the modernization radicalism of the contract theory as applied to the observed post-Soviet reality.

The concept of "public contract" (a literal translation of the term "social contract"), presented in the writings of Hobbes (XVII c.), Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (XVIII c.), was born in an era of religious wars, when the feudal regulation consecrated by traditions gradually gave place to the conscious regulation of civil society. The development of contract ethics and culture of agreement compliance was an imperative, and in this sense, the social contract theory was originally an illusion of a specific type. Depersonalization as an integral condition of the disappointment with the social world as seen by Hobbes is not listed as a key intellectual figure but "Leviathan" states the fundamental position which is both a cause and a consequence of the formation of stable monopolies of force: due to the social contract citizens change the horizons of expectations in relation to each other; they do not fear for their investments and property; they gradually get used to their horrible Leviathan beginning to trust him, and slowly create a new situation (one can modify Hobbes and quietly move to Locke). We can call it a "bourgeois revolution"; the natural result of it is that citizens become minority shareholders of the state seen as a company producing security and stability.

In short, it was enough for the XVIII century thinkers to assume that collisions of politics can be resolved without any reference to religious authority, through the mechanics of intellectual principles and an imaginary involvement into politics of many people who initially did not even think about it, and so the royal throne collapsed. Thus, in modern times, the "body of the King" as a regulator that is unfathomable in its essence and a metaphysical center of power, replaced the mechanical doll of the political self-regulation while two competing ideas, those of the contract and the market, in fact, asked to be included into its foundation.

In his brilliant book "Utopian capitalism. A history of the idea of the market"[3] Pierre Rosanvallon writes that the concept of the market in the form in which it was presented in the XVIII century in the writings of Scottish economists (primarily, those of Adam Smith) had, first of all, a sociological and political character. The concept of the market is not "technical" (defining a way to regulate economic activity through freely formed prices) and is actively opposed to the idea of the social contract as a self-regulating *unmediated* civil society. Rosanvallon believes that the main feature of this concept is the total elimination of the political for the market but not politics should govern the society. Thus, the role of the "invisible hand" of the market is not limited to the functions of the organization of economic activity; it is given more radical importance both socially and politically. From this point of view, Adam Smith, a striking example of anti-Rousseauism, is not so much the founding father of modern economics as a theorist of withering politics.[4] Rosanvallon concludes that this apolitical (in the strict sense of the word) interpretation offers to see in the market society an archetype of a new understanding of the social as it is not a (political) contract but an (economic) market that is a true regulator of society and not just economy.

Market creates an archetype of a non-hierarchical system within the frame of which decisions independent of one's will and moreover personalized will are made. Formal procedures and professional logic replace arbitrariness. The process continuing up to this day forms the main feature of modern societies and causes the emergence of a new understanding of the concept of social change. Rosanvallon believes that in a strictly procedural, i.e., depersonalized and law obeying space there is no possibility for the revolutions of the former type, as the leading authority which could be removed or replaced disappears. He also adds that perhaps in the market there is no room for these uprisings, as evidenced by certain social fatalism in relation to the phenomenon of unemployment.

Such fatalism was relatively easily moved into the research conducted by BISS. "Groups of contract", in particular the bureaucracy and retirees, of course, do not think about social discontent as they are assigned to a social contract (agreement) according to the rules of the game. This effect is logical since the theoretical concepts that underpin the feasibility study as they took shape in the post-war years (in the 1950-60s) have already produced an impressive migration of concepts from economics to political science having combined competing ideas of contract and market self-regulation and there is hardly any room left for political games.

The interpretation of politics as a process of exchange goes back to the thesis of Swedish economist Knut Wicksell "A new principle of fair taxation" (1896) while the book of J. Buchanan and G. Tullock, "The Calculus of consent" (1962) contains a broad analogy between the state and the market. Relations between citizens and the state are considered in accordance with the principle of "a service for a service" (quid pro quo), for example, taxes in exchange for security. These ideas were further developed in the work of James Buchanan "The Limits of Liberty" (1975)[5] and formed the basis of the public choice theory. They were also elaborated in the works of D. Mueller, W. Neskanen, M. Olson, R. Tollison, and others.

The study of contractual and constitutional bases of the theory of economic and political decisions is a predictable strategy within the frame of the currently dominant U.S. legal and jurisprudential paradigm in political sciences the personalized embodiment of which is J. Rawls, R. Dworkin, B. Ackerman and others. However, I believe that it is important to look at the actual and potential political consequences of the 'commercial' vision of politics; it acquired its strong beginning at the dawn of the new century including consequences for Belarus.

(Con)sequences:

– **The first consequence** from the point of the process of democratic transformations should be assessed as positive. The most important statement and conclusion borrowed from old contract theories and preserved in new contractualism is *the conclusion that there is a need to create and improve institutions to coordinate public interests through political negotiations* (regardless of whether a direct or representative democracy is meant). When dealing with post-Soviet countries at the level of relations state/citizens we can speak only

about the imitation of such institutions.[6] Thus, in a strict sense a contract is only a result of negotiations and it does not matter whether it is fixed in the form of a legal document or not.

Undoubtedly, there are a lot of problems in terms of the applicability of contract theories in post-Soviet conditions, so the interpretation of the social contract (in this case one means "Hobbes's" or "vertical" contract) acquires the following form: "When the representatives of various interest groups cannot agree with each other on mutual rights these rights shall be submitted to the treasury of the governor who then begins to redistribute these rights without the consent of the people who could not agree among themselves".[7] A. Auzan believes that mathematical models of Martin McGuire and Mancur Olson describing the mechanism of the change of the vertical contract into a horizontal one, among other things, show that even extreme forms of tyranny contain elements of social contract. We could actually agree but these elements do not define the whole picture.

The metaphor dealing with the "transfer of rights to the ruler" is misleading because the experience of observing political processes in Belarus, Russia and other former Soviet countries shows that people do not so much exchange their rights for safety but also find themselves in conditions which do not get reflected regarding the presence or absence of rights. An authoritarian bureaucratic state is, on the one hand, a method of reproduction of the total asymmetry of social relations (ideally it should be an absolute supremacy, i.e., an unconditional submission) which is non-contractual in its essence, while on the other hand, it is a specific way of structuring and dividing society in accordance with "accounting and statistics categories" which are not social (or contractual) groups in possession of interests and behavioral patterns corresponding to these interests, especially political strategies. "J. Baudrillard reminds us that the term 'strategy' is used to present available opportunities because it is an attractive term." This is a very good term. It defines the form of reasoning and appeals to the imagination. It assumes high qualifications and directs you to space. However, I believe today it no longer means anything really great, because in order to have a strategy, we need an appropriate person; it should be someone who has the will and ability to start from the result. There should be a completeness of actions presupposing it. But when a decisive influence on the strategy is made by self-varying conditions of its implementation, then it is no longer a strategy in the true sense of the word. In other words, "we can continue to use this term but only in a metaphorical sense."[8]

This statement contains two important insights related to Belarusian society in particular and modern society in general. Firstly, the experience of passive adaptation to changing conditions possessed by both separate individuals and the state as a corporate "person" can be called a strategy for lack of a more appropriate term. "The strategy of self-preservation" (or "survival") is an oxymoron, although agents are prone post facto to legitimizing their individual actions and inactions, while imagining the latter as elements of rational programs (for which they are occasionally polled by sociologists). Secondly, a major problem today is the subject of the political action itself. In this sense, it is difficult to prove what we often take for granted, namely, the existence of such collective agents as the

"power", "opposition", "middle class", "retired", etc., i.e., collective agents capable of producing a specific action or a certain inaction. But as a part of any individual and perhaps the most sociologically significant part is the individual's belonging to a group (e.g., professional) we can doubt social and political subjectivity as such.

But I would like to repeat once again that a normative or utopian aspect of contractualism is fundamentally valuable. Social contract is a goal but not a fact. As the target of utopia, it forms the legal basis for criticism of the existing political regime.

– **The second consequence** is related to the concept of an "economic man" (homo economicus) who is the main figure in the current political process. As part of the public choice theory the rationality of the individual has a universal appeal. This means that everyone from voters to the president is guided in his activity, first of all, by the economic principle when one compares marginal benefits and marginal costs in an effort to fulfill the following conditions:

MB> MS

where MB is marginal benefit and MC is marginal cost.

Sine qua non of contractual theories or rationality is, on the one hand, a tribute to Descartes's "reason" (i.e., the notion that introspection is a basic characteristic of the subject, as a result of which he inevitably runs into the certainty of his ability to make judgments, i.e., the ability to reason and to make decisions on the basis of reasoning) while on the other, it is due to Bentham's utilitarianism (understood as a subjective human right; as one researcher said "not to think about anything Descartes like" and just coincide with the individual's life activity with the aims of pursuing pleasure and avoiding suffering). As a result, we have two fundamental fictions: (1) the fiction of an individual who plans his behavior and "calculates" positive and negative consequences of his actions, and (2) the fiction about a selfish individual who never forgets about his interest that is clearly defined and is relevant.[9]

A more realistic view of the individual's behavior is presented in the works of H. Simon.[10] His theory of limited (or incomplete) rationality (bounded rationality) considers not only the existence of information costs but also cognitive limitations. This theory assumes that the individual is not only unable to collect all the information about the transaction and the market situation, the individual is also unable to process the information gathered successfully because the mind and the ability to process information adequately represent a rare resource. However, the reason why practice in general and political practice in particular are satisfied with an incomplete and fragmentary logic and bounded rationality is not because the individual is forced to economize on thinking but also, as P. Bourdieu reminds us, because of the principle of economy of time. This principle means that "one should remember that it is typical of practice to operate in conditions of urgency, and that even the best solution in the world is not worth a penny if it is found too late, when the opportunity or the time has already passed (this is what analysts and experimenters forget about as they behave as if a participant of the game can slow down and ponder its meaning, without risking being practically punished for his delay)".[11] Finally, the

inevitable voluntarism ("irrationality") of human decisions is due to that both practical and theoretical fact that many goods are not compatible, i.e., it is impossible to compare and choose the "best" through the introduction of some common dimensional instance ("gaps of transitivity"[12]).

For our purposes, it is important not only to present all the arguments against the rationalist view of the agents of the political process but to indicate that people in their everyday life rely on their practical sense, and, apparently, they are right, because the endless comparison of costs and benefits can lead them to ambiguous conclusions or even block the decision-making process. "Implicit" cultural practices and informal institutions that reduce uncertainty are also a good tool to save on thinking and time. Sociologists offering questions related to the choice of preferences in one way or another have to ignore the fact that the "awareness" of answers does not have the same force and, therefore, these answers are difficult to aggregate in the form of a general opinion. One can ask a woman why she tolerates the violence of her husband and one will receive a rationalized post factum response that supposedly reveals the implicit content of the family contract, and it is likely that the response will spare her feelings to the max. Using Hirshman's language we can say that citizens saying they prefer the strategy of "loyalty" to the strategies of "voice" or "escape" are most likely to talk about the benefits delivered by power because there is no need for them to confess that they are jerks and sycophants.

If one continues to think this way, one should consider the term "consent" crucial when it comes to explaining political stability. "Consent" or "loyalty" is not necessarily the result of comparing total costs and benefits. In this context one can think in terms of a "forced adoption" of power when the citizens obey the regime but internally deny it their regulatory approval.[13] As R. Rose, N. Munro and W. Mishler note, in countries with a "forced adoption" of power the latter tends to adopt such policies that would ensure the political passivity of the population, or, in other words, the element of "loyalty", "approval" or "consent" was not a key issue. Finally, as for the collective opinion of "contract" social groups, it is permissible to speak about a kind of a "contract" spiral of silence[14] arising out of a simple principle that "majority approves majority" because no one wants to remain isolated.

Thus, we come to a provision that turns out to be one of the central provisions in the context of this publication. The system of social contracts in Belarus is a group of conventions while the formal compliance sets the frames of the common game. Authorities pretend that they provide citizens with all possible benefits while citizens in every way display loyalty, initiative and hard work. Authorities pretend that they respect the rights and freedoms of citizens while when needed citizens vote "correctly" though surprises do happen. In such cases authorities use a variety of protection mechanisms. In short, on the one hand, one can speak about the "minimum" compliance with obligations while on the other it has to do with mutual hypocrisy which acts as a principal component of the system of contracting just like other simulation institutions including parliament, courts, etc. It is important to keep in mind that the participants of the game due to their experience and practical sense are mainly aware of this deception but the attitude to it as if there were no

such thing is part of the game the result of which is that the agent is recognized as a "member of the government", "MP", "professional", etc.

– **The third consequence** is ambiguous; it is based on *the exchange (ideally equal) which is taken as an archetype of all possible social relations*. For Belarus, the consideration of politics as an arena for the exchange of benefits is a pretty serious modernization of the current state of things because the "unvalued gifts of power" and other powerful effects of fetishism hinder exchange processes. B. Silitsky believes that the social contract in Belarus has an asymmetrical nature[15] and in this sense, apparently, we can talk about the reproduction of an unequal exchange. Therefore, the research curiosity driven by the motive of finding sources of stability should be directed not only at the content of the proposed agreement between the government and citizens, but at the conditions that ensure the "non-equivalence" of these exchanges.

You can pay attention, for example, to how the Belarusian authorities so strongly inflate the exchange rate of the key public good, namely, that of security. Instead of saying that there are no risks, in contrast authorities exaggerate them in every way possible. Every time authorities use an opportunity to remind about this or that risk blowing its size to immense proportions (NATO expansion, gas problems, a global financial crisis, swine flu, etc.) as if supporting the regime of the "stabilization" of risks not so much through the efforts of the State which a number of Western political scientists identify as "weak"[16] but through personal efforts of A. Lukashenko. The Belarusian society and state still have to go through the demystification and de-personalization of power relations, and in this sense a consumer or, if you would prefer, mercantilist attitude to the state as an enterprise for the production of stability is still a concept of the future. Meanwhile, the process is certainly on the way and it is a two-way process: not only citizens, but the state itself more and more rely on the "mercantilist ethic" of exchanging services. This is a positive aspect.

The negative component is the fact that it is fatally ignored by rationalist contractualism. If we follow P. Bourdieu, it is the symbolic domination that is critical for the identifying of the conditions of its reproduction (e.g., "paternalism", home-exploitation of women by men, economic instability, etc.) as the dominator does not only appropriate a greater portion of the benefits but also compels us to consider the very legitimacy of its domination; it forces the dominated to see it and the surrounding reality through the eyes of the dominator for it is an attitude that is the key in this context. Most often, the mystery of the reproduction of the political system is solved either through jurisprudential approaches (this is especially true for political science) or by using public opinion polls (which is typical of sociology) as both strategies are usually limited by what can be designated as the "calculus of consent". At the same time both strategies overlook proper mechanisms for the reproduction of the system starting with the reproduction of "legitimate" elites and ending with a monopoly on the production of opinions.

– **The fourth consequence** concerns the bringing of all relationships both political and trade to the "market" relations as the only "natural" form of social relations. In the case of public choice theories the political market is analyzed using the analogy with the

trade one; the state is seen as an arena of competition of people for the influence to make decisions regarding the access to the distribution of resources, etc. The state is seen as a market of a unique kind where its participants, voters and politicians, are treated as individuals exchanging votes and campaign promises. In fact, in this case we can clearly see a purely normative function of economic science described by F. Simiand. The normative function is involved in the general work of subduing the social system to the dominating logic of economic space. F. LeBaron states that "the neoclassical economic theory is the embodiment or a scientific rationalization illusio of the economic field; the more spread this illusion in society is, the stronger this power in society is".[17] LeBaron believes that the existence of the economic universum is a result of the process that culminated in the autonomization of the order of social reality or of the economic system. He identified a certain illusio, a belief in the value of the game, and a form of libido that represents a special energy that makes economic actors whoever they may be maximize their winnings (usually presented as an individual cash prize). The spread of this illusio is the result of a long and controversial process in which the state played a crucial role by providing a monetary and fiscal unification monopoly, mainly through the creation of a relatively stable space for the exchange and circulation of money.

Meanwhile, the use of the market exchange fiction to understand politics brings specific fruits. We are especially interested in those that symbolize an escape into the shadow of the social contract (providing the exchange of loyalty for stability) of vast enclaves of social life. As a result, we have to deal with the exclusion from the sight of various economies (social, political and actually economic ones) which are based on, for example, a gift, but not on an exchange, as well as various forms of managed economy. For the study of the processes of managed economy Russian neo-institutionalists use a specific conceptual apparatus of the "administrative market". However, it seems to be only the first way to approach the problem, though, undoubtedly, this topic is worthy of a series of thorough research. Meanwhile, it is enough to recall the existence of different "anti-economic" circles, i.e., spaces in which the search for a symbolic capital is associated with a certain denial of monetary economy (artistic, scientific, bureaucratic and other universums) to show that the exchange is only a special case of inclusion into the social game.

Economy of time

The resulting function of the social contract is social trust that reduces uncertainty and identifies horizons of mutual expectations. In this sense, the social contract in Belarus if one looks at it not in a hypothetical or regulative but rather actual respect is based more on the lack of confidence, or, if you wish, fear. Fear should not be understood in a domestic sense. It should be looked at in a rather existential Kierkegaard sense where fear is seen as dizziness due to the individual's realizing his freedom. This statement that is tantamount to the denial of one of the key provisions of the old, new and newest contractualism, however, is essential if we really deal with a current social contract in Belarus.

Today there is a widely accepted position according to which the political order is not only based on coercion and repression, but also on the consent and belief. This is also true for authoritarian political regimes. Meanwhile, in a strictly theoretical sense, one could construct a minimalist model of political equilibrium, based primarily on fear and mistrust, which, strictly speaking, force parties such as the state and society to refrain from extraordinary activities. It would be more precise to say that there should be a double-entry bookkeeping of cooperation based on fear that arises, for example, in cases of terrorists seizing hostages. This "contract" in some ways is Hobbes's idea, but with one significant amendment that the "war of all against all" does not disappear after the establishment of cooperative relations and continues to be a background circumstance of common agreement.

If there is a fundamental explanation of the fact that despite the "recession" of the world financial crisis consumer goods in Europe are becoming more expensive (i.e., inflation), then it is the government's fear of the people. Instead of stopping the decline in production, governments including the Belarusian government use all their power to save banks and the financial system in general. Externally, one of possible interpretations is that banks have a special contract with the authorities and this contract is stronger than, say, contracts with industry groups. However, it is not so much about the contract. The problem is that the government fears population more than any other group. Population is a scarecrow for any government, especially marginalized and pauper population. In the same way, people fear the power in all its recognizable manifestations from the tax bodies to the police and the army.

Researchers believing that the fundamental condition of political balance in Belarus is the exchange based on the principle "votes in exchange for social indulgences" ignore, at least two important points. First of all, there is no need to treat the natural tendency of man to survive, i.e., in this case, the need to sell his labor as a condition of a similar or even not quite equivalent exchange. Or, in other words, for some reason the authority is always in a better position, because it can attribute the overall success to itself but make the whole society feel guilty for the failure. Secondly, if votes were essential to the Belarusian political process, the government would not seek to monopolize the mechanisms of registering and counting votes thus as if reducing or even annulling their weight and value. Lukashenko fundamentally does not trust his people, and for this simple reason he, like his regime, needs these vital tools.

So, in the most general form the "contract" component of the social and political balance is an equalizer, one side of which is the fear of ohlocratia and social rebellion, and the other is the fear of isolation, the possibility of losing a job, economic instability, etc. This peculiar system of checks and balances suggests, as it has already been mentioned, a certain minimum level of agreement or trust. For example, the ruling class and the opposition parties form a unique couple, whose relations could also be considered in terms of the contract: the government uses repressions in a restricted mode, while the opposition uses strategies, relatively speaking, concentrating within the "normalized" corridor of possible actions.

The above said shows that social hypocrisy is a necessary condition for making a comprehensive series of actions and rituals (presumably arising from contracted social responsibility) or abstinence from them. Alexander Lukashenko is likely a hypocrite, claiming that the average salary will exceed the level of $500.00, but on the other hand, nobody expects that he will fulfill this promise (like many other commitments and campaign promises). Most importantly, voters accept him as he is, playing a role, without any objections, because social acceptance is not based on what someone thinks or does in reality but on how he meets the "role" features of the position held. In this sense, the trust described by political scientists and sociologists, should be taken similarly to Stanislavsky's words "I believe". The episode of "Doctor House" called "Social Contract" tells the story of a patient whose symptom is the inability to dissemble. Because the patient tells people what he thinks, he is excluded from social networks. In the same way with all the stretch the glue of hypocrisy holds together Belarusian layers and strata. It should be added that the potential of trust/distrust will vary greatly depending on the agent's position objectively occupied in social space while the system of social contracts is not the only and is not always the leading linking component of the social world.

A less obvious observation speaks in favor of the fact that there exists or at least there should be a rather extensive set of "contracts" (with overlapping, doubling and mutually exclusive contents) allowing individuals to maneuver between certain contractual terms and obligations. For example, "Belarusian universities continue to cooperate with European partners in the framework of Tempus, and its national coordinator is a senior official of the Academy of Management; the latter is a "smithy" of the bureaucratic personnel of the regime".[18] This is just one of many examples of this kind. Government officials and "people's" parliamentarians patronize businesses which are the agents of globalization while private businesses are involved in a multi-faceted cooperation with local authorities; finally, the party opposition somehow supports the regime in terms of its political stability providing a kind of a "democratic" alibi.

People do not have qualities that are usually attributed to them by experts interpreting opinion polls ("supporters" and "opponents" of so and so), and, in fact, do not make a choice between democracy and authoritarianism, between capitalism and the planned economy, between freedom and slavery, or between obedience and rebellion. People seek their freedom (political, economic, consumer) in the gap between the former and the latter. So in the complex web of social networks and markets of a variety of services double or ambiguous structures of adaptation which are subtle and unobtrusive because of their ambiguity are formed. The key to the situation is in these "ambiguous" positions and statuses but not in intensities (including social forces) between the East and the West, democracy and anti-democracy, state and society, and other actively used analytic antagonistic pairs. One should probably look for the reasons of stability of the political regime in these "intermediate" structures of adaptation because: (1) it is often a mismatch between informal norms and formal rules that leads to an ambiguous situation in which no one benefits from following the instructions of potentially more effective rules. Consequently,

it is more profitable to play on the difference in rates between different rules (or, if you will, contracts), i.e., otherwise follow formal requirements in one case, or informal rules in another, including choosing between the informal rules, etc.; (2) the idea of the profit is probably based on the practical sense referring to a specific situation, rather than on the rational calculation appealing to the universal (that is, in principle, exchanged for money and thus having a certain "exchange rate"); this idea is the basis of the practiced individual and group policies. It is true that people tend to save on costs and above all costs of time. It is also true that they seek to maximize the utility function doing so more in the sense of increasing the amount of free or effectively used time. However, such a calculation is practical but not rational in a strict sense.

An effective tool for the understanding of various social obligations whether they have been contracted or not is the idea of social capital interpreted differently by J. Coleman, R. Putnam and Pierre Bourdieu. R. Putnam uses a three-factor model of social capital that includes norms of reciprocity, trust, and social networks while Coleman's followers see social capital as an attribute of the individual, which gives him a real advantage in achieving life goals, career, access to information, etc. According to Coleman, the economic importance of social capital is that it reduces costs of coordinating joint activities, replacing contracts, formal rules and bureaucratic procedures with the relationships of trust or, simply speaking, informal norms that are spread by cultural traditions and education. For Bourdieu, social capital is "the sum of actual or potential resources associated with the possession of a sustainable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition or in other words, membership in the group."[19]

One of Bourdieu's important comments concerns the not so always obvious fact that different types of capital, in particular cultural and social, can be derived from the economic capital or converted into it, but at the cost of more or less serious transformation efforts required to produce the type of power most effective in a given field. Economic capital provides direct access without any secondary costs to some goods while others can only be obtained through the relationships of social capital (or social obligations) which cannot occur instantly and are acquired at the cost of investment into communication, which has to be long-term. "In contrast to the cynical (and economical) transparency of the economic exchange in which equivalents pass from hand to hand, the essential ambiguity of the social exchange <...> implies a much more subtle economy of time."[20]

From the point of view of economic rationality presentations by political parties, public organizations, financial institutions, etc. with invited experts, politicians, diplomats, and just "people with connections" are a waste of time and money. Yet such actions are not meaningless, because they are aimed at building social capital, i.e., they are useful as connections. In other words, the transformation of economic capital into social involves labor costs, i.e., an unpaid amount of time, attention and participation, which should mean the transformation of a purely monetary understanding of exchange, and thus, the very meaning of the exchange on the whole. In terms of the logic of social exchange examples that we have chosen are investments the profit from which will eventually manifest itself in money

or in some other form. "According to certain principles (equivalent to the principle of conservation of energy)," notes Bourdieu, "a gain in one area inevitably turns into expenses in another. So the concept of waste does not make sense within the framework of the general science about the economy of practices. The universal equivalent, a measure of equivalence is none other than the time used for work (in the broadest sense) while the preservation of social energy in all forms happens if in each case we take into account working hours, as accumulated in the form of capital, and the need to transform one type of capital into another."[21] The same applies to the cost of the acquisition of cultural capital, which represents all skills, knowledge and competencies in its incorporated form and diplomas and certificates in the institutionalized one.

In conclusion, it must be said that as the direct transfer and distribution of economic capital remains one of the controlled means of the reproduction of groups, weight and impact of social (including "hidden agendas", "chummy ties", etc.) and cultural capital increases and, as a rule, corrects the impact of sanctions. Thus, in the shadow of social contract there take place games of trust (forming groups) that do not coincide with the unifying work of the state for the structuring of social space.

Notes

1 See: Gurr, T.R. Why Men Rebel? Princeton University Press, 1970.

2 Sotsialnye kontrakty v sovremennoj Belarusi / Pod red. K. Gaiduka, E. Rakovoj, V. Silitskogo. SPb: Nevskij prostor, 2009. P. 5.

3 Rozanvallon, Pier. Utopicheskij kapitalizm. Istorija idei rynka / Per. s frants. A. Zajtsevoj, red. V. Kaplun. M.: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2007.

4 In the end, depersonalization of the world becomes an essential precondition for progress and freedom. In his "Political Essays" David Hume probably moves the furthest praising habit and custom in the spirit of these ideas. D. Hume believes that for the public order not to be built on the dependence of the individual on a political or religious authority it is necessary for the behavior of society to be governed by the most impersonal principle that is the least amenable to appropriation or manipulation, i.e., tradition.

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6 It is enough to point to such a simulation as the Public Advisory Council under the President of the Republic of Belarus.

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Ion Xenofontov

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES – ENVIRONMENT GOING THROUGH CHANGES (Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus)

Abstract

The study provides a comparative analysis of historical and recent developments, as well as general and specific features of the academies of sciences of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. Deeply marked by the Soviet past, an outdated infrastructure, ageing staff, exodus of specialists, scarcity of financial means, social and political pressure etc., academic organizations still tend to align with international requirements in the field of science. Internal and external factors are analyzed including those directly or indirectly influencing the dynamics of academic science such as globalization and computerization, historical traditions and current circumstances, government policies, human and financial resources. In the light of established scientific tools, such as Foresight, Science Citation Index, statistical indicators, bibliometric analysis, scientific cooperation, etc. the study presents main results of academic research and scientific production, international scientific cooperation, scientific and technological globalization activities, structures and dynamics of research & development activity, managerial difficulties challenging the academies of sciences of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus.

Keywords: academies of science, science of science, scientific products, impact factor, peer review, innovation, scientific research, internationalization science, scientific cooperation, science performance, national science, Foresight, bibliometric analysis, research & development, scientific policy, knowledge production, citation index.

There is no national science just like
there is no national multiplication chart.
A.P. Chekhov

Problem setting

In a narrow sense science is a sum of already accumulated knowledge and a form of a complex activity aimed at the production of new knowledge. In its essence it is universal and overcomes geographical borders and time. A.P. Chekhov once said, "There is no national science just like there is no national multiplication chart". Academic science can become a part of a complex globalization process only when the laws of its development and principles of correlating with world achievements have been studied. Science has a complex character though its phenomenological and sociological aspects have national attributes. The growing internationalization of science leads to the corresponding increasing influence of scientific policy carried out by supranational organizations.

At present science faces serious public challenges. A rapid development of economy, information and telecommunications, forms and methods of scientific communication and international cooperation require a new conceptual basis of institutional research (academies of sciences, universities, etc.) which could correspond to the new global reality. Besides the human factor that *volens nolens* implies new social and professional responsibilities there is a need for a new scientific approach both theoretical and methodological as well as a new understanding of the role of science in the era of information and globalization.

There are examples when in the CIS the very functioning of academies was questioned. Turkmenistan in 1998–2007 could serve as an example as the president decree terminated the central body of the Academy in 2007 and the Academy had to function on the so called public basis (2007–2009). On June 12, 2009 the Academy of Sciences of Turkmenistan was restored as a state organization (the Academy of Sciences of Turkmenistan). The National academy of sciences of Georgia has not been closed down but its scientific bodies have been transferred to ministries and universities. The tendencies to liquidate and reorganize academies of sciences can also be observed in Moldova and Belarus. In 2011 some parliamentary political parties of the Republic of Moldova made several attempts to close down the Academy of Sciences of the country (Proiectul cu privire). There are certain personae in Belarus including some from academia who believe that science should be reformed. President A. Lukashenko also promotes the idea of changes within the Academy of Sciences, "We need to think very seriously whether the country needs such a monstrous and multi-profile Academy of Sciences" (Lukashenko).

Scientific, research and educational establishments are trying to unite into multifunctional clusters with similar organizations. Consequently, the forms of the organization of scientific and innovation activity are changing as well along with communication models, the character and form of training of scientific staff, the content of scientific work, specifics of labor division and cooperation (Cuciureanu 2011: 49).

At the same time while in the West academic science has secured its proper status and model of development in the post-Soviet countries (including Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus) science is in search of its identity and recognition both nationally and interna-

tionally. Common problems of the institutional science in the CIS correlate with the level of social and economic development as there is a mass decrease of active population, the old age of researchers, no need for scientific results (from the business sector as well), outdated equipment, the disappearing of traditions of scientific research, the shifting of emphasis from fundamental to applied research, etc. When the countries declared their independence and rejected statism they stopped making scientific orders and that led to the loss by science of its competitive edge though the centralized science system was turned into a democratic one.

In a global sense we could observe a certain specialization by country in various scientific fields (there are 22 scientific areas according to the Institute for Scientific Information). For example, Canada has got 8 specialty areas, Australia, Germany, Great Britain, the USA, Israel, Estonia have 7, while Iceland, Norway, the Republic of South Africa have got 6 specializations; Korea, Japan, Turkey, Indonesia, Taiwan, Latvia have 3, and Austria and Croatia have 2 such areas. Such countries as Portugal, Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and the countries of South East Asia specialize in technical and engineering fields. Some states are hyper-specialized. The specific weight of certain fields of science per country exceeds the world level by 3 times in the Republic of South Africa (plant and cattle growing), in New Zealand (agriculture), in South Korea (materials science); by 3.5–4 times in Singapore (engineering and computer science); by more than 7 times in Chili (sciences about space). Traditionally, the countries of Eastern Europe pay more attention to exact sciences. For instance, Moldova, Ukraine and Poland are similar when it comes to physics and chemistry. Moldova specializes in 4 scientific fields, namely, physics (specialization index is 3.85), chemistry (2.4), materials science (2.08), and mathematics (1.35). The country meets the world average level in the field of engineering and computer science. The lowest indicators can be found in the sphere of social sciences, economics, clinical medicine and other natural and agricultural sciences and ecology. Ukraine is among the leaders in the field of physics. The volume of scientific physics publications in Ukraine is 39.25% while it is only 12.27% in the world (Cucureanu 2011: 113–114).

If one would like to assess the contribution made by researchers from Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus then these countries can be identified as states with a medium level of scientific development. It is similar to the situation in other CIS countries. At present we can observe the difficulty that academic science is experiencing trying to meet new international standards. One of the factors complicating the inclusion of the scientific community of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus into the globalized science is the language barrier. Russian, Romanian, Ukrainian or Belarusian are not the languages of modern science. The share of the English language has grown considerably over the past 20 years as 95% of articles indexed by ISI are published in English. On a global scale national scientific journals are moving towards publications in English addressing the international audience.

History and Modernity

Academy is the name of a scientific establishment or a higher educational establishment. The word "Academy" goes back to the philosophical school founded by Plato around 387 B.C. Various scientific communities were created in Europe in XV–XVI centuries. They called themselves "academies" and the first one was opened in Florence in 1459. Initially, those organizations were mainly interested in humanities but in the XVII century they began to concentrate on natural sciences as well. Quite a number of national scientific centers called "academy" were opened starting in the second half of the XVII century. The centers were supported by the state. They included, among others, the Royal Society (1660), the French Academy of Sciences (1666), the Prussian Academy of Sciences (1700), etc. (Bolshaja 2005: 323; Novaja 2006: 209).

In the Soviet Union the founding of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR was connected with the opening of Petersburg Academy of Sciences in 1724 (sic!) and the Russian Academy of Sciences in 1917. During the Soviet times national science in the academies of sciences of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova was integrated into the scientific space of the Soviet and partially world science. The process of educating and training scientific staff began. Those scientists still influence the decision making in the sphere of science policy, directions of scientific research, science issues, etc. The Soviet "quasi-science" represented the doctrine that repudiated an area of science with a similar name.

The typical feature of the Soviet science was its hierarchical organization. The head of each scientific division was automatically considered to be the most prominent scientist in his respective field of study. That led to the so called scientific doublethink when "deep in his heart the scientist agrees with world science but officially works within the framework of "quasi-science" while on the other hand, it led to the emergence of the scientific opposition, i.e., scientists who openly supported the positions of world science in spite of the punishment connected with it" (Legler 1993: 49–55, 68–82). The Communist Party of the Soviet Union tightly controlled the scientific activity and limited contacts of scientists with their foreign colleagues. Scientific information sent to the center from the republics was also strictly controlled. The authors were recommended to refrain from publishing the results of their scientific activity abroad and from participating in international scientific events. However, the USSR occupied the third place in the world according to the number of scientific articles and the USSR's share in the world flow of articles was 7% (Markusova 2002). In comparison, the contribution of Russia was about 80% while Ukraine produced 10% of scientific articles and the rest, 10%, came from other republics of the USSR including Belarus and Moldova (Dikusar, Kravtsov 2010: 13). Soviet scientists were concentrated in research establishments, the so called "scientific towns" having a high social prestige. So it is not surprising that the Union human rights and dissident movement was headed by the famous academician Andrei Sakharov (1921–1989) (Hobsbawm 1994: 622).

After the disintegration of the USSR the volume of funds to the academies of sciences of Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine shrank radically. Scientists began to leave research

institutes either becoming entrepreneurs or going abroad. By that time the academic infrastructure had become out-of-date and the construction process practically stopped. All those factors left their imprint on the quality of the scientific product.

National academy of sciences of Ukraine

Created November 27, 1918, the National academy of sciences was the oldest among the republican academies in the USSR. It changed its name 5 times. For example, during the period between 1918–1921 it was called the Ukrainian academy of sciences, from 1921 to 1936 its name was the all-Ukrainian academy of sciences; in 1936–1991 it was renamed the Academy of sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; from 1991 to 1993 its official name was the Academy of sciences of Ukraine and in 1994 it became the National academy of sciences of Ukraine.

The first president of the academy (1918–1921) was one of its founders, the Soviet natural scientist who was well-known abroad V. Vernadsky (1863–1945). During the academy's long history it was headed by N. Vasilenko (1921–1922), O. Levitsky (1922), V. Lipsky (1922–1928), D. Zabolotny (1928–1929), A. Bogomolets (1930–1946), and A. Palladin (1946–1962). Since 1962 the academy has been headed by B. Paton (who was born the same year the academy was founded) and who set a record of holding this position both in the post-Soviet space and in the world in general (Paton 2008: 1.5–6; Paton 2012, 27 lutogo). B. Paton is also a foreign member of the National academy of sciences of Belarus (1995) (Natsionalnaja 2003: 328) and the Academy of sciences of Moldova (1998) (Membrii 2006: 350–351). In January 1992 the National academy of sciences of Ukraine was awarded the status of the highest scientific establishment in the country. Later it was also registered on the legislative level (Paton 2011). In most cases the conditions for research in the National academy of sciences of Ukraine do not correspond to international standards. There are modest attempts to establish cooperation with those specialists who left the country in the 1990s and 2000s. However, the country is unable to offer them an appropriate level of remuneration and working conditions (Yegorov, Strogylopulos 2010). In Ukraine specialists point at the need to make quality and quantity parameters of Ukrainian science correspond to European science (Kavunenko, Goncharov 2003). Before January 1, 2008 the NAS of Ukraine had 182 acting members (academicians) and 343 corresponding members. According to the data for 2010 the NASU had 3 sections, 14 branches and about 170 institutes and other scientific establishments employing 19 861 people including 2632 doctors of sciences and 8231 candidates of sciences (Kulchitsky, Pavlienko, Ruda, Hramov 2001: 250–286; Natsionalnaja 2008; Korotka 2012; Natsionalnaja 2011: 27). In the same 2010 there were 1474 scientists per one million people (UNESCO 2010). Attempts of the NAS of Ukraine to introduce necessary amendments to the existing legislature which would allow creating a university within the academy system failed (Paton 2011: 38).

National academy of sciences of Belarus

The National academy of sciences of Belarus ( ) was created October 13, 1928. The name of the academy was changed four times. In 1928–1936 it was called the Byelorussian academy of sciences; from 1936 to 1991 it was the Academy of sciences of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic while in 1991–1997 it was the Academy of sciences of Byelorussia; in 1997 it was named the National academy of sciences of Belarus. In 1997 the academy acquired the status of the state scientific organization of Belarus responsible for coordinating and carrying out fundamental research. The first president of the academy was V. Ignatovsky (1928– 1931). Other presidents elected were P. Gorin (Kolyadka) (1931– 1936), I. Surta (1936–1937), K. Gorev (1938–1947), A. Zhebrak (1947), N. Grashchenkov (1947–1951), V. Kuprevich (1952–1969), N. Borisevich (1969–1987), V. Platonov (1987–1992), L. Sushchenya (1992–1997), A. Voitovich (1997–2000), and M. Myasnikovich (2001–2010). Since December 2010 A. Rusetsky has been the Chair of the Presidium of the NAS of Belarus.

At present the NASB fulfils the functions of state management in certain areas of funding scientific and innovation activity, developing informatization and the system of scientific and technical information. It also controls the effective use of state funds allocated for the financing of scientific research and development as well as scientific and technical expertise (analysis). In fact, Belarusian science imitates the Soviet science being its direct follower. It has got some features of "quasi-science" (rejecting the world area of science with the same name) and can be characterized by certain negative aspects and a bureaucratic vertical. At the same time Belarusian science, according to President Lukashenko, is striving to "take the best from the world experience". The actions of authorities in relation to science are "thought out and legitimized". The academic reform should be interpreted not as an opposition "to the keeping of traditions" and "commercialization" but as a change of bureaucratic groups with a goal to monopolize the resources belonging to the scientific sphere (these are the explanations used to justify recent changes among the administrative body of the NAS of Belarus) (Pankovsky 2008: 204–205). The country's President has a significant influence on the academy, partially through his supervision of staff selection. For example, on February 21, 2012 A. Lukashenko appointed the corresponding member Sergei Chizhik the deputy Chair of the Presidium of the NAS of Belarus and Sergei Kilin the chief scientific secretary of the National academy of sciences of Belarus (President 2012). President Lukashenko is against fundamental science believing that science should produce immediate results, "Funds will be sent to those places where we can see results. Let's clear science from all kinds of sticking diggers… I would like the invested money to bring serious results." (February 7, 2012). In April, 2012 Anatoly Rusetsky, the Chair of the Presidium of the NASB said that a number of measures have been prepared to reform science and that they will allow "to optimize the structure of the scientific sphere, to remove everything unnecessary and to concentrate attention on the main scientific directions, as well as to integrate the academic and university sector into

the real sector of economy" (V strukture). In 2009 the NAS of Belarus concentrated 19.3% (86 unites) of all scientific establishments of the country uniting 30.3% of all researchers as well as the majority of the unique scientific equipment and devices (39%). The NAS of Belarus has got 7 branches, 3 state scientific and production associations, 8 scientific and practical centers, and 54 scientific institutes and centers. In 2007 the NASB began to offer the second stage of higher education, a Master's degree. The body administering the program is the state establishment "Scientific Staff Training Institute of the NASB" (Magistratura 2012). There are 5 specialties with about 60 graduates annually. Upon graduation they join scientific bodies or continue their studies in post-graduate schools of academic scientific establishments (Myasnikovich 2008: 4). The NASBelarus employs over 17 699 people. Among others they include about 6242 researchers, 491 doctors of science (66.5%) and 1879 candidates of science (58.1%). The dynamics of the number of post-graduate students, mainly young people, show a decline as there were 685 students in 2006, 639 in 2007, 561 in 2008, and 560 in 2009 (O sostojanii 2010: 14–16, 30–36). In 2010 there were 1903 scientific researchers in Belarus per one million people (UNESCO 2010). Belarusian historian Irina Chikalova believes that the salary of women working in the field of science in Belarus is lower than that of men by 16.9% (2003); women acutely feel this discrimination (Chikalova 2006: 168–170).

The Academy of Sciences of Moldova (Academia de Științe a Moldovei)

Unlike the academies of sciences of Ukraine and Belarus the Academy of sciences of Moldova has quite a short history. The first academic scientific and research establishments were created in 1946 by setting up the Moldovan scientific and research base of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. After the reorganization of the latter the Academy of Sciences of Moldova was opened on August 2, 1961. The name of the Academy of Sciences of Moldova changed only two times from the Academy of Sciences of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (1961–1990) to the Academy of Sciences of Moldova in 1990. Historian Ya. Grosul became the first president of the academy (1961–1976); he was followed by academicians A. Zhuchenko (1977–1989) and A. Andriesh (1989–2004). Gheorghe Duca was elected the president of the Academy of sciences of Moldova February 5, 2004. He is also a member of the National academy of sciences of Ukraine (2009) (Blog 2012). The president of the Academy of sciences of Moldova is also a member of Moldova government. Upon the development and passing of the Code on Science and Innovations in 2004 the role of the ASM greatly increased as science was declared to be a national strategic priority (art. 55) (Codul 2004). The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova states that "the state encourages the preservation, development and dissemination of achievements of national and world culture and science" (art. 33) (Constituțsija 1994). According to the ERAWATCH report for 2010 (an information platform of the EU related to European, national and regional research systems, policies and programs) the concentration of the development and introduction of research and innovation policy and, accordingly, research in one institu-

tional body (i.e., the ASM) is a weak point of the scientific system of the country (Rotaru 2011: 7). There is practically no research infrastructure on the left bank of the Dniester region (the so called Transdniestria) that corresponds to world achievements (Burla 2010: 427–428).

According to the 2010 survey, the activity of the AS of Moldova is not quite visible for society even after quite radical reforms in 2004. At the same time 70% of the scientific staff of academia and universities believe that the results achieved by them in corresponding fields of science reflect the needs of society for development and can be successfully implemented (Mîndru 2010: 55–58; Mîndru 2011: 31–34).

The basis of the scientific sphere in the Republic of Moldova is the state sector (94%) (Pishchenko 2011: 120). The result of the accreditation of scientific organizations in the country is the acquirement by them of the status of the institutional, profile or affiliated member of the ASM. In 2009 scientific bodies operating under the auspices of the ASM made up 36% of the total number of accredited organizations (Pishchenko 2011: 75). According to the data (as of January 1, 2012) the ASM consisted of 3 branches, 20 scientific and research institutes (academy members), 31 profile members including 13 universities, and 1 affiliated member (Raport 2012: 92). In 2008 a university was created within the ASM system and then on the basis of the university an ASM lyceum for gifted children was opened (Duca 2010: 44–47). Both institutions are a part of the scientific and educational cluster UnivER-SCIENCE.

More than 3336 researchers work in the Academy of sciences of Moldova including 441 doctors of sciences and 1450 candidates of sciences. The average age of doctors of sciences is 64.5 years while for candidates of sciences it is 51.5 years. The staff also includes 50 academicians and 48 corresponding members. The average age of full-time members is 73.7 years and 72.8 years for corresponding members accordingly (Academia 2006; Codul 2004; Furdui, Jarcuțchi, 2009: 380–399; Tarasov 1987; Jarcuțchi 2010: 14–22; Raport 2012: 92; Membrii 2006: 60–61). The number of the ASM female employees is quite low as the Assembly (the highest administration body of the ASM) has got only 6% of women. There is only one woman-academician and one woman-corresponding member in the ASM thus making it only 2% of the total number of academicians and corresponding members (Cuciureanu 2010: 30). In 2010 there were 912 scientific researchers per one million people in Moldova (UNESCO 2010).

Academic establishments of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova still haven't been able to overcome and deal with the heritage of the Soviet period when we look at their administrative structure, human resources, and directions of scientific activity. We can speak about the existence of an invisible conflict between different generations of scientists. Some academic institutions try to distance themselves from the whole image of the ASM even by changing their legal name in order to integrate into the globalization process. However, it should be mentioned that there are visible signs of modernization of scientific establishments.

Financing of Academic Science

It is well known that additional financing of science in highly scientifically and industrially developed countries leads to high indicators of the economic growth and standards of living. For instance, in 1939–1957 science led to a 20% economic growth in the USA (Cuciureanu 2011: 32). Even in the conditions of the world economic crisis the USA continued its policy of science support. When speaking at the National Academy of Sciences of the USA in April, 2009 President Barack Obama said, "Science is more essential for our prosperity, our security, our health, our environment, and our quality of life than it has ever been. And if there was ever a day that reminded us of our shared stake in science and research, it's today" (Obama 2009: 97).

In the 50s of the XX century simultaneously with the emergence of Big Science () the prestige of scientists and engineers grew as well as state and private investments. At present employees working in science and technology make up 25–35% in developed countries. In 2006 the number of researches reached 6 million (UNESCO 2011). More than 150 thousand dollars is spent per one researcher in the world (A more 2008). We could identify three world scientific "centers", namely, the USA, the EU and Japan with their 70% of world spending on science and 65% of all scientists in the world working for them (UNESCO 2011). The state looks at its long-term goals of state development when it finances science. That is why its major priority is either social issues (health care, ecology, national security) or fundamental research (something that does not present any interest to the private sector). The state must also provide funds for research dealing with national specifics that does not generate any profit. Such research deals with history, language, national culture, etc. Fundamental research expenditures in Europe (especially in Germany and France) are higher than in the USA and Japan (Cuciureanu 2011: 45, 58).

It is believed that if the funding of science makes up 0.4% of the GDP then it fulfils socio-cultural functions; if this indicator exceeds 1% of the GDP then one can expect a strong economic influence of science; if the number is higher than 2.6% of the GDP then the economy of the country follows an innovative way of development (Pishchenko 2011: 24). The new European strategy of economic development "Europe 2020: strategy of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth" presupposes a growth of funds to be spent on research and innovation by up to 3%. 2/3 of research and innovation expenses should be covered by the private sector (More 2002). The calculations of G.M. Dobrov Center for Scientific and Technological Potential and Science History Studies of the NAS of Ukraine show that in order for science in the CIS to produce a noticeable impact on economy the indicator should be 1.7% of the GDP (Krasovskaja 2003; Novyj 2010: 175). At the same time it should be taken into account that it seems to be quite difficult to identify a proper relation between expenses on science and achievements of economic effect especially when it concerns fundamental science.

In fact, highly developed countries show a significant level of state subsidies. The following comparison shows that funding of science in Israel is 4.53% with 3.82% in Sweden

and 3.45% in Finland while in Japan it is 3.33%, in the USA 2.62%, and in Germany it is 2.51%. In 2008 the research intensity of the GDP in the European Union reached 1.93% (Pishchenko 2011: 26–27). In Eastern Europe science was never an area of considerable funding provided either by the state or by the private sector (Darvas 2002: 18–27).

From the moment when the Republic of Moldova acquired independence (in 1991) and up to 2000 the state funding of science went down by 20 times. In 1996– 2003 the state spending on science decreased from 0.19 to 0.09% of the GDP. About 90% of the funds were used to pay for salaries and social security and to cover utilities and other household expenses (Academia 2006: 159). In 2004 upon the passing of the Code on Science and Innovations the ASM returned to the centralized model of development. In 2008 science state funding increased by 3 times (0.6% of the GDP) in comparison with 2004 (0.22% of the GDP). After 2009 science funding decreased with 0.59% of the GDP in 2009; 0.50% of the GDP in 2010; and 0.4% of the GDP in 2011-2012 (Raport 2011: 8; Raport 2012: 7). Expenses to cover scientific and research activity per one scientist make up 9.5 thousand dollars. We can compare it with Lithuania where these expenses make up 56.3 thousand dollars. (UNESCO 2010).

After a dramatic decrease in the early 90s of the XX century the funding of the NAS of Ukraine today is a little bit higher than 53% of the level preceding the decrease. Actual science state expenditures in Ukraine are 0.8% (2008) of the GDP instead of the 1.7% stated in the law. The amount of state funding of science (as a GDP share) decreased more than twice during 1992–2002 while the share of general financing of science went down by 1.4 times in comparison with 1992 and by 2.75 times when compared to 1990 (Malitsky 2004: 19; Shpak, Popovich 2010: 29). The level of funding of the academic sector of science is second only to the funding of branch science with almost two thirds of all funding provided to the NAS of Ukraine. In 2004 the level of the academy funding practically reached its maximum (17.5%) as well as the general level of funding of the academic sector (23.6%) being just a little bit less than the level in 1996 (Krasovskaja 2005). In 2010 the state funding given to the NASU was 2.1 billion hryvnias that is a little bit more than in 2009. However, such sums make up only 96.6% of the approved planned annual amounts. More than 81% of the NASU state funding goes towards payroll (Natsionalnaja 2011: 5). Expenses to cover scientific and research activity per one scientist in Ukraine come up to 40.8 thousand dollars. (UNESCO 2010).

In Belarus in 1990–1996 the amount of funding went down by 7 times though in the second half of the 1990s this tendency was reversed (Natsionalnaja 2003: 7). However, after 2008 science funding began to decrease again as in 2009 it was 0.65% of the GDP, in 2008 – 0.75%, and in 2007 – 0.97% of the GDP. In 2010 if we compare the data with 2007 this indicator was 28% lower (Karotki daklad 2011: 20). In 2009 the main source of funding of scientific research and development was the state budget with 61.8% (in 2008 it was 52.9%) of the total funding allocated to research and development. The own funds of scientific bodies used for research and development made up 12.7% (with 27.4% in 2008 and 38.6% in 2007 respectively). Foreign investments (including foreign credits and loans)

came up to 8.5% in 2009 (with 5.5% invested in 2008 and 5.3% in 2007). 57.7% of financing was spent on development in 2009 (and 59.2% in 2008), 26.9% of the money was used on applied research (26.1% in 2008), and 15.4% was provided for fundamental research (14.7% in 2008). However, one should remember that in the last six years the funding of fundamental research in Belarus was gradually decreasing (in 2006 it was 17.7%, in 2007 – 15.8%, and in 2008 – 14.7%), though in 2009 the amount allocated for fundamental research went up to 113.4% in comparison with 2008 (O sostojanii 2010: 17–19, 130). Recent statements of President A. Lukashenko allow to make a conclusion that the funding for fundamental research will be cut. Expenses to cover scientific and research activity in Belarus per one scientist come up to 17.4 thousand dollars (UNESCO 2010).

Thus, the insufficient financing of the modern science system in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus negatively affects all spheres of scientific activity from the process of training scientists to international cooperation. This, in turn, does not allow to see any significant economic contribution from science. Many academic establishments still have the old system of mainly state or departmental financing. The increase in the number of the fulfilled economic agreements is accompanied by the decrease in funding at their expense. Salaries of scientists are insufficient. There are no investments in scientific equipment and devices.

Academic Scientific Resources through Prism of Science of Science and Scientometrics

When one looks at the prospects of validation of scientific product of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus one notices a dual approach (national and international). The national approach treats science, first of all, from an economic perspective concentrating on science's influence on the standards of living (Ceaglei 2012). On the other hand, the international approach emphasizes efficiency and transparency.

Since the institutionalized science is subsidized by the state it is under constant scrutiny of tax payers. Society often treats science pragmatically demanding immediate results. However, one cannot expect instantaneous (and often even mid-term) results thus leading to stress and a hidden conflict between the society and the academic community. In a long-term perspective the application of knowledge in real life turns into an essential financial profit that has been proved time and again.

Being a complex form of a new knowledge production science represents a triad consisting of the personality of the scientist, scientific environment, and scientific community. The social and psychological portrait of a scientist includes such characteristics as curiosity, passion, an aspiration to thoroughly study the object, independent thinking, rich imagination, friendliness, and the ability to solve difficult tasks. It is essential for a scientist to have relations with pedagogy staff, family, an immediate circle of communication, social environment, etc. (Volodarskaja 2009: 16). These specific factors should be considered when analyzing the achievements or failures of the academies of sciences and scientific communities of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus.

We should address the theoretical and methodological achievements of science of science if we want to raise the international status of academic science of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. J. Bernal (1901–1971), a British researcher, is considered to be the founder of science of science. In 1939 he published the book "The Social Function of Science" (Bernal 1939) identifying science as a special object of research. In 1966 J. Bernal wrote that, "Science of science, or as I call it in other places, self-consciousness of science is a great undertaking of the second half of the XX century" (Bernal 1966: 255–280). D. Price, "the father of science of science", applied the quantitative method of analysis of science development (Price 1961; Price 1963). At some point there was a rapid growth of scientific research dealing with scientometrics and its components (Nalimov, Mulchenko 1969; Granovsky 2011). At present scientometrics includes several separate branches such as history of science, philosophy and methodology of science, social and psychological issues of science, economic problems of science, management of science, and image of science. Methods of scientometrics allow evaluating the contribution of specific scientists and scientific bodies into the world information flow.

The importance and weight of this or that country from the scientific point of view is assessed on the basis of the quantity and quality of innovative scientific produce. The recognition of fundamental research is done through scientific publications while the recognition of applied and technological research is evident in registered intellectual property and patents. At the present moment the EU, the USA and Japan together produce about 3/4 of the total amount of scientific publications (Thomson 2010; Web 2010) and 4/5 of all patents (WIPO 2010).

The annual world report of SCImago Institutions Rankings 2011 (containing the results of 3042 most effective scientific organizations from 104 countries based on the data for 2005–2009 and registered by the bibliographic and reference database SciVerse Scopus) includes only one Moldovan organization, the Academy of sciences of Moldova (2127 place). Ukraine is on the list with 7 scientific establishments including the NASU (89 place in the world) and 6 universities. Belarus is represented by 3 research centers, among them the NASB (802 place) (SIR 2011).

Science presupposes the inclusion of the scientific product into the world research turnover and its recognition at the international level. One of the international recognition factors is citation index *(Social Science Citation Index [SSCI])* or its Internet version *(Web of Science)* in the sphere of social sciences (Markusova 2002). The world-accepted quantity characteristic of the level of recognition in scientometrics is *If,* the impact factor defined as the result received by dividing the number of cited articles of a specific journal by other observed journals during two years by the number of articles published in that specific journal during that same period of time. The higher the impact factor, the more prestigious the journal is. There are about 6000 journals in the world having an impact factor while there are more than 30 000 specialized scientific journals published in the world (Pishchenko, Rotaru 2008: 142).

Moreover, scientific production receives its international recognition on the basis of SCI (a database for natural and engineering sciences and mathematics).

The CIS countries have a very low index of article citation. Even Russia with its high human and financial potential practically does not reach the average European level. In no field does the citation of the articles of Russian scientists reach the average world level though in some areas it is close to it. This is true for physics, informatics and computing, space research, mathematics, and technical sciences. The Russian Academy of Sciences stands out as it is a leader in 12 out of 16 scientific fields (Simonov 2011).

The data provided by SCI и SSCI indicate a small contribution of the Republic of Moldova into the development of world science with its 0.02. This number remained unchanged throughout 2006–2009 while in 2010 it actually decreased (0.01). The dynamics of the Ukrainian contribution is similar to the dynamics in Russia as there was a decline by 1.5 times in 1996 with the indicator equaling 0.46 and 0.31 in 2010. Belarus also shows a decline from 0.11 in 1996 to 0.7 2010. In comparison, Romania has greatly increased its indicators (the growth by more than three times from 0.16 in 1996 to 0.51 in 2010) (SJR 2012). This growth became noticeable immediately upon the country joining the EU. The impact factor of Romanian researchers almost equals that of the researchers in Ukraine though if one looks at the scale (in particular, the population) Romania is certainly much smaller (Human 2010).

There is another scientometrics indicator that can serve as an alternative to the impact factor. It is an h-index (offered by the American physicist Jorge Hirsch in 2005) that concentrates on the productivity of the scientist, namely, the number of publications and the quantity of citation of the publications. This index is used in the databases Web of Science or SciVerse Scopus. This index equals 1139 for the USA, 262 for Russia, 164 for Ukraine, 88 for Lithuania, and 44 for Moldova respectively (Dikusar 2011: 28–30; Dikusar, 2011: 105–108). The V. Vernadsky National library presents and publishes on its web-site the rating of top 100 researchers of Ukraine using the information of the scientometric database of SciVerse Scopus. It includes more than 20 members of the NAS of Ukraine (Reiting 2012).

In the Republic of Moldova there is only one journal that is considered and that has got an impact factor. It is "Elektronnaja obrabotka materialov" ("Surface Engineering and Applied Electrochemistry") founded in 1965 and published by the Institute for Applied Physics of the AS of Moldova (the main editor is academician Mircha Bologa). The journal is published in Russian and English. The English version is distributed by the company Springer. Most articles published in the journal come from Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Russia (Bologa 2011: 35–36; Springer 2011). On the whole, the share of articles of the ASM researchers published in the journals with the impact factor is quite low (338 in 2011) and in some scientific fields it is simply non-existent (0 in the field of social sciences and humanities) (Duca 2012: 7).

In 1997–2007 the contribution of the Republic of Moldova into the world scientific production (scientific articles indexed by ISI) made 0.018% of the total number of 7 million putting the country into the 94th place out of 145 present in that classification. The

articles of Moldovan authors were cited on average 3.44 times while the average world indicator is 9.88. As a consequence, Moldova finds itself at the end of the classification (129th place) and it makes her achievements comparable with those of Turkey, the UAE, Pakistan, and Oman. However, it is higher on the list than Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan. According to the number of publications per one million people (503) Moldova takes the 86th place in the world behind such countries of the third world as Trinidad and Tobago, Botswana, Fiji, Jamaica, Lebanon, Brunei, and the majority of the Arab states (Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, etc.). When dealing with the citation of publications of Moldovan authors per one million people (1731) Moldova is in the 90th place in the world and it is comparable with Venezuela, Fiji, Thailand, Namibia, and the best indicators of China and India. During the studied period Moldova spent about 25 thousand Euros on an ISI article while the countries of Eastern Europe (Hungary, Romania, Poland) spend about 100 thousand Euros, the Western Europe spends about 400–500 thousand Euros, and the USA – more than 800 thousand Euros (Cuciureanu, Spiesberger 2010: 21; Cuciureanu, 2011: 107–110). Accordingly, in spite of very limited financing important results have been achieved at the international level.

Bibliometric data for Ukraine show a rather low international level of Ukrainian science. The number of publications of Ukrainian authors is different in different sources and varies between 4100 and 4500 during 1995–2007. It means that the share of Ukrainian publications in the world went down from 0.52% in 1996–2000 to approximately 0.3% in 2007. At the same time it should be mentioned that the share of Ukrainian publications in certain spheres of technical sciences such as welding, electric machines, space research is much higher. These areas remain far ahead in comparison with other countries. The lowest Ukrainian publication indexes are found in social and natural sciences and humanities. Institutes of the National academy of sciences mainly publish articles in international reviewed journals while universities concentrate more on national publications. The total number o9f publications in Ukraine keeps rising every year with 314 830 articles published in 2009. To a certain extent, this is the result of the rules introduced by the Ukrainian system of science and education as publications in national journals are more important for receiving a scientific degree than publications in international journals (Yegorov 2010: 21).

Indicators of scientific activity provided by SCImago Journal & Country Rank according to the number of publications in well-known scientific journals in 2004–2008 are the following: 30 567 publications in Ukraine (668 per 1 million people), 7090 publications in Belarus (748 per 1 million people), and 1336 publications in Moldova (375 per 1 million people) accordingly. Most of these publications are produced by academies of sciences of these countries.

Let's compare these numbers with indicators for other countries of the former USSR: 5719 publications in Estonia (4268 per 1 million people); 8152 publications in Lithuania (2509 per 1 million people); 2394 in Latvia (1074 per 1 million people); 2639 in Armenia (811 per 1 million people); 2243 in Georgia (811 per 1 million people); 36 publications

in Turkmenistan (7 per 1 million people). When comparing these number with those in the developed countries one can see a huge gap as there are 56 7695 publications in Great Britain (9187 per 1 million people); 69 331 in Israel (8995 per 1 million people); 50 7935 in Germany (6209 per 1 million people); 180 3529 publications in the USA (5800 per 1 million people) (Khavrus 2011).

International recognition of scientific publications also finds its reflection in joint articles written in cooperation with foreign authors. If in 1988 only 7% of scientific literature was the result of international cooperation now it is 25%. This indicator is higher for small countries. In Moldova about ¾ of internationally recognized articles were written in cooperation with authors from 82 countries and this is the highest in the CIS countries. It testifies to the presence of the tendency of researchers to integrate into the international scientific process. At the same time only those researchers who cooperate with foreign colleagues can achieve international recognition of their results and have publications in prestigious journals. For instance, In Armenia and Georgia this indicator is about 60%, in Ukraine and Belarus it is 45%, in Israel, Canada, Italy, Great Britain and Spain it is 40, and in Russia it is 35% while in the countries with substantial financing (the USA, Japan, China) these numbers vary between 22–27% (Cuciureanu 2009: 84–91). In 2006–2008, according to the UNESCO report, joint scientific publications had the following dynamics: in Moldova in 2006 there were 171 publications, in 2007 – 131, in 2008 – 151; in Belarus in 2006 – 466, in 2007 – 468, in 2008 – 486; and, finally, in Ukraine in 2006 – 1918, in 2007 – 2086, and in 2008 – 2079 such publications (UNESCO 2010).

Achievements in the field of applied research and technological development are recognized by three most important world bureaus for patent registration: the European Patent Organization (EPO), the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the Japan Patent Office (JPO). Together they cover three most important markets of technologies. 3 countries with the highest number of patents issued include the USA (59 089), Japan (46 934) and Germany (33 289) (Total 2011). In 2011 Ukraine took the 41st place in the world having registered 131 patents (22.4% more than in 2010) in the EPO. In 1997–2007 Moldovan researchers registered 7 applications to receive patents in the EPO, 12 in the USPTO and none in the JPO (Cuciureanu 2011: 116).

The USA has got the highest potential in the development of new materials and technologies of their practical use (5.03 points out of 6). America is followed by Japan (3.08), Germany (2.12), Canada (2.08), Taiwan (2.00), Sweden (1.97), Great Britain (1.73), France (1.60), Switzerland (1.60), and Israel (1.53) (RAND 2012). According to the Index of global economic competitiveness in 2008–2009 Moldova was in the 129th place according to the level of innovativeness (World 2012). The Agency for Innovation and Technology Transfer, scientific and technological parks, as well as incubators along with programs for technology transfer were created to strengthen the link between economy and science. Some authors believe that in a short-term perspective it is more important for Moldova to adopt rather than develop technologies for the increase in production (Belostecinic 2009: 52–54).

One of the challenges is the outdated scientific equipment and devices in scientific and research organizations and laboratories. For instance, the scientific equipment of the NAS of Ukraine is absolutely out of date as 60% of all devices have been in use from 15 to 25 years while in developed countries the period of use of such equipment does not exceed 5–7 years (Novyj 2010: 172). This negatively affects any scientific innovation.

The index of innovativeness of economy in Belarus was 0.3 in 2009 (in Lithuania it was 0.313, in Poland – 0.294, in Sweden – 0.636) placing it into the 25th place in the Euro Table (O sostojanii 2010: 67). The number of enterprises and organizations producing technological innovations of the total amount of the NAS organizations was 15.0% (O sostojanii 2010: 92). It is a very low European indicator. Belarusian subjects made 133 applications to receive the Eurasian invention patent. It is 17% higher than in 2008 (in 2004 there were 46 application, in 2005 – 54, in 2006 – 64, in 2007 – 99, and in 2008 – 114) (O sostojanii 2010: 137).

Bibliometric data for Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus are very modest from the international point of view though we should note that there are some achievements, and there is a certain scientific potential needed for a successful scientific activity in the modern world.

International Scientific Cooperation

Through the international scientific cooperation academies get a chance to use progressive technological resources such as an intensive development of the global infrastructure, get access to serious funding, exchange experience, etc. Developed countries, for instance, spend huge parts of the public budget on the international scientific cooperation with 5% provided by the USA and up to 25% given by small highly developed European countries (Cuciureanu 2009: 44).

Academies of sciences of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus (the latter is in a certain international isolation) are striving for cooperation with international scientific bodies. Consequently, external funding has become more easily available and science is oriented towards world tendencies. There has been certain recognition of scientific results on the international level (including publications in journals from the ISI list).

In 2011 Moldovan organizations operating in the field of science and innovation participated in 101 international projects (they managed to attract 1.3 million dollars) including 45 grants provided by the European Commission, 5 grants of the Program "Science for Peace and Security" (SPS), 22 grants of the Swiss National Science Foundation within the frame of the Program of Scientific Co-operation between Eastern Europe and Switzerland (SCOPES), 3 grants of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 1 grant of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), etc. (Raport 2012: 286–289; Duca 2012: 7). Moldova is the first of the CIS countries to join the Framework Program of the European Union (support of research programs that started in the 1980s). Joining the Framework Program was preceded by a number of offers of cooperation. For example, in 2007–2008 33 Moldovan organizations working in the field of science and innovations

cooperated with partner organizations from 27 EU countries. Most of them were from Romania (77), Italy (54), Greece (49), Bulgaria (45), Germany (43), and Great Britain (43) (Cuciureanu 2011: 114). January 1, 2012 Moldovan researchers obtained full rights in the European research space including the right to vote and participate in international projects (Duca 2012: 4–5).

It should be noted that academies of sciences of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus jointly participate in a number of scientific programs and international conferences. Before 2005 Moldova and Belarus signed about 60 bilateral agreements in different spheres including science (Gheleţchi 2009: 9–11; Ermolovich 2005: 14). 100 agreements were signed with Ukraine before 2007 including those in the field of science (Bîzgu 2007: 32–35). In 2010 Moldovan organizations working in the sphere of science and innovations participated in 19 projects together with the Ministry of Education of Ukraine and in 20 projects with the Belarusian Republican Foundation for Fundamental Research (Raport 2011: 189).

On May 13, 2010 the general meeting of the NAS of Ukraine was held in Kiev. The meeting was attended by the President of the Academy of sciences of Moldova Gheorghe Duca. He met with his colleague, the president of the NAS of Ukraine academician B. Paton. The questions of bilateral cooperation including those involving joint projects and research bodies in both countries were discussed during the meeting (Raport 2011: 188).

The most intensive form of cooperation between the academies of sciences of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus in all spheres was the International Association of Academies of Sciences headed in 2006–2011 by the President of the NAS of Ukraine Boris Paton (Paton 2011).

International cooperation allows creating suitable conditions for the attraction of funding. Grant joint scientific and technical projects in Belarus attracted 4.2 million dollars in 2009 with 2.6 million dollars going to the NAS of Belarus (O sostojanii 2010: 121).

Taking into account that international cooperation is the main form of internationalization of research in the private sector private companies participate in it through outsourcing. For example, the Institute of Plant Growing "Porumbeni" from Moldova actively cooperates on an agreement base with various economic agents from Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Corn hybrids created and supplied by this Institute make up 80% of the market in Belarus (Cuciureanu 2011: 122–123).

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Academies of sciences of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus have to solve a number of complicated re-organization issues including problems with staff, international integration, commercialization of scientific projects, etc. However, when dealing with these problems they face various difficulties such as lack of funding, ageing of their staff, outdated equipment, language barriers, "provincial character" of science, etc.

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BYZANCE APRÈS BYZANCE: POST-IMPERIAL CONFIGURATIONS OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN BORDERLAND (experience and contexts of the Moldovan/ Romanian historiography)

Keywords: *post-Byzantine heritage, borderland, Terra Moldavia*

The concept of *Byzance après Byzance* (Byzantium after Byzantium) was introduced into scientific milieu by Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga who attracted researchers' attention to the political, social, and cultural heritage of the Byzantine Empire. In 1935 his book called "Byzance après Byzance. Continuation de l'Histoire de la vie Byzantine"[1] was published. Contrary to the debate about the decline of the empire and its epilogue represented by the destruction of Constantinople in 1453 and last remains of the Byzantine state such as the Despotate of Morea and Trebizond (in 1460–1461) the author offered the "image of the survived Byzantine"[2] in the south-east of Europe filling the historical era of the Classical and Late Middle Ages in the Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia with the idea of *the Byzantine succession*. N. Iorga believes that Byzantine institutions and ideas preserved by the people along with the cultural autonomy acquired there forms of the inherited civilization which became a factor of community identity up to the time of the strengthening and spread of the ideologies of the national state.

The publication of the book between the two world wars of the XX century was probably a response to the unfolding search for a new geopolitical identity of southeastern Europe. At that time, the continuity of the Byzantine Empire, both in Romanian and south-eastern historiography, seemed a historically obvious fact that was based on the image of the Orthodox Church prevalent in the public consciousness. The Orthodox Church was seen as the preserver of traditions and connected the peoples of the area with Byzantium's spiritual heritage.[3] However, at the other end of the Byzantium heritage discourse the sacred images of the origins of nations and peo-

ples of southeastern Europe that inherited the Byzantine principle of *Symphony* (Greek συμφωνία) and defined the special role of Orthodoxy in the national mythology turned into old-fashioned and harmful traits of traditionalism. The correlation of the Byzantine tradition with a European style modernization that led to the implementation of the project of the national state during the XIX century and the unification of Romanians in 1918 crystallised the image of Byzantium as an obstacle to early modernization and as stagnation in comparison with the West; that turned Romanians into accomplices of the forming of the new empire that adopted the ideology of the "new", "Third Rome".[4]

In this context, however, historians developed and offered their own definition and conditions of *the civilized choice* made before and after 1453.[5] Historians had to rely on that stage specific methodological approaches that were used during the development of the concepts "nation" and "state" and that preserved special reverence to the "integrity of structures" and "immutable laws of development". In particular, the choice of the nobility of Wallachian principalities was explained as a "result of predominantly intellectual and cultural influences including those established through direct political relations [with the Byzantine Empire]"[6]. Christianity was seen as a constituent link of the ethnogenesis of Romanians while the Byzantine baptizing of Slavic Bulgarians found its direct "reflection in the subsequent development of the church organization, culture and spiritual life to the north of the Danube"[7]. In this context, it seems quite clear that the introduction of the "Slavic-Byzantine religious ritual" outlined the acceptance of Romanians under the jurisdiction of the Constantinople Patriarchate as well as the provision of the special status to Romanians who remained to this day the only Romance people among the Orthodox peoples, therefore, "preserving linguistic ties with Rome and spiritual ties with Constantinople"[8].

Obviously, in different intellectual fields, the interpretations of this historical episode were lined up in certain cultural hierarchies, reinforcing the image of the Carpatho-Danubian space as a borderland of empires including Roman, Byzantine (Ottoman), and Russian. However, the branches of the genealogy of Eastern European borderland certainly lead to the projects of imperial (Byzantine) succession performing a variety of configurations: from the "full scale cultural utopias for the region" up to the territorial annexations. Repeated re-conversion of this tradition in the new centers of influence, as well as building a social and cultural space in the *imperial*, is one of the factors determining the "context of Eastern European borderland with the Balkans and the European south"[9]. This generally explains the presence of the Republic of Moldova in the historical and geo-cultural areas with its stable border identities. [10]

The study of Romanian researcher Alexander Elian published in 1964 dealt with the relationship between the Byzantium and the Principality of Moldavia in the XV century. A separate section is devoted to the report of Moldovan Metropolitan George IV (1723–1729) about the visit to Kiliya of the Byzantine Emperor John VIII Palaeologus and his meeting with Moldavian ruler Alexander I of Moldavia (Alexandru cel Bun). The author believes that the description of the event, often attested in the Moldovan historical tradi-

tion of the XVIII–XIX centuries, went through a certain development and turned into a historical legend with many political implications. In the Synodal Act of Metropolitan Jacob Putnyanu from January 1, 1752 against the Greeks entering the church hierarchy of Moldova, this episode was "supported" with details emphasizing the legal independence of the Moldovan Church. The legend describing the dialogue between two sovereigns ends up with the return to Constantinople of the emperor who sent as a token of respect to Alexander *the crown* and *purple robe* (sic). They were later traditionally used as part of the rulers' clothing. The emperor also kept his promise and provided independence to Moldovan churches following the example of "Ohrid, Ipek or Cyprus". The Sobor (Council) approved the decision supporting it with documents which were allegedly kept in Neamt monastery during the reign of Dumitrașcu Cantacuzino before the invasion of Poles (1673, 1674–1675, 1684–1685) and whose description was provided by Metropolitan George.[11] It is worth noting that Dimitrie Cantemir mentioned another symbol of independence recognition a little earlier in "Description of Moldavia" *(Descriptio Moldaviae)*. It was *the diadema regium* sent by the emperor. Such reflections of scribes on the independence of Moldova in the early XV century were probably caused by Metropolitan Dosoftei's finding (1624–1693) of the 1392 charter of ruler Roman I in monastery Probota.[12] The charter contained the address *great sovereign*. The found written document later turned out to be extremely important and was repeatedly reproduced by many scribes. For Dimitrie Cantemir, just like in the description provided by Metropolitan George, Moldavia's participation in the community of unconquered states which were under the spiritual guidance of the Byzantine basileus at the beginning of the XIV century had a special meaning backed by the inherited symbols of political power.

At the beginning of the XXI century when it seemed that all the mythological facts of this legend were well known the legend was further developed and acquired "new details" in the book of the former President Petru Lucinschi "Moldova and Moldovans"[13]. Having mentioned several times the status of the "second Byzantium" that medieval Moldavia inherited for a short time as well as the "imperial consciousness" acquired by Moldavians while they were a part of the Russian Empire the author following the post-Soviet-style historical and political canon provided the details of the Byzantine Emperor's visit to "our country" at the beginning of the chapter about ruler Alexander I of Moldavia and the formation of administrative political structures of medieval Moldavia at the beginning of the XIV century. Citing the chronicler, the author argues that when returning from Vienna to Constantinople, John II (sic) Palaeologus stopped in Suceava, was met and welcomed by Alexander and with all the honors was accompanied to Galați. "[...] when back in Constantinople, the ruler sent Alexander the imperial crown, the purple robe and the golden belt which in fact served as the international recognition of the Moldavian state. Then the Emperor sent Metropolitan Joseph a robe, namely, a bishop silk clothing, and an episcopal miter while his wife Alexandra Anna received the miraculous icon of Our Lady. The author emphasizes that that specific ruler created Bessarabia pushing the eastern Moldavian border to the Dniester."[14]

It is necessary to clarify that the scientific debate about the influence of Byzantium on the Carpatho-Danubian space in the last decades inevitably affected the characteristics of the made borrowings and transformations. Moreover, the critics of the concept of *Byzantium after Byzantium* expressed their doubts about the authenticity of the inherited forms that emerged not in the center but at the periphery of the Byzantine civilization. It was emphasized that the transfer of Byzantium's models of political power, culture and mentality was brokered by South-Danubian neighbors, i.e., Bulgarians and Serbs, and this could not but lead to the borrowing of the characteristic elements of "non-imperial features" or resistance to "projects of supranational political entities".[15] Andrew Pippidi who dedicated his book to the Byzantine political tradition in Romanian states noted that over the XVI–XVII centuries Romanian rulers did not appropriate the imperial title but preferred to "use evasive or direct hints about the nature of their dignity which is close to the imperial one".[16] In his opinion, the hypothesis of *translation imperii* in Romanian principalities would contradict the very configuration of the political power divided between several administrative and cultural centers such as Târgoviște or Bucharest in Wallachia, and Suceava and Jassy in Moldavia. Historians believe that the desire of Wallachia and Moldavia rulers to take on the role of the heirs of the Byzantine emperors was often the result of creative writing and was never a subject of achievable projects. In fact, as the author points out, *the revival of the Byzantine Empire* was an ambivalent political ideal for Romanians. The projects of Byzantium restoration long associated with the necessity to liberate Constantinople, did not fully reflect the existing interests while the involvement of Western countries in anti-Ottoman campaigns radically changed their meaning, and could probably have had unintended consequences. Ultimately, the author argues, the phenomenon of *Byzantium succession* in the history of the medieval Moldavia and Wallachia, should only be considered in the context of a *symbolic belonging*[17] constantly coordinated with the political situation.

However, subsequent research led to a series of questions and controversies. Forty years after the publication of Nicolae Iorga's book there formed an opinion that in fact the concept of *Byzance après Byzance* only suggests that "people of southeastern Europe, especially Romanians, were able to express themselves only with a significant help of Byzantium, in opposition to it, building up their own *non-Byzance*"[18]. Areas for further consideration and detail were determined on selected topics of research. They included such questions as whether in Medieval Moldavia and Wallachia the representation of *the revival of Byzantium* is a political ideal, a regulatory paradigm, a "horizon of expectations", a myth, or Constantinople nostalgia. What were the echoes of the imperial idea and its attempts to revive the political practices of the social memory or the book tradition? In the context of the debate on the issue of Byzantium continuity the problem of cultural identity directly determined the research issues of this article. What is the influence on these processes of Moldavia's border location in relation to the Byzantine Empire, and later the Ottoman and Russian empires? How did the discrepancy between the ideal of the Empire revival and the re-established practices, projects and their different interpretations reveal itself in the bor-

derland context? Have there been changes in the stored images of the past? What produced alternating partition from and reconnection with this tradition?

The working hypothesis of this investigation states the idea that the location of the Carpatho-Danubian area at the border of empires – Roman, Byzantine (Ottoman), and Russian – for two thousand years has produced a multitude of cultural configurations confirming the interaction between the center and the periphery as well as the identity structures characterizing the borderland as *a space of cultural communication*(Lotman). In the borderlands of the post-Byzantine epoch new sovereign peoples and dynasties have emerged, which appealed to the symbolic infrastructure of the empire as a source of legitimacy and authority, and, in the end, this fact turned into a change of patterns of the internal organization of the empire.

Undoubtedly, answers to many questions lead to the beginning of the historical era. The foundation of "New Rome" in the IV century on the banks of Bosporus marked the move of the center of the Roman Empire to the East, and once again redrew the space of southeastern Europe as a zone of convergence of civilizations.[19] The political activity within the frame of the Byzantine ideological paradigm was interpreted only as the domain of the manifestation of the divine will and the embodiment of Christian imperatives while the space of the empire and its borders were to grow at the expense of the peoples and territories joined by the Christian missionary and with the help of political means. British historian Dimitri Obolensky in his book, "The Byzantine Commonwealth" presented the stages of a sharp turn in the history of Eastern Europe that drew its peoples and states into the political and cultural orbit of the empire.[20] In southeastern Europe the northern border of the Byzantine Empire established after the conquest of Emperor Basil II by 1019 went up to the place where the Danube and the Drava River merge and then followed the route of the latter's lower and middle reaches. To the north of this line there stretched lands "which the Byzantines never owned but which they always treated, at least in the early Middle Ages, as being within the scope of their influence"[21]. The reasons for this were partly ideological, partly political as "Byzantine rulers, who considered themselves the successors of the Caesars of Rome, well remembered that those once owned Pannonia, Transylvania, and Dacia and that in II AD Roman legions came to Slovakia and moved north to the foothills of the Carpathians"[22]. In addition, the constant pressure on the central government from the periphery formed a particular configuration of the political universe of the Byzantine Empire. Attention to Transdanubia lands was also dictated by the fact that from the III century to the IX century that area was a "melting pot" for the tribes which kept under constant tension *limes* of the empire, and which had to be tamed by "means of Byzantine diplomacy and culture". The direct link between the Balkans and the area beyond the Danube was the trade routes which passed through that territory along with the directions of military invasions leading to the Bosporus, Aegean and Adriatic seas from central and northern Europe or from the East.[23] The author believes that the consolidation of the Bulgarian rule and the emergence of new centers of political life in this part of Europe led to the development of social institutions, the formation of ethnic identity, and soon the interest in the

achievements of the Byzantine civilization that arose in the northern part of the Balkan Peninsula. These processes developed in the second half of the IX century that was a relatively peaceful period. It continued amid tumultuous upheavals that shook the peninsula in the X century until the end of the first millennium when *the Byzantine Commonwealth of Nations* in Eastern Europe reached its largest size and "unseen before cultural and political unity"[24]. Contrary to the decline of political relations in the second half of the XII century and during the XIII century, the peoples and states from the Gulf of Finland to the southern Peloponnesus, from the Adriatic Sea to the Caucasus, were united by Byzantium's influence on their religion, culture and social institutions and to a certain extent supported the bonds of loyalty to the Byzantine Church and Empire, or were its members.

While agreeing in general with the concept of *Byzantium after Byzantium*, Dim. Obolensky, however, did not join in the tendency to treat these processes mainly in terms of ethnicity. In his opinion, the status of Porte's vassals did not prevent the rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia from feeling like the only Christian rulers in souteastern Europe. Trading grain and cattle brought considerable wealth and enabled them to provide support and protection to the Church of Constantinople, Alexandria, Jerusalem, and the monasteries of Mount Athos. The author believes that for these and other reasons "they considered themselves the heirs of the Byzantine emperors" and, to the north of the Danube, under their tutelage, this represented a kind of "Byzantium in miniature" recognized in most of southeastern Europe and in Christian communities of the Middle East. That "Byzantium in miniature" was "impregnated with the political and cultural tradition of the empire, much deeper than their contemporaries in Russia, than the Moscow Tsars"[25].

The two Romanian medieval principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia that were formed in 1330 and 1359 accordingly, of course, had features typical of the context of southeastern Europe and of the historical epoch. These processes directly provided for the establishment of their own church hierarchy while the circumstances of the recognition of the Moldavian Orthodox Archdiocese by Constantinople, which took place, according to the Romanian historians in 1387 or a little earlier, were directly related to the question of the international political recognition of the Principality of Moldavia and the confirmation of the jurisdiction of one of the fundamental institutions of the medieval state. Achieving this goal required a lot of effort from Moldavian and Wallachian rulers as the Ecumenical Patriarchate wanted to place only Greek bishops as heads of recognized church structures. The conflict with patriarchy was perhaps due to the expression of the interests of the local political elite and the church hierarchy that at time existed *de facto* in the Moldavian state. Historians are of the opinion that in the context of the indisputable authority of Constantinople, the church in Moldavia in the second half of the XIV century, in particular, small and medium clergy, had close relations with Galych Diocese, identified in the records as the Byzantine episcopate (1328, 1347) or Metropolis (1303-1305, 1341).[26] This allowed Moldavian ruler Petru Mușat (1375–1391) to convince Metropolitan Galich to promote to the rank of Metropolitan two Bishops of Moldavia Metropolitan Joseph and Bishop Meletius. In response, the Patriarch of Constantinople, Anthony IV, refused to recognize Joseph as

the Metropolitan of Moldavia, elevated to the rank Teodosie and Ieremia, and anathemed the ruler and the entire population of the country for the refusal to welcome Teodosie and Ieremia to Moldavia.[27] After long negotiations and an unsuccessful visit in 1395 of the ambassadors of the Moldavian church headed by archpriest Peter the conflict was solved during the ruling of ruler Alexander I of Moldavia (1400–1432). Joseph was enthroned as Metropolitan in Suceava, the Moldavian Ruler residence, while the Moldavian Church was recognized as being under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.[28]

However, according to some researchers, the following period was not deprived of the manifestations of *religious nationalism*. It was the second significant blow to *Byzantine universalism*, after the collapse of the empire and the loss of the western part due to the fall of Constantinople. It is quite paradoxical but against this background Ottoman Porte contributed to the support of Christian universalism of Byzantium. Making no distinction between religion and ethnicity, the Ottomans identified Christians at the population controlled by the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In this case, the power of the emperor over Christians moved into the hands of the patriarch who lost freedom during that period but not the trust of his flock.[29] In the *berat* issued in January 1454 by Sultan Mehmed II the Patriarch of Constantinople was recognized as *etnarh* (мilet-basha), the Vizier of the Sultan of all Christians, the head of the Orthodox Church both on all occupied territories and outside them.[30] The berats issued in 1483 and 1525 by Turkish sultans Bayazid II and Suleyman I, mentioned two Danubian principalities – Wallachia and Moldavia – that were subordinate to the Patriarchate. Sultan's second charter in 1525 described the same order of the recognition by the Patriarchate of Wallachian and Moldavian Metropolitans. It was also later described by Dimitrie Cantemir. The order was identical to the procedure of the appointment of Metropolitan of Kiev who moved under the jurisdiction of the Constantinople Patriarchate in 1465–1467.[31]

Shortly after the fall of Constantinople infrequent attacks of the Ottomans on Moldavia[32] turned into a constant military pressure and a succession of heavy battles and truces during the second half of the XV century. They led to the conquest by the Ottomans of Kiliya and Ackerman[33] and payments of tolls to Porte. A new attempt of Petru IV Rareș (1527–1538 and 1541–1546) to fight the Ottoman rule in 1538 brought a devastating campaign of Suleyman I, the consequence of which was the establishment of the Ottoman suzerainty and the annexation of Budjak and Tighina. However, the Turkish conquest of the Balkans and the fall of Constantinople defined the unique position of Wallachia and Moldavia. Retaining their relative political and cultural autonomy in XV–XVII centuries, Moldavian and Wallachian rulers mastered the role of defenders of cultural and spiritual traditions of the Byzantine Empire in southeastern Europe. Without excluding the interaction between the tradition and innovation of these processes from then on the political projects of the rulers were supplemented by several components such as the help provided to Athos and the Orthodox East, following the principles corresponding to a certain Greco-Roman model and Byzantine ideal (*concordia*) which added special sense, solemnity, and sacredness to the institutes of internal ruling and external resistance to the Ottoman

Porte.[34] In this context, it should be noted that the military campaign of the Ottomans in the south-east of Europe that led to the fall of Serbian Despotate in 1459 and Morea Despotate in 1460, the conquest of the Empire of Trebizond in 1461, the Kingdom of Bosnia in 1463 and Albania in 1468, just like other subsequent events periodically caused flows of wanderers who were moving north to Christian Europe. Greeks who among others found refuge in Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania carried with them a rich ideological and spiritual heritage, fuelling the domestic political and ecclesiastical life of the Romanian State and anti-Ottoman resistance. Greeks were also more frequently found in the courts of rulers extending their participation in the privileges of the nobility through acquiring or serving and thus obtaining estates.[35] The third marriage of Stephen III of Moldavia (Ștefan cel Mare) who married Maria of Mangup, was, apparently, based on the strategy of a political alliance with a Byzantine imperial dynasty, planned during the 1471–1475 period, and completed with the conquest by the Turks of the southeastern part of the Crimea and the fall of Mangup fortress under their attack.[36] The researchers found no evidence that supports the hypothesis about the imperial claims of Stephen III on the legacy of the imperial throne, but according to some the development of the imperial idea in Romanian principalities, particularly medieval Moldavia can create a "missing link in the continuity of the Orthodox empire from the second to the third Rome"[37].

Another important cultural factor of the resulting borderland is that the penetration of Christianity to the north of the Danube starting in the XI century was through the Church Slavonic language that came to Wallachia and Moldavia from Bulgaria and Serbia. The Church Slavonic language became the language of liturgies and chancellery and the Lord's Court maintaining its status till the middle of the XVII century. The Orthodox Church and the language of its liturgy turned into the transmitter of Byzantine culture while the range of literary sources till the second half of the XV century consisted almost entirely of South Slavic and Byzantine translations. The earliest example of the Old Slavonic text of the local origin was the chronicle of Bishop Makarie (1531–1558) covering the period of Moldavian history from 1504 up to 1551. The lives of saints and chronicles, numerous stories and legends were widely used in everyday life. Among them the most popular was "Historia Alexandri Magni", the Serbian version of which was rewritten in 1562 in Neamț monastery, the Old Slavonic translation of the novel "Barlaam and Josaphat" and Matthew Blastares's set of Byzantine laws "Syntagma".

In the current context the relations with the Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian Orthodox community are developing forming a distinct cultural and religious environment. In Kiev and Bratslav, Orthodox nobility preserved their influence and support, as well as in Podolia, Volhynia, and part of Red Rus'. Nobility also maintained close ties with Greek clergy and Moldavian elite. Patriarch Jeremias II of Constantinople participated in the establishment of the Moscow Patriarchate and secured for Moscow the historical and canonical level definition of the "Third Rome"[38]. In 1589 he was returning through the Polish lands and took part in the setting of local ecclesiastical hierarchies that needed cooperation in the face of the danger of the Counter-Reformation, in particular the Orthodox "Brotherhoods"

in Vilna and Lviv. The prevailing cultural climate in Eastern Europe could also be characterized by the fact that the emissary of the throne of Constantinople during the Brest Union was Nikiforos, a representative of the Byzantine aristocratic family Cantacuzino. A representative of the Patriarchate of Alexandria was Cyril Lucaris, known in the history of the Orthodox Church of the XVII century due to his being accused of rapprochement with Lutheranism, which, as researchers suggest, began in Vilna.[39]

Another representative of this era that was a kind of "aggiornamento" of Eastern Christianity in the face of the onset of the Counter-Reformation was Metropolitan Petro Mohyla (1597–1647). A descendant of the Moldavian dynasty Movilă, Petro Mohyla became Archimandrite of Pechersk Lavra in 1627 and Metropolitan of Kiev in 1632–1633. He received the support of the cultural environment headed by Metropolitans Iob Boretsky and Isaiah Kopinsky and Archbishop Meletius Smotrytsky and put a lot of effort into the spiritual revival of Orthodoxy in the new for its time-theoretical theological basis. Submitted for discussion to the Holy Synod in Kiev in 1640 Catechism "Confessio fidei orthodoxae" (*Orthodox confession*) against the theses of Patriarch Ciril Lucaris Metropolitan identifies only two points of disagreement with Catholics.[40] Metropolitan Petro reformed the Jesuit school based in Kiev back in 1615, renamed it the Academy and was the first to introduce into its curriculum Latin, Greek, Russian, Polish, philosophy, arithmetic, rhetoric, theology, and other disciplines.

Like in other parts of medieval Europe or at the dawn of a new time, in Wallachia and Moldavia the number of rulers with no blood relations with the lord's dynasties of the Basarabs and Mușatins increased but in order to support their political legitimacy at the domestic and international level they tried to emphasize a continuous connection with *the tradition and the dynastic idea.* Often, it became a real political program and was reflected in the texts of the chronicles, architecture, or painting. A strong desire to establish an unbroken connection with the tradition and the succession of the dynastic idea in the Romanian principalities in the XVI–XVII centuries determined a search for and identification of prior political models and led to *the conversion of political models* into *the cultural and artistic dimension*.

Along with the establishment of the Orthodox Church hierarchy of the Principality of Moldavia there began a practice of founding monasteries and dedicating them to Athos monasteries and the patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem. The monastic "republic" on Mount Athos was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1312 under the act issued by Emperor Andronicus II Palaeologus to Patriarch Niphon I and confirmed by Patriarch Joachim I in 1498. The patronage of Moldavian ruler Stephen III (1457–1504) of the Monastery of Zograf according to the Venetian source extended over the whole of Athos by 1502. Greek monks repeatedly visited and participated in the management of church affairs throughout the XV–XVIII centuries and during the times of Phanariotes reign (1711–1821). Among the numerous Greek clerics and scholars who settled in the capital of Wallachia and Moldavia there were Dionysos Komnenos, Panteleimon (Paisios) Ligaridis and Ignatios Petritsis who founded the Greco-Roman College

in Târgoviște in 1646. Neo-Byzantine models were seen in the characteristic features of the ruling of Vasile Lupu who managed to raise the prestige of the country in the Orthodox world and to organize in 1642 the Synod of the Orthodox Church with the Patriarch of Constantinople and the Metropolitan of Kiev. The same year, with a direct participation of Kiev Metropolitan promoting the organization of printing in Moldavia the conclusions of the Synod in the Greek language called "The Synodal Decree of Patriarch Parfeny" were published in Jassy. In 1640 Vasile Lupu founded a school teaching Greek and Latin in Jassy.

During the second half of the XVII century, Greek teachers were often hired by different rulers of Moldavia as mentors to their children. Famous Moldavian scientist and politician Dimitrie Cantemir was a disciple of Jeremiah Kakavela who had been educated in Constantinople, Vienna and Leipzig[41] and by the future Metropolitan of Athens Meletios while Greek scholar Azaros Tsigalas was raising the children of his brother, Antiochus Cantemir.

In the eulogy written to the Patriarch of Constantinople by Athanasios Petaloros he addressed the Moldavian ruler as a "living receiver of the emperors who had ruled Byzantium before". Generous subsidies and the patronage of the Romanian Orthodox Church by the Romanian rulers in the XVI–XVII centuries of Orthodoxy supported in the Greek environment a certain prestige and hope of restoring the Byzantine Empire. The number of dogmatic and polemical works directed against Catholics and Calvinists, written by Greek scholars and printed in Jassy and Bucharest, usually at the expense of the Moldavian and Wallachian households spoke about the role taken. [42] The work of the printing press in Bucharest and Jassy, taking over the initiative from one another during the second half of the XVII century was not interrupted due to the work of Greek scholars-scribes. Wallachian ruler Șerban Cantacuzino (1678–1688) and Constantin Brâncoveanu (1688–1714) saw themselves as the protectors of the Greek Renaissance. With the help from Sevastos Kiminitis, the former director of the Academy of Constantinople, Constantin Brâncoveanu at the end of XVII century founded the Greek Academy in Bucharest, reorganizing it later in 1707, under the patronage of the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Chrysanthus of Jerusalem. Around 1700 Bucharest was visited by Antioch Patriarch Athanasius III Dabbas of Antioch requesting assistance in printing prayers in Arabic. Subsequently, following the order of the Wallachian ruler Antim Ivirianu took on publishing religious books in Greek and Arabic. Following the advice of Antim Ivirianu and the assistance of Wallachian ruler Mikhail in Tbilisi at the request of the governor of Georgia Vakhtang a printing workshop was opened and the gospel was printed for the first time in Georgian along with dozens of books before 1722, when it was destroyed by Turkish conquerors.

A new phase in the history of Moldavia and Wallachia began only a few years after the death of Constantin Brâncoveanu. It lasted throughout the XVIII century. It was the period of Phanariote rulers who were Greeks by origin and came from Constantinople dynasties of Phanar assigned to the throne of north-Danubian principalities by the Turkish sultans. The active policy of Hellenization of the administration pursued by Phanariotes and their devotion to Greek culture ensured that the legacy of Byzantium would not be forgotten

among the educated Christians of the Balkans. There was a convergence of the two strong currents of Hellenism: *neo-Byzantine* and *Byzantine Hellenism*. In the second half of the XVIII century Greek rulers and traders brought to Bucharest and Jassy trends of south-eastern modernity; Greek newspapers and literature were published in Vienna together with the news on developments in Western Europe.

Like their predecessors, Phanariotes continued their patronage over the church and education and often made generous donations to the Church in the principalities in the form of money and lands. Greek academies in Bucharest and Jassy were reorganized by Prince Alexandros Ipsilantis starting in 1776 who introduced elementary sciences into the curriculum and attracted students and teachers from abroad. However, outside the academy the teaching standard was definitely low reflecting acute problems of the development of Romanian principalities under the Turkish yoke in the XVIII century. In 1796 Andreas Wolff wrote about Greek teachers in Jassy that "it is difficult to find one or two who can read with use, not to mention the comments of ancient Greek authors"[43].

Fertile regions of Moldavia and Wallachia offered significant opportunities for the personal enrichment of the ruler and his entourage while the appointment by the Turkish sultan to the throne for Greek Phanariotes was a matter of political intrigue and bribery and required a lot of resources that the rulers tried to acquire during their short time in office. This system of corruption and exploitation was condemned by Greeks themselves including such people as historians Konstantinos Athanasios and Ipsilantis Dapontes and often received a derogatory epithet *Byzantine*.

The literature of the Phanariote era included chronicles, epigrams, anacreontic poems, books, and theological works[44] that presented the world in the first place as Orthodox with the center in Constantinople as well as the visions of the future revival of the Byzantine Empire. Messianic beliefs predicting Greek liberation from the Ottoman rule spread and influenced both those informed about and those unaware of the secrets of international politics. Historian Dapontes who served as Constantine Mavrokordat's secretary (who several times was the ruler of Moldavia and Wallachia) saw in 1738 in Bucharest the vision of a two-headed eagle with an imperial crown. But these hopes were dashed; new ideas spread among the educated Greeks. The age of the Enlightenment was coming, and the Romanian principalities, with the exception of the Prut-Dniester interfluves annexed in 1812 by the Russian Empire, were already involved in projects of their own national state.

Notes

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[13] Pyotr Luchinski, Moldova i moldovane. Perevod Borisa Mariana, Kishinev, Izd. Cartea Moldovei, 2006.

[14] Ibid. P. 78.

[15] Andrei Pippidi, Tradiția politică bizantină în țările române în secolele XVI–XVIII, București, Ed. Corint, 2001. P. 12–13, 20.

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[17] Ibid. P. 22.

[18] Valentin Al. Georgescu, Bizanțul și instituțiile românești până la mijlocul secolului al XVIII-lea, București, Editura Academiei, 1980. P. 289; apud: Daniel Barbu, Bizanț contra Bizanț. Explorări în cultura politică românească, București, Ed. Nemira, 2003. P. 16.

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[21] Ibid. P. 145.

[22] Ibid.

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[24] Dimitri Obolensky, Op. cit. P. 79, 218.

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32 The first campaign of the Ottoman army against the Principality of Moldavia took place in 1420.

33 Cetatea Albă.

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38 The charter of the Moscow Sobor in 1589 contains the definition of the Third Rome presented by the Patriarch of Constantinople Jeremias II: "[…] your, Tsar, great Russian stardom, the Third Rome, is greatest of all due to its piety…"

39 Răzvan Theodorescu, Civilizația românilor între medieval și modern, Vol. I, Orizontul imaginii, București, Ed. Meridian, 1987. P. 90.

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41 V. Koroban, Dmitry Kantemir, in "Voprosy Literatury", N. 10, 1973, Moskva. P. 151.

42 Among others they include: Spor o primate papy rimskogo, Patriarha Erusalima Nektariusa, (1682); Protiv Eresi, Arhiepiskopa Fessalonikov Simeona, (1683); Rukovodstvo protiv uchenija Ioana Karrofillisa Patriarha Ierusalima Dositeja (1694).

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Andrej Rolyonok

IDEA OF EUROPE IN BELARUSIAN IDEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE

Dedicated to the cherished memory
of Svetlana Andreevna Naumova

Abstract

The following text is a part of the research dedicated to the problem of the European identity's construction in the Belarusian ideological discourse. The research has received support at the grant contest organized by the European Humanities University thanks to the means passed on to the EHU by the European Parliament's President Jerzy Buzek.

The objective of the given research is to analyze the specifics of the "Idea of Europe" and define the strategies of the European identity's construction as a horizon of the Belarusian national identity in the Belarusian ideological discourse using the example of the journal "Belaruskaja dumka" ("Беларуская думка") (2011 issue period). The set objective is detailed in the course of solving the following theoretical goals: 1) to reveal the specifics of the ideological representation of the Belarusian national idea ("Belarusian model") in the context of being involved with the "idea of Europe"; 2) to define the conditions of the possibility as well as the measurement of the Europeanization of the "Belarusian model" in the ideological discourse; 3) analyze the tendencies and peculiarities of the transformation of historical memory (concerning the Belarusians and Belarusian statehood in the context of the European civilization/the "idea of Europe") in the ideological discourse.

By using the critical-ideological approach, as well as certain methods of content and discourse analyses, the results of the given research prove the following hypothetical statements: the "idea of Europe" is positioned independently of itself and is necessary to the

ideology of the Belarusian State as a horizon for constructing a Belarusian identity, in order to legitimize the political articulation of the Belarusian national identity in its involvement with Europe.

If the ideological articulation aspires towards the monopoly of the "European idea", the task of the critical theory of Europe is to de-monopolize and de-idealize the "idea of Europe" showing the basis of the existing interpretations/evaluations.

Keywords: "idea of Europe", Belarusian ideological discourse, construction of the national identity, "Belarusian model", selected Europeanization, Re-Sovietization of historical memory

*Introduction**

In order to understand this part, one first needs to understand the general research plan and main study parameters .

With the expansion of the European Union in 2004, "Europe" (identified with the EU) acquired a common border with Belarus. Since then the rhetoric of the authorities could not be limited to the statement of otherness or the enemy nature of 'Europe' while the strategy of communicative silence (following the principle "Belarusian model is the only model") has also exhausted itself. There, therefore, arose the need to thematize the "idea of Europe" in its relation to the "Belarusian model" of social development. This need became even more urgent with the launch of the "Eastern Partnership" in 2008 and the deterioration of relations with Russia.

In this context, it is important not just to articulate the specifics of thematizing the "idea of Europe" in the Belarusian ideological discourse, but also to define the strategy of constructing the European identity as a horizon of the Belarusian national identity. This is the goal of this study.

The "idea of Europe" is viewed as an empty signifier that is "filled with content" in the frame of the ideological discourse. Such a "filling" claims the monopoly of meaning (the strategy of homogenization) and has an idealized character (the strategy of idealization).

We will treat the ideology of the state of Belarus (hereinafter the IBS) as the Belarusian ideological discourse in this study. The IBS has no conceptual unity and is structured primarily through the reference to the statements (keynote speeches) of the President of the Republic of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko broadcasted by state mass media.[1] For example, the starting point in the design of the IBS is considered to be the year of 2003 when President Lukashenko spoke to the executives at the seminar devoted to the improvement of ideological work (Lukashenko 2003).[2] Later the ideological discourse was supplemented with numerous books and teaching materials on the "ideology of the Belarusian state".[3]

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Year after year it continued to "acquire" new statements (calls, messages, directives, decrees, programs, and concepts) of the President, was quickly integrated into the ideological discourse and was snapped up for quotes. The understanding of the "idea of Europe" in the ideological discourse of the President is of an open nature and is subject to change according to market conditions in the domestic and foreign policy. In the context of this study, it is important to register the shift in the interpretation of the "idea of Europe" found in the ideological discourse at the turn of 2010 and 2011 (before and after the presidential election).

The state media (television, radio, newspapers, magazines, etc.) especially differ in the "propaganda" of the state ideology. The socio-political and popular science magazine "Belarusian Thought"[4] ("Belaruskaja dumka", hereinafter – the "BT"), established by the Administration of the President of the Republic of Belarus (published since 1991) has its own niche in the space of ideological work.

The choice of publications in the magazine "BT" as the research subject is due to the following factors:

1) the magazine (usually in a special section "Ulada") publishes what the top officials of the regime/state machine (ministers, the attorney general, representatives of the legislative, executive and judicial power, etc.), advanced "ideologists" of the regime (eg, V. Gigin , J. Jaskiewicz, S. Reshetnikov, E. Babosov, etc.) as well as other representatives of various state institutions and the whole "pro-state thinkers" have to say.

2) Since 2009, the magazine has been on the list of the Higher Attestation Committee of the Republic of Belarus (for the publication of dissertation research results) and claims not only to be "socio-political" or "popular" but also "scientific" (unlike newspapers, for example) ;

3) The journal represents the official view of Belarusian authorities, as it has been published (since 1995) by the Presidential Administration (previously it was the Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Belarus and the Council of Ministers) and since 2007 it has been a part of the "BELTA" (Belarusian Telegraph Agency), "though, in spite of this fact, we should avoid equating the President's ideological discourse with that of the "BT"" ;

4) main editor Vadim Gigin is an active participant of public discussions[5] (especially history panels) and has been included into the list of citizens banned from entering the territory of the EU;

5) Throughout the Soviet history the "BT" was also a propaganda publication (from 1922 to 1927 it was the magazine "Vperyod" ("Forward"), from January to March 1927 it was "Vestki TsKa KP(b)B" ("News of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus", while in March 1927 it was turned into "Balshavik Belarusi" ("Bolshevik of Belarus"), and in 1952 it was once again rebranded into "Kommunist Belarusi" ("Communist of Belarus")).

In order to narrow down the field of study we have selected samples of the "BT" articles published in 2011. The choice was conditioned due to the following facts:

1) 2011 is the turning point in the relations between the EU and Belarus as the latter lost its European vector in its multi-vector policy. Those positive political contacts established within the "Eastern Partnership" broke off after the presidential elections in December 2010. A brutal dispersal of the peaceful assembly of citizens December 19, 2010, the arrest of the majority of presidential candidates and subsequent political repressions against the opposition and civil society contributed to the deterioration of relations with "Europe"; the OSCE did not recognize the elections as democratic, the EU imposed visa sanctions against state officials, sponsors and promoters of Lukashenko's regime.

2) In addition, 2011 will be remembered in the history of the Republic of Belarus as a period of an economic crisis, devaluation, inflation, public debt and selling of state property, impoverished citizens and, as a consequence, a series of civic protests ("Stop-gas", "Silent protest"). A terrorist attack in the Minsk metro 04/11/11 should be mentioned separately. In 2011 ideological workers had to do a lot of work creating the "right" interpretations of political, social, and economic events. "Outside" events such as the "Arab Spring", "Europe's debt crisis", the "danger of a technical default in the U.S.", the "humanitarian intervention in Libya and killing of Gaddafi", the "establishment of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space", etc. significantly increased the volume of work.

3) Many researchers (for example, A. Sarna[6]) have already noted that the assessment of the "idea of Europe" in the rhetoric of the Belarusian authorities depends on the current relations with Russia: if 2010 was about "information wars", then 2011 was marked by a "reset" of friendships (Russia's accession to the elections including elections to the State Duma and presidential elections contributed to that). The image of Europe is transformed in consistency with the transformation of relations with the Russian Federation.[7] On this basis, it can be assumed that the construction of the European identity in the ideological discourse is opportunistic.

It should be noted that the content of the journal, just like the editorial policy, has undergone changes in the past 20 years, and, in principle, is not static. In 2011, the magazine turned 20. The editors decided to assess the path offering to use the following periods of the history of the magazine as a visible reconstruction: 1) "ramantychna-avanturystychny" ("romantic and adventurous") period (1991–1995), 2) "dynamichna-usnesly" ("dynamic and persistent period (1995–2007), and 3) "stvaralna-nastupalny" ("creating and offensive") period (2007–2012). The choosing of the name for the 3rd period in which we are interested was motivated by a further legitimizing of the "Belarusian model" (the search for which was completed during the previous "dynamichna usnesly-period") under the slogan of "building a strong and prosperous Belarus" and the need to fight back the "enviers" and "detractors" of the process. Thematically, the "stvaralna-nastupalny" period centered on "politics" and "society" but "history" also was given a prominent place, "History also is a peculiar brand of the "BT"" (Lougach 2011: 16).

Retrospectively, we can identify a specific mode of representation of "Europe" (and "Russia") for each period .

If the first period can be characterized by the use of the slogan "return to Europe", an active discussion of the de-Sovietization of the Belarusian identity and a democratic nation-state with a market economy, then starting at the end of 1995, the editors embarked on the policy of legitimizing the re-Sovietization and reintegration of Belarus and Russia, while the European vector, as well as its followers, became marginalized.

The topic of integration lost its political value (was devalued) after the end of Yeltsin era in Russia and was followed by the actualization of Putin's aim to pragmatize the relations between Russia and Belarus (including new market contracts for the supply of gas and oil, and a limited access of Belarusian goods to the Russian market). I venture to suggest that this was the main factor of transforming the ideological support of A. Lukashenko's authoritarian regime from the integration populism and Pan-Slavism to the ideology of a sovereign Belarusian state, the project of which was formed and articulated in 2003. In fact, this period did not end for the consolidation of the IBS did not take place.

Since late 2007, the magazine's content has been changing, introducing the multi-vector rhetoric and Venezuelan, Chinese, and European vectors. In late 2007, the main editor was changed and V. Gigin was appointed instead of V. Velichko. V. Gigin became the chief advocate and executor of presidential orders and an ardent defender of the Belarusian model from the attacks of internal and external enemies . The IBS is an open (or rather – opportunistic) project and the content of the IBS in general and the content of the "BT" in particular change accordingly if the relations between the Republic of Belarus and Russia change : if the relations with Russia (Russian authorities) worsen, then a multi-vector rhetoric is activized but if the relationship is improving (RB receives a discount on energy resources), then Russia again becomes a fraternal people. Relations with Russia in 2008–2010 (some analysts call this time the period of "liberalization") have been rather strained or even conflict (for example, an information war on the eve of the presidential election). This found its reflection in the ideological discourse of the "BT" and the keynote speeches of the President (a letter to the Parliament, an address to the All Belarusian People's Assembly). In contrast, during the same period, the relations with the EU significantly improved and Belarus became a party of the "Eastern Partnership". Accordingly, in the ideological discourse "Europe" was positioned as our good neighbor and major trading partner, with the quality standard of life to which we should aspire.[8]

So, the IBS (for example, the "BT") is a pragmatic project designed to justify and legitimize the current policy of the Belarusian authorities considering its all sorts of changes.

In this study we used standard techniques for searching and processing data in the process of monitoring materials of a periodical (namely, the magazine "BT"), as well as methods of discourse analysis and content analysis to identify the specific features and general (qualitative and quantitative) characteristics of the texts. The monitoring of the "BT" was carried out in the period from January 1 to December 31, 2011 (12 issues were published during that period).The solid sample included all the texts in Russian and Be-

larusian languages which contained references to the "idea of Europe" in the broadest sense[9] such as the mention of European countries, events, persons, a dominant discussion of European values ("democracy", "freedom", "civil society", etc.), the understanding of the "Belarusian model"/"path" of development, a vector of the foreign policy and the debate about the history of Belarusians in the context of the European civilization. In this case, it was important to assess not only the thematic direction of the publication but also its evaluative character, namely, the attitude (positive, negative, or neutral) expressed by the author of the material.

In 2011, the magazine published 205 original texts (not including publications polls, congratulations, and letters to the editor). The vast majority of texts was written in Russian and only 20 texts (9.76% of the total) were published in Belarusian. As the Chief Editor V. Gigin said, "The language policy of the "Belarusian Thought" illustrates the situation in our society. We accept materials in the language presented by the author, we prepare interviewers in the language that the interviewed prefers to use when speaking with our journalist. It happens so that it is mainly the Russian language. We even pay higher honoraria to Belarusian language authors; however, this does not seem to help. What is the way out in this case? Maybe we should just simply translate the whole volume of texts into the Belarusian language?" (Gigin 2011a: 9). This statement shows that there is a tendency of the ideological discourse to monopolize the right of representation of the Belarusian society, as the language of copyright publications, presented in the journal "BT" is constructed in direct correlation with the state of society in general.

The study of periodicals by content analysis reveals not only the total number of publications, but also features of the topic coverage, and the status of the information field as a whole. At the same time, it allows to take into account the nature of the message source, the number of publications, the number of references on the subject and the assessment of the information provided. Institutions, persons, events, European countries themselves along with the "idea of Europe" on the whole can serve as the objects of the discussion.

The study by means of discourse analysis is devoted to identifying the specific thematizing of the "idea of Europe" and the construction of the European identity in the journal "Belarusian Thought" (for 2011) in relation to the "Belarusian model" of development. At the same time, attention is drawn to the following parameters: the ideological position of the publication and its author, peculiar features in the format and genre of the publication, and a problematization strategy and its rhetorical design (the author's style and means of expression used in the publication).

On the whole, the general background information can be considered neutral (56.88%, 62 texts), although the coverage of the situation in the EU countries in the conditions of the economic crisis contains a prevalent negative assessment (25.68%, 28 texts). There are fewer materials with a positive assessment (17.44%, 19 texts). On the whole, during the period from January 1 to December 31, 2011 the journal contained 109 topic relevant articles/texts. Most of the materials are commentaries about/authors' assessment of the situation in Europe or various activities of the European institutions and their interaction

with the Belarusian institutions, businesses or associations. The thematization of the "idea of Europe" is more likely characterized in a complementary way as it is given in a particular context as an addition to the background information which is made up of other topics (such as security policy, the liberalization of the political and economic model, the discrediting of the opposition, and the genesis of the Belarusian national identity), which provides the ability to justify a selective approach to Europeanization and an indirect appeal to the "idea of Europe". The study was mainly limited to the analysis of mostly general dominant trends that were identified on the basis of the monitoring results.

Thus, the aim of this study is to analyze the specific way of thematizing the "idea of Europe" and to identify the strategies of constructing a European identity as a horizon of the Belarusian national identity in the Belarusian ideological discourse using the magazine "Belarusian Thought" as an example (covering 2011). To achieve these goals we should solve a number of theoretical problems. We need:

1) to identify the specifics of the ideological representation of the Belarusian national identity (the "Belarusian model") in the context of the complicity to the "idea of Europe";

2) to identify the conditions of the possibility and measure of the Europeanization of the "Belarusian model" in the ideological discourse;

3) to analyze the trends and patterns of transformation of the historical memory (about the Belarusians and Belarusian statehood in the context of the European civilization/the "idea of Europe") in the ideological discourse.

It should be noted that this article will be devoted to solving the first two problems. The results of the study within the frame of the third task were published in the Belarusian magazine "ARCHE Pachatak" (Ralyonak 2012).

This study is an attempt to prove the following hypothetical statement: "The idea of Europe" is positioned improperly and is needed for the Belarusian state ideology as a horizon of the Belarusian identity construction, in order to legitimize the political articulation of the Belarusian national identity in its complicity to Europe.

If the ideological articulation claims a monopoly of the meaning of the "idea of Europe", the task of the critical theory of Europe[10] is to de-monopolize and de-ideologize the "idea of Europe" by having shown the "foundation"/background of the present interpretations/evaluations. The "idea of Europe" in the framework of the Belarusian ideological discourse is detected as a "mirror" that reflects the Belarusian identity.

1. "Belarusian model" and "idea of Europe"

The thematizing of the "idea of Europe" is not permanent in the ideological discourse (it does not find any reflection in special issues or even columns) published in the journal "Belarusian Thought". This topic is brought into the focus of analysis mainly due to the changes in the relations between Belarus and the EU (for example, in the context of the presidential election in 2010 or the program "Eastern Partnership"), or various "wars" (gas,

oil, trade, information) between Belarus and Russia. The rest of the issue is, if not marginal, highly specific, and has a background character (discussed in the context of other issues/topics). However, despite the lack of a dominant focus, the topic of "Europe" performs an important ideological activity , as it is a way (in contrast/comparison) of constructing the Belarusian national identity (in contrast/comparison). The juxtaposition of its OWN model of the political and socio-economic development to that of the "Europe"'s ALIEN (in a wider sense of the West) allows to reach ideological legitimation.

It should be kept in mind that an appeal to the discourse of the "model" or "path" is dominant in the period selected for the analysis (2011).[11] Most of the authors in their texts are trying to legitimize the right of the country's leaders to choose their models/ways of development for Belarus and prove the effectiveness of the model, no matter what the objective difficulties (such as a currency crisis) are . For example, Galina Mokhnach, one of the journal's employees, prepared a publication ("Saldo v meshke ne utaish" ("You can't hide the surplus in a bag")), including the opinions of the experts in the field of economics on the specifics of the current economic situation in Belarus. This text is an attempt to analyze the causes and consequences of the economic crisis in the Republic of Belarus in 2011 (the leitmotif of the text is to prove that the Belarusian model is as successful and effective as before). The main reasons/external factors identified include[12]: 1) the global financial crisis, 2) the rise in oil prices, 3) the panic of Belarusian consumers (food "mass arrests"). The author concludes that we need a "modernization of certain institutions and mechanisms without giving up on the chosen social market model," "Statements about the insolvency of the model chosen were at the least premature <...> Another thing is that any model, socially oriented or some other, is not rigid " ("Saldo v meshke ne utaish" 2011: 34, 38).

In other words, we could conclude that the appeal to the discourse of the "model" or "path" is not problematized and uncritically accepted as a self-evident fact. The only exception (corresponding to the scientific criteria) is the statement of L. Zaiko, director of the analytical center "Strategija" ("Strategy"): "In this case, I think it is not necessary to focus on the terms, such as, in particular, the Belarusian economic model, in particular, because, in theory, this approach seems counterproductive ... it has to do with a provincial character of the Belarusian economic thought. <...> I've had to study various systems of the economic knowledge, and I can say that, in Belarus, we have a Keynesian model. More precisely , it is a leftist Keynesian model in the spirit of Joan Robinson, with a rather strong paternalistic policy that widely uses the mechanisms to stimulate the aggregate domestic demand. It is specifically this demand that has just "burned out""(Saldo v meshke ne utaish 2011: 45).

It should also be noted that the construct "Belarusian model" in the ideological discourse does not have to be created in a negative manner (as the "non-West"). For example, I. Kotlyarov, the director of the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Belarus, Doctor of Social Sciences, has identified the following key components of the national development model: 1) ideology (the "ideology of the Belarusian state is the moral outlook of the Be-

larusian nation"), 2) science (the move to the society of innovations and the economy of innovation), and 3) an effective governance (Kotlyarov 2011: 68–69). At the same time, the key principle of the Belarusian model lies in its openness and dynamism: "The model of the Belarusian society is an open system", "it is in constant dynamics" (Kotlyarov 2011: 67, 71). The thesis of the system's openness also allows to develop the idea of the transformation of the "Belarusian model" in a political dimension. The theme of the transformation of the political system of Belarus was further dwelled upon in the article of chief editor V. Gigin "Belorusskaja politicheskaja sistema: perspektivy razvitija" ("The Belarusian political system: Prospects of Development" (Gigin 2011s: 59). The author has identified the following key characteristics of the Belarusian political model: 1) the concentration of power at all levels of the governance structure, 2) direct democracy carried out through both elections and national referenda, 3) a significant personification of power (President Lukashenko as the center of the political decision-making process), 4) a non-party membership or de-partying of the Belarusian society,13 5) an increased political activity of public organizations (such as "Belaja Rus'" ("White Russia")), 6) an acute confrontation between the current government and its political opponents ("We can say that in Belarus there are elements of the two opposing political cultures: the civil majority (dominant) and the political opposition (underground)" (Gigin 2011s: 59)).

1. First of all, the "Belarusian model" is positioned in the ideological discourse as an **alternative to global capitalism**. In today's (conflicting) world there is a competition of the models of development and Belarus has the right to choose its own model and its development path and this is the most common argument among the journal's authors. For example, the KGB Chairman Vladimir Zaitsev in his article[14] "Bor'ba s terrorizmom i ekstremizmom kak chast' natsionalnoj bezopasnosti RB" ("The fight against terrorism and extremism as part of the national security of the Republic of Belarus") tries to show that there is a competition of models of social structure in today's world. At the same time, the modern global world (in the spirit of globalism) is marked as potentially conflict (i.e., as an external threat). "The situation in the world today is characterized by a growing potential for conflicts related to political and religious extremism, based on aggressive nationalism, increasing religious intolerance and xenophobia, as well as a high level of terrorist activity and concomitant drug trafficking, weapons and ammunition, and a growth of illegal migration" (Zaitsev 2011: 32). In his article on information security, the Minister of Information Oleg Proleskovsky talks about the information war with the West, which is allegedly trying to destabilize the situation in the Republic of Belarus ("to change the legal constitutional order" by "importing" a "color" revolution). The Minister makes a stunning comment-consequence[15] of the aforementioned thesis: "The main reason for such actions is an independent, focused on the absolute priority of national interests of the policy of the Belarusian government, the position of our country on the international arena, openly declaring its non-acceptance of the unipolar world, a full support of the integration processes in the post-Soviet space, first of all, with the Russian

Federation" (Proleskovsky 2011: 49). It should be noted that in the Belarusian ideological discourse there is an identification of the "West" and "Europe" and in this context the use of the word "model" in relation to the West/Europe as well as in Belarus, is an attempt to homogenize the European and Belarusian identity.

The Advisor of the Party of the European Left V. Kaller-i-Salas has a similar point of view (similar to that of O. Proleskovsky). The expert believes that the negative attitude to Belarus in Europe is due to the fact that Belarus "resists the globalized world" and advocates a non-liberal socially-oriented economy. "After all, your country is not a member of the EU, is not included in other integration structures created in the West. Belarus became a kind of a given political issue, which is a popular topic for discussion in the EU. At the same time there is a clearly defined pattern of this "debate": Belarus is the last dictatorship in our part of the world. Any deviation from this format is severely suppressed. Of course, political freedom in the country is very important. But I see that in Belarus there is no large-scale violations of human rights, as it is often said. Belarus is just trying to resist the globalized world" ("Belarus – ES: v poiskah vzaimoponimanija" ("Belarus – the EU: in search of understanding") 2011: 70). It is worth noting that this statement does not deny the fact that there are human rights violations in Belarus and the lack of political freedom is not disputed while the emphasis is made on the Belarusian model as an alternative to global neo-liberalism (the search for which is the leitmotif of the left critics of globalization).

In general, many of the "Left" thinkers[16] presented in the magazine, positively assess the Belarusian model and its effectiveness. For this authors and editors use a media method of "foreign language" (foreigners speak about Belarus = the "objective" view). It is even emphasized that the "Belarusian model" can be exported, "But there are countries which welcome and are willing to follow the Belarusian model, particularly, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Cuba. In Libya, the situation is different. In 2007, Gaddafi himself said at a large conference that the Belarusian model is a role model" (Belarus – ES: v poiskah vzaimoponimanjia 2011: 75). The feeling is that the discourse of the "model" is imposed on the European Left by the Belarusian colleagues formatting the discussion. Maybe, part of that is due to the editorial sample of fragments taken out of the general context of the discussion. It should also be noted that the ideological discourse is dominated by a reduced understanding of globalization as globalization and/or Americanization echoing the position of the European "Left" represented in the text.

2. Moreover, Belarus is not just an alternative to global capitalism; it is also a model of the **re-actualization of socialism**, that is, the "Belarusian model" is a neo-socialist model. For example, the text report "Den' vyborov" ("Election Day") describing the attempt to legitimize the results of the presidential election in 2010 (especially in the context of their not being recognized by the OSCE) contains the most interesting insertion from the statement of the Israeli journalist Israel Shamir: "I find the prevention of the absorption of the market by big international companies the most positive element in the economic development of Belarus. During this twenty-year long difficult period of giant Western raiding

around the world, Belarus has managed to preserve its heritage. This is an important lesson for many. Another positive development factor is that Belarus has managed to preserve and develop elements of socialism which were defamed in the 1990s. Today the phenomenon of socialism is returning with confidence, in new clothes and with a new meaning. The elements of socialism Belarus managed to support and preserve are wonderful. Belarus is a shining lantern of socialism" (Den' vyborov 2011: 32).

2.1. An articulated neosocialist normative foundation of the "Belarusian model" allows the ideological discourse, along with the "Western" model of development being imposed in the context of globalization, to criticize "Western" values in general (democracy, civil society, and parliamentary republic). Western models/ideas are positioned not only as "alien" but as ineffective (if they do not rely on the local or national context). For example, the article "Tretij put' dlya Sirii" ("The Third Path for Syria") examines the concept of Arab renaissance in the ideology of the Ba'ath Party. The young author A. Filippov concludes that "Western philosophical and political ideas, without being transformed in the local context, became non-viable in Syrian society. All of the basic concepts and ideas of the Ba'ath such as nationalism, socialism, revolution, the power of the minority, the dialectical development of the "eternal Arabic message" revival have both Arab and European roots. At the same time, we should note that the trend is clearly traced to their "Arabization", especially at the terminology level" (Filippov 2011: 113).

If the dominant form of government in Europe is a parliamentary republic, the ideological discourse legitimizes presidentialism while parliamentarism is criticised. For example, in the interview with the first Prime Minister of Belarus, V. Kebich says: "Do we need a modern parliamentary democrac y in Belarus? I do not think this is possible and it is not needed. In this changing world, with the consideration of the crisis, God forbid! We cannot have a discord of the branches of power! This will be just a loss of control" (Kebich 2011: 36).

A similar point of view was articulated by V. Leonenko (Member of the Standing Committee of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Belarus in international affairs and relations with the CIS countries, candidate of historical science) during the round table discussion with Lithuanian political observers devoted to the election results and the situation in Belarus: "With regard to the parliamentary republic, the responsibility is blurred as there is nobody to be held responsible. Everyone points out at another one and, in fact, nobody can be held completely responsible for the situation in the state. Perhaps, this system is suitable for more stable periods of life of society. But we are facing the reality and see that certain problems arise, challenges appear which can only be overcome with a strong political system. I believe that a presidential republic allows you to build a system where the parliament and the head of state, who is also the chief executive, are elected by the people, and it only strengthens the guarantees of the separation of powers" (Gigin 2011d: 31).

2.2. **Belarus as a European, Too European State.**

The ideological discourse articulates Belarus's belonging to "Europe" according to the territorial and civilizational lines. On the one hand, geographically Belarus is a

European state (Gigin 2011s: 60) or it is a state situated in the heart of Europe (Martynov 2011: 12); on the other hand, it "belongs to the European civilization" or shares selected European values/standards (for example, the right of nations to self-determination). "Relations with Europe are in a phase of an acute political confrontation but on the one hand, it does not prevent," from "developing relations in economy, security, and border security," while on the other, "nobody doubts the fact that our country belongs to the European civilization, and has an impact on the development of the region" (Belarus – ES: v poiskah vzaimoponimanija 2011: 67).

It should be noted that in Belarus, according to the ideological narrative, you can discover more of Europe ("Belarus as a too European state") than in its current "stronghold," that of the EU. To prove this thesis, we shall turn to the ideological interpretations of such notions as "European democracy" and "Christian roots of European identity".

1) The model of democracy used in the EU (neo-liberal in spirit) is accused of being oligarchic while the Belarusian model of democracy is seen as a real democracy: "But the democracy which they keep talking about is the democracy only for the rich and powerful that's why it is necessary to show people in Germany and other EU countries that in Belarus it is possible to build a real democracy through democracy" (Belarus – ES: v poiskah vzaimoponimanija 2011: 74).

Another drawback of European democracy is that it does not guarantee the continuity of the course (afterall, Hitler came to power by democratic means) (Bainev, Vinnik 2011: 88). The guarantee is "the integral world view of the individual, and the people on the whole"(which Belarusians do have).

Moreover, the immorality of Western philosophy makes the model of Western democracy which claims to be universally valid untenable in the ideological perspective. "What is the reason why the worldview that carries varying degrees of reflexive and instinctive characteristics, combined with the liberal market principle "the winner takes it all", can form the basis of the model of true democracy?" (Bainev, Vinnik 2011: 90).

Thus, the "true" European democracy is a democracy for the people and by the people while in the EU they forgot the "true" democracy, and its actualization and realization became possible in the "Belarusian model". According to the logic of the ideological argument, Belarus is more European than the EU if one is to follow the criterion of democracy.

2) In the ideological discourse the Belarusian model is constructed as non-secular and is based on the traditional Orthodox values of the Belarusians thus allowing to criticize any "model" claiming the status of the secular one (such as neo-liberalism or the model of the EU on the whole). Because of that such models are labeled as "foreign" and thus are non-traditional for Belarusians. In his article "Hristianskie tserkvi kak uchastniki evropejskoj integratsii" ("Christian churches as members of the European integration") S. Mudrov discusses the problem of the EU politicians' invasion into the religious sphere after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 as well as an attempt to neglect the Christian origins of the united Europe when writing the EU Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty. Main threats include the following: "In particular, it found its reflection in an attempt to

impose a one-sided view of the history of Europe in the text of the EU Constitution, the ignoring of the era in which Christianity played a leading role. Political interventions could be also observed in the European Parliament's resolution, including, for example, the requirement to provide free access to the Holy Mountain Athos (Orthodox monastic autonomy in northeastern Greece, closed to women.) Finally, a purely religious component gained special significance when the EU membership of Turkey being a country with a predominantly Muslim population was being discussed" (Mudrov 2011: 56).

The author notes that an adequate analysis of the European integration is not conceivable without the consideration of the religious factor providing the following arguments: 1) Christian Democratic parties were the initiators of the European integration after the Second World War; 2) the united Europe based on Christian values was designed as a 'bulwark against communism'.

Thus, the ideological discourse of the "true" European identity is constructed based on Christian sources, "they write about the economic origins of the European integration, there is every reason to believe that the political component, due, in particular, to Christian values, has played a key role" (Mudrov 2011: 58). They also refer to the statement made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy Alcide de Gasperi as an additional argument. He, in particular, said, "When I say that Christianity stands at the source of the origin of the European civilization, I do not intend to pick an exclusive confessional criterion to evaluate our history. I'm just pointing out the common European heritage, that single morality, that focuses on the individual and his responsibility" (Mudrov 2011: 57).

Thus, the according to the ideological scheme of arguments, the modern EU politics is dominated by "anti-religious forces" and, therefore, shows tendencies of forgetting its own identity; this is happening according to the ideological scheme of arguments. In this context, the Belarusian model is more European or even "true" European as it relies on Christian values (it honors Orthodox roots of the Belarusians).

3. The EU is represented in the ideological discourse primarily as a threat to national sovereignty. They provide, for example, the opinion of Pierre Levy (a French political scientist and a publisher from France), who believes that "the EU is trying to limit the sovereignty of its member countries" (Belarus – ES: v poiskah vzaimoponimanija 2011: 72) and at the same time it does not accept alternative models of public and political development (which are allegedly present in the Republic of Belarus). In an interview with the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Kazakhstan to Belarus, Anatoly Smirnov, journalist Panin described the OSCE as a violator of national sovereignty (under the guise of promoting the idea of democracy), "Anatoly Vladimirovich, in recent years, the OSCE has paid much attention to the promotion of democracy and monitoring of political processes in some member states. Does the adoption of the Astana Declaration "Towards a Security Community" based on the results of the OSCE summit mean that there has been a return in the activity of the organization to the originally stated priorities, that is, the development of "safety" and "cooperation"? (Smirnov 2011: 18). In general, the possibility

of joining the EU is evaluated negatively in the ideological discourse. For example, Philip Funovic, a member of the Communist Party of Austria, said that "the entry into the EU does not mean getting into paradise," that the EU actions are based solely on the economic benefit (the Republic of Belarus as a product market) and the economic and political pressure (as it is in the case of an artificial aggravation of the conflict with Belarus).

The "Belarusian model" in the ideological discourse is positioned as implicated into Europe in terms of its sovereign policy and the process of nation building. However, despite this, one could still notice nostalgic ideas about the "death" of the empire in the Eastern European region. For example,V. Gigin, the chief editor of the journal, when thinking about the prospects of the "Eastern Partnership" on the whole comes to the conclusion that the post-Soviet space (and wider – Eastern Europe) is gradually losing the Big Brother (the presence of a responsible power center) and believes this situation to be the drama of Eastern Europe. "For our countries, this situation is very much a drama, as Eastern European countries have got used to the fact that some great country assumes leadership and can actually implement this leadership. The geopolitical isolation leads to a rather long period of instability in the region, the lack of common security settings and a possible actualization of dormant conflicts" (Belarus – ES: v poiskah vzaimoponimanija 2011: 71). It would seem that the death of the "Empire" opens the possibility of implementing the sovereignty by new national states. However, an independent policy requires responsibility and for some reason it needs external reference points (centers of power providing the stability and unity of the situation in the region). Here we find an ideological contradiction.

A different position is presented by Yu. Makeychik in the article "Novye realii integracii. Prakticheskie shagi modernizatsii politicheskogo ustrojstva ES" ("New realities of integration. Practical steps for the modernization of the political system of the EU" (a rare example of a neutral analysis of the problems of the European integration). The author analyzes the process of the EU political modernization in connection with the extension in detail and describes the reasons for the failure of the project of the EU Constitution as well as the problems of the adoption (ratification) of the Treaty of Lisbon. In general, the author is quite positive and represents the process of the political integration of the EU and the overcoming of the constitutional crisis. This confirms the final conclusion of the author: "The Reform Treaty that extends the powers of the legislative body, namely, the European Parliament, increases the rights of the national parliaments and the EU citizens, establishes a new procedure for the decision-making bodies of the EU, and clearly differentiates between the competence of the national structures and national authorities of the Member States; it is an effective incentive for the political reforming of the European Union. It will also give the union activity more efficiency and democracy and contribute to the expansion of the EU's influence in the world" (Makeychik 2011: 112). I am glad that the author managed to avoid the ideologization of the topic and representation in the style of "let's be happy because the enemy has got problems". The author quite correctly notices that the unity of the EU comes at the price of serious political efforts. In fact, the com-

mon European identity is the result of political articulation. The author also manages to avoid the common ideologeme, that is the positioning of the EU as a destroyer/limiter of national sovereignty. The article's positive element is its adequate assessment of national parliaments in the context of the Lisbon Treaty (the principle of subsidiarity instead of the loss of sovereignty).[17] But this is a rather rare example of a non-ideological analysis of the problems of the European integration.

4. The "Europeanization" discourse has been actively used in the ideology of the Belarusian state since 2008. This was associated with the launch of the "Eastern Partnership" program (hereinafter - the "EP"). In this regard, the tone of statements about the program can serve as an indicator of changes in the ideological discourse. That is why we should concentrate more on this issue.

One of the key texts showing the regime's attitude to the "EP" is the publication (Belarus – ES: v poiskah vzaimoponimanija (Belarus – the EU: in search of understanding) in 2011) put together by V. Gigin on the basis of the conference "Prospects of the "Eastern Partnership"" materials (Minsk, May 5, 2011).

The text is fragmentary, as it is composed of selected statements of international representatives (Europe, Russia) and local experts. According to V. Gigin's plan, the purpose of the sample is to understand how the "scientific and civil society in the West sees the Belarusian model of development" (Belarus – ES: v poiskah vzaimoponimanija 2011: 67). Western community, in this case, is reduced mainly to the representatives of the left-wing political platform (for example, members of the Communist Party of Belgium and Austria) or the Euro-skeptics. as it is not so much the attitude of the whole West to Belarus that is presented but the attitude of the "European Left to Belarus" that is presented here (Belarus – ES: v poiskah vzaimoponimanija 2011: 75). This publication sets the appropriate background, i.e., criticism of the West, global capitalism, and hegemonic attitudes of the EU and the U.S. The problematization of the Belarusian "model" is non-existent and its presence is given as a fact that requires assessment and positioning.

The "Eastern Partnership" is assessed primarily as a "new tool for the enforcement of neo-liberalism" and as an element of the struggle for the influence in the former Soviet Union with an Eastern competitor (Russia), as well as a conspiracy against Belarus. Mateusz Piskorski, the president of the European Center for Geopolitical Analysis (Poland) writes: "It is a kind of conspiracy against the last country on the continent with a social market economy. They create plans to destroy the economy and model of this country to convince everyone that the only possible way of development is neo-liberal" (Belarus – ES: v poiskah vzaimoponimanija 2011: 67). This is a mirror reflection of the geopolitical discourse of the Cold War of Zbigniew Brzezinski style.

There are both negative and positive evaluations of the "EP".

The disadvantages of the "EP" include: 1) a "soft" character of integration (seminars, trainings, exchange of experience, etc.), 2) inequality of the southern and eastern vectors of the European Neighbourhood Policy (a smaller budget of the "EP", the presence of po-

litical constraints of cooperation). "We hope that in the end, thanks to our contribution and support of other partner countries" the Eastern Partnership "will be more democratic, more pragmatic and generally a more useful tool for cooperation in our part of the European continent" (Belarus – ES: v poiskah vzaimoponimanija 2011: 69).

The "EP" is a special and multilateral format of cooperation of the EU with its Eastern neighbors as a single entity (similar to the Mediterranean environment). This project allows Belarus to cooperate with the EU (regardless of the political controversy) in line with its foreign policy, based on a multi-vector principle. Dmitry Yarmolyuk, head of the department of European integration of the Head Office of Europe of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus: "Belarus as the closest neighbor of the two most influential and major centers of power on the European continent is developing deep and balanced relations with both of these centers" (Belarus – ES: v poiskah vzaimoponimanija 2011: 69). The ability to preserve in the "EP" the principle of multi-vector politics in the "EP" (by not joining the EU) is close to the national interests of the Republic of Belarus and is a definite advantage. Consequently, the project "EP" allows to carry out a selective approach to Europeanization, where political and ideological components of the European integration may become marginalized.

Thus, in the Belarusian ideological discourse the dominant element is the narrative (in the spirit of the Soviet rhetoric of the "cold war") of the "Belarusian model" as an alternative to global capitalism while the condition of the possibility of this positioning is the understanding of globalization as globalism; the normative base of the "Belarusian model" is re-actualized socialism that, in its turn, allows to criticize the Western/European (in the ideological discourse of the "West" is identified with "Europe") values (democracy, parliamentary republic, etc.) and to position the EU on the whole, and the "Eastern Partnership" in particular primarily as a threat to national sovereignty; on the other hand, the ideological discourse contains the representation of Belarus as a European state (advocating the preservation of the "true" European values), and the necessity to choose the selective Europeanization following the "EP" model is justified (according to the ideological concepts of national interest). Summarizing, we should say that the non-reflexive appeal to the discourse of the "model" (Belarusian and Western/European) relying on the limited understanding of globalization borrowed from left criticism is an attempt to homogenize the European and Belarusian identities. In the Belarusian ideological discourse the "idea of Europe" serves as a horizon of constructing the Belarusian national identity.

2. Selective Europeanization

The negative attitude to the worldview of the European/Western civilization does not prevent the ideological discourse from identifying the Belarusian state as a European one (even too European). The achievements identified include , for example, a high degree of Europeanization of the local government, the introduction to the European standards in the field of civil society and party system, digital television, and the overall quality of life. In

other words, the ideological discourse is dominated by a selective approach to the "Europeanization" and, in spite of various symbolic sanctions/actions, the EU ("Europe") continues to be positioned as a "strategic partner". For example, A. Russakovich, Senior lecturer at BSU (Belarusian State University), PhD, writes: "The EU remains our strategic partner, despite the fact that the decision made by the European Council on January 31, is unfriendly. The relationship between us is quite effective and beneficial to the economy and other spheres; we cooperate in international organizations. What has happened in recent years is only one of the segments of our complex relationships and it is not the happiest for both sides" (Kredo gosudarstva 2011: 90).

2.1. "Eastern Partnership" as a model of "selective Europeanization"

The ideological discourse treats the "Eastern Partnership" as a basic model of the European integration, as the existing form of cooperation does not imply membership in the EU and provides an opportunity to carry out a selective approach to Europeanization. "Selective Europeanization" correlates with pragmatism advocated by the Belarusian authorities under the guise of national interests.

For example, the main advantage of the "EP" project for Belarus (the position of a representative of the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) is the possibility of a selective integration with the European legislation, i.e., "Selective Europeanization". The "EP" is in harmony with the priorities or national interests of the Republic of Belarus for it does not entail entry into the EU and represents a special format of regularization (for example, in trade with the EU); it allows to consider/observe integration commitments in the post-Soviet space, and promote the Republic of Belarus on the European continent as a reliable partner and neighbor. "Our priority is the progressive harmonization of the national legislation with the EU in the areas of our national interest. We are also interested in the harmonization of technical regulations and standards, and in a deeper cooperation with the EU in the field of border security, illegal migration, diversification of energy sources, increase of our energy security, and in the enhancing investment cooperation with European financial institutions" (Belarus – ES: v poiskah vzaimoponimanjia 2011: 69). It is easy to see that the plan of "selective integration" misses the cultural and political dimension as it does not concern the European values of democracy and human rights.

The attitude to death penalty is quite illustrative in this respect (the problem of its use in the RB was actualized in the context of the terrorist attack in the Minsk metro). The journal is dominated by a positive evaluation of the use of death penalty against terrorists. This is a counter-European position. "The people who have experienced this horrible evil will say: "Terrorists should be put to death; problem solved" (Huka 2011: 67).

Thus, the model of the "EP" allows to select the priority areas of Europeanization such as trade, investment, security, as well as to fix the interest in the Europeanization in the

sphere of local government, introduction to the Bologna process in the education sector, the digital broadcast standard, and the quality of life in general.

2.2. "Europeanisation" in the sphere of local government

In the article "Razvivat' initsiatsivu i aktivnost' grazhdan" ("To develop the initiative and activity of citizens") the authors (V. Klochkov and A. Melnikov) address the issue of local government as an important factor of democracy and the making of civil society. The authors justify the thesis about the necessity to "Europeanize" local government.

Local self-government refers to a system of management of local affairs carried out by specially elected bodies which directly represent the inhabitants of a given administrative unit. The authors note that this definition correlates with the understanding of local government in the "European Charter of Local Self-Government" (Klochkov, Melnikov 2011: 60). Local government implies elections and independence (autonomy), and mediates between the individual and the state. However, the authors state that there can be no absolute independence of local governments from the central government.

The authors discover the Europeanization of national legislation in the sphere of local government. For example, the Law "On Local Government and Self-Government" (adopted 01.04.2011.) says, "Attempts to partially reform our system of local government and self-government have been made, bringing it closer to the norms of the European Charter of Local Self-Government" (Klochkov, Melnikov 2011: 62). More specifically, it states that "this is the first time when the present law identifies the right of local councils to create, on a voluntary basis, their own unions, associations. In European countries, such structures have long played a significant role" (Klochkov, Melnikov 2011: 63) ... Quite within the framework of European values the authors see the importance of the implementation of the law in "the development of democracy, initiatives, citizen participation and, ultimately, in the formation of civil society."

2.3. "Europeanization" in the sphere of civil society and party system

When speaking about the transformation of the political system in Belarus, editor V. Gigin indirectly identified the need for the Europeanization of the Belarusian party system in particular and civil society in general. According to the author, the formally existing multiparty system and a network of pro-state associations do not have a real impact on politics and society (their impact is minimal). For example, the number of political parties in local councils is 1.4% of the total number of elected members (Gigin 2011b: 18). The author writes that one cannot respond to dissatisfaction just by dealing more thoroughly with citizens' complaints; political parties and public associations must provide channels for capturing and categorizing protest dissents, "it is necessary to deal with the third sector in a proper way, namely, in that interlayer that is between the state and the opposition"(Gigin 2011b: 18). In this regard, the author seeks (he even complained after

the President had done it[18]) to avoid identifying civil society in Belarus solely with opposition groups. V. Gigin identifies Europe as a guide for the party system , as in Europe there are numerous cross-party unions and associations in which you need to be involved (that is what the Belarusian political opposition does), i.e., the author recognizes the need for Europeanization in the organization of a multi-party system (and civil society in general). At the same time, the importance of the values of civil society (even if in such a roundabout way) is also recognized, which is also an example of Europeanization.

2.4. "Europeanization" in the sphere of digital television

In addition to the local government and civil society sphere Europeanization (primarily in law) was also revealed during the "digitalization" of television. For example, in the article "Analogovoe TV ili tsifrovoe?" ("Analogous or Digital TV or Digital? ") I. Tolstik describes dealing with Europeanization in the field of telecommunications technologies: "Belarus was one of the first to join European countries and ratified a series of international agreements on the development of digital television" (Tolstik 2011: 102).

The "digitization" of Belarus (according to commitments and government programs) should take place before 2015. While positively evaluating the experience of European countries in the transition to digital broadcasting, the author points out that there are significant challenges to the project in the Republic of Belarus: 1) provision of social equality, 2) lack of staff and service organizations, 3) lack of funding, 4) lack of proper legal regulations, and 5) interactive digital television as a threat to national identity (there is no way to fill the quality content) = fear of loss of information influence.[19]

2.5. Liberalization and private property

The adoption (December 31, 2010) of the Directive of the President of Belarus № 4 "On the development of entrepreneurship and stimulating business activity in Belarus" (informally it was called "Directive on liberalization"[20]) initiated the Belarusian state ideology on the development of appropriate assessments of the phenomenon. 2011 was declared the "Year of Entrepreneurship". In 2011, the magazine "BT" published numerous articles and specific statements on the subject.

Most statements and texts relate to the discourse of the "Belarusian model" (a socially oriented market economy) and are aimed at legitimizing the latter. In this context, the "European liberal economy" is marked as a "large casino" and the need to protect its independence is proclaimed. This is the opinion of, for example, Bruno Drveski, Professor of Political Science (France) when he generalized the attitude of the European Left to Belarus (Belarus – ES: v poiskah vzaimoponimaja 2011: 75). Another indicative illustration is the opinion of the first Prime Minister of Belarus Vladimir Kebich who calls for the need to use "Gosplan" (which is nothing but blatant Soviet-style state planning economy) and an evolutionary path of economic development (Kebich 2011: 35–36).

The magazine is dominated by either a negative or neutral evaluation of the liberal concept of private property while it also points to the lack of the middle class in the Republic of Belarus (or rather, the complexity of the selection of this category) (Yaroshevich 2011: 59–60), indicating that "more recently, in the latest Belarusian history, the word "entrepreneur" in the minds of many has had a negative connotation" (Mahnach 2011: 94). However, there are some negative opinions about the "Belarusian model". For example, in the article "Formula predpriimchivosti" ("The enterprise formula of enterprise ") G. Mahnach addresses the problem of entrepreneurship pointing to the negative impact of the administrative-command and welfare economics (the forming of a statist mind/outlook and the shifting of the responsibility to the state). "They say that in this regard, many Belarusians are still quite different from the Germans, Poles and other Europeans who have a very noticeable entrepreneurial streak <...> the presence of this quality, in contrast, means an engaged creative approach to life and the desire to succeed no matter what" (Mahnach 2011: 94).

The "liberalization" also functions in the ideological discourse fully in line with the model of "SE" ("Selective Europeanization"), so it is a selective liberalization. For example, in the article "Privatizatsija – predposylki dlya modernizatsii" ("Privatization is a prerequisite for modernization") N. Zhernosek indicates that, in the RB, there was a "minor" privatization (in the service sphere, light industry, and agriculture), a transformation of enterprises into joint stock companies, and a sale of government assets not for the budget but in compliance with national interests (Zhernosek 2011: 34). The publication "Nashi innovatsii glazami mezhdunarodnyh ekspertov" ("Our innovations through the eyes of international experts") is dedicated to the discussion of cooperation of Belarus with the European Economic Commission of the UNO (European (and other) experts prepared (May 12–13, 2011 in Geneva) a review of the innovation policy, namely, the recommendations for Belarus (May 12–13, 2011 in Geneva). The author concludes, that "participation in this project clearly demonstrates the intention of Belarus to integrate into the world economy" (Lukashevich 2011: 102). Indirectly, the "idea of Europe" becomes a "guide for future development" while the importance of innovative entrepreneurship is recognized. Continuity in this sphere is the dimension of Europeanization.

2.6. "Europeanization" in the sphere of security policy (and disarmament)

Adopted in late 2010, "The Concept of National Security of Belarus" sets the format of the discussion of the problem of safety in all areas. Actually, the very "concept" is called a "business card" of the state, or even a new basic text ideology of the Belarusian state. Such a position is supported, for example, by Yu. Shevtsov, a Belarusian political scientist, "I think that in view of the obvious deficiency in our country of a developed and clear ideology this document serves as the core of such an ideology. <...> But, having created it, we also hit the mainstream with the European states. They face some of the same security challenges, which are described in our Concept and are struggling with these challenges not by

increasing sovereignty, as it is done in our country, but through the transfer of sovereignty to supranational bodies of the EU, NATO or other organizations. It is not necessarily true that their way is more successful than ours. We are looking for answers to the challenges by improving state institutions, not by destroying them. It is quite possible that this is our Belarusian know-how" (Kredo gosudarstva (the Creed of the State) 2011: 86).

Thus, "security" becomes the issue that is designed to unite politicians from Belarus and the EU, regardless of the political models of development (this is the bet in the ideological discourse). For instance, KGB Chairman Vladimir Zaitsev said that the importance of Belarus for the European Union could be seen in the following way: "Belarus serves as a "buffer zone" and it has achieved significant results in the neutralization of criminal gangs who organize channels of illegal migration" (Zaitsev 2011: 34). Foreign Minister Sergei Martynov in his turn has stressed the importance of regional security structures on the European continent and indicated a desire to integrate into the European security system: "The strategic goal is to prevent the creation of new dividing lines in Europe and to further integrate Belarus into the European security structure" (Martynov 2011: 15).

"Europe", in this context, is positioned as a vector of the foreign policy of the Republic of Belarus, as a model of diversification of energy supplies,[21] the experience of disarmament, and also as the main trading partner.[22] In addition, it also means access to advanced technologies, an investment potential, and the experience of economic modernization.

"Europe" arises mainly in the context of discussions about the multi-vector ("diversification") foreign policy of Belarus. "Europe" (the EU) is like the second (adjacent to the RB) after the Russian Federation world center of power . In our business with Russia we are dealing with a "close economic and military and political integration" (as we co-participate in the CSTO, CIS, Customs Union, and the Common Economic Space); when it comes to Europe (the EU), we are "interested in maintaining meaningful relationships" and a "full cooperation". S. Martynov writes about the impossibility of isolating Belarus in the context of an "acute phase" of relations with Europe and reminds that (this idea deserves our special attention), "Our state is a donor of European security; it acts as an important factor of a strategic diversification of energy contacts in the region, and, finally, it provides a reliable energy transit to Europe," "it filters the flow of illegal migration and effectively blocks the penetration into the adjacent territories of drugs and weapons" (Martynov 2011: 13).

The Minister also looks at the disarmament as an example of Europeanization: "In line with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Belarus destroyed 1773 battle tanks, 1341 armored vehicles, and 130 combat aircraft. This is more than 10% of all arms and military equipment which were to be liquidated in accordance with the CFE Treaty" (Martynov 2011: 13).

However, there are also neutral ("non-ideological") opinions about the security policy. For instance, in the article entitled "Bezopasnost' i oborona: politika ES" ("Security and Defence: the EU policy") I. Kuznetsova talks in a fairly neutral way about forming a common security policy in the EU avoiding ideological clichés. The author recognizes the possibility and prospects of cooperation between Belarus and Europe in terms of security (includ-

ing energy security). The EU is positioned as a political partner of Belarus with which Belarus should build a single secure conflict-free and good neighbor policy. I. Kuznetsova correctly (outside the ideological "mainstream"[23]) decides that "with the end of the Cold War, Europe could claim political and military autonomy. Since then its safety has not been determined by a dialectic confrontation between the two superpowers;" further she states: "The EU embodies a special type of 'soft political management" relying not on force but on economic factors" (Kuznetsova 2011: 116, 117).

Thus, in the Belarusian ideological discourse Europeanization is thematized following the model of the "Eastern Partnership" as a "selective Europeanization": This kind of Europeanization does not involve the country's structural integration (entry) into the EU; Europeanization is treated as an opportunity for Belarus as a European state to selectively and pragmatically choose spheres of harmonization of the national and European legislation (as a geographically European state); Thus, Europeanization is positioned as an orientation to the (mostly material) European standards in economics, technology, safety, and quality of life but it does not involve following the political and cultural values of Europe.

Conclusion

Having analyzed the thematization of the "idea of Europe" in the Belarusian ideological discourse using the issues of the journal "Belaruskaja dumka" ("Belarusian Thought") published in 2011 as an example, we can conclude the following:

1. In the Belarusian ideological discourse the dominant element is the narrative of the "Belarusian model" (in political and ideological dimensions it is construed as the one well-founded in the Soviet past) as an alternative to global capitalism while the understanding of globalization exclusively as globalism serves as the condition for the possibility of this positioning; re-actualized socialism is constructed as a normative foundation of the "Belarusian model" allowing, in turn, to criticize the Western/European (in the ideological discourse, the "West" is identified with "Europe") values (democracy, parliamentary republic, etc.) and position the EU in general and the "Eastern Partnership" in particular, primarily as a threat to national sovereignty. On the other hand, the ideological discourse contains the representation of Belarus as a European state (advocating the preservation of the "true" European values) while the necessity to select the model of Europeanization "SE" (according to the ideological concepts of the national interest) is justified. Summarizing, we should note that the appeal to the non-reflexive discourse of the "model" (Belarusian and Western/European) based on the limited understanding of globalization borrowed from the left criticism is an attempt to homogenize the European and Belarusian identities. In the Belarusian ideological discourse, the "idea of Europe" serves as a horizon needed to construct the Belarusian national identity.

2. In the Belarusian ideological discourse, Europeanization is thematized using the model of the "Eastern Partnership" as a "selective Europeanization"; Selective Europeaniza-

tion does not involve the country's structural integration (entry) into the EU; Europeanization is treated as an opportunity for Belarus (as a geographically European state) to be selective and pragmatic when choosing the spheres of harmonization of the national and European legislation; Europeanization is positioned as the orientation to the (mostly material) European standards in economics, technology, safety, and quality of life, but it does not include following the political and cultural values of Europe.

In conclusion, we should say that we have dealt specifically only with a discursive dimension of the process of construction of the Belarusian identity within the framework of a specific example (namely, the 2011 issues of the journal "Belaruskaja dumka" used as a sample) of the functioning of the Belarusian state ideology. Any resemblance to the "real"(true) identification or world outlook of different social groups of the Belarusian society is random.

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Notes

1 This is the verbal or discourse level of IBG. Besides that, there is the institutional level represented by a chain of state bodies and "specialists" in the field of ideology as well as the visual level represented by a combination of images in mass media (but not limited to mass media) (for example, a series of billboards "Za Belarus" ("For Belarus")).

2 This report of the President defined a peculiar "canon" of interpreting the "idea of Europe". First of all, the Belarusian national identity is constructed in the context of opposition to the "West" (the "West" is the "common Other" which includes Europe and the USA). In terms of the content the "West" is reduced to "neoliberal" values (private property, individualism) which are imposed upon Belarusians and which are opposed to the traditional Belarusian values (sobornost', tolerance, "pamyarkounast'", and collectivism). So, the Belarusian identity is constructed as non-Western. It is mostly a "negative identity". Secondly, the ideological discourse of the President is an attempt to build the Belarusian national identity solely based on the country's own historical narrative (the "Belarusian tradition"). Moreover, following this strategy is precisely that element that "can" be borrowed from the "West" (the "Westernized" element of the Belarusian state ideology). This is how latent Europeanization is manifested by following the European model of nation building, namely, the type of national identity articulated in the ideological discourse of the President, despite its dogmatic character, suggests a way of Europeanization through the independent determination of its own way of development: "We are not

someone's province, not an Eastern edge of Europe or a Western edge of Russia. We must stand up straight, stop being defensive and apologetic" [Lukashenko 2003]. This is mainly a "positive identity". Thirdly, positive elements of the Belarusian national identity, on the one hand, allow to position Belarus as a European country (not only geographically, but also culturally), while on the other hand, to claim to be fulfulling a special mission, "the time, fate, and situation probably advanced Belarus to play a great role of the spiritual leader of the Eastern European civilization" [Lukashenko 2003]. This is how the missionary element of the Belarusian identity is constructed in the President's ideological discourse. Thus, despite the fact that "Europe" is positioned as the "Alien" seeking symbolic terror (imposing the "neoliberal" model of development), Belarus – in the horizon of the "alien Europe" – is constructed as a European nation state with a European quality of life, but without European political and economic values ("democracy", "liberalism", "market economy", etc.).

3 For a detailed analysis of conceptually different versions of the ideology of the Belarusian state: see Rudkouski, P. Paustanne Belarusi. Vilnya: Instytut belarusistyki, 2007. P. 15–70.; Feduta, A. Kollektivnyj politinformator i agitator // Neprikosnovennyj zapas. 2006. № 3 (47). [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2006/47/fe14.html.

4 "Current issues related to the further expansion of the "Belarusian model of development" are discussed and resolved in the magazine; recommendations to address the most important economic and social problems facing the state are made." [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: http://beldumka.belta.by/ru/about.

5 See, for example: [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: http://news.tut.by/politics/271250.html.

6 Sarna, A. Evropejskaja identichnost' belorusov i imidzh Evropy v beloruskih SMI. V: Puti evropeizatsii: mezhdu politikoj i konstruirovaniem identichnosti (1990–2010). Pod. red. O. Shparagi. Minsk: I.P.Logvinov, 2011. P. 225–256.

7 The intensification of economic and political relations, for example, with China, Venezuela and Cuba also transforms the tone of statements about the prospects of Europe and the articulation of Belarus's Europeanization.

8 The text of the President's address to the Belarusian Parliament and people in 2010 is dominated by a rather positive assessment of "Europe": it is noted that the relations of Belarus with the EU have improved, and the initiative of the "Eastern Partnership" is welcomed. Although there is some criticism of the European Parliament's attempt to impose certain terms and conditions (the format of "Euronest" presupposed the participation of both the Belarusian opposition and the official Belarusian parliament). In general, "Europe" is approved as a "quality standard" (of life, economy, technology, construction, diversification of energy resources, etc.). "Europe" is positioned as "your enemy" and the "main trading partner". The priority interest of the relations between Belarus and the EU is economic relations (which implies the growth of direct European investments, a trade surplus, and a technology exchange among others); it has nothing to do with the continuity of cultural values.

The positive tone in the evaluation of relations with Europe takes place in the context of the so called information war with Russia (for example, the movie "The God-dad", a Russian documentary shot by and shown on Russian television, featuring the darkest episodes of Lukashenko's reign, directly accusing the dictator of the disappearance and, apparently, death of his most dangerous and irreconcilable political opponents by order to his personal executioners in the 1990s). The text of the address contains some very negative comments about the administration of Russia. "At times the heads of Russia believe that "we will have no choice anyway".

We will have a choice... We will have a choice. The country will not stay empty in the center of Europe. But we will not allow anyone to make us give in, to kick us. <...> And the last time I spoke candidly, I said, we will go to the dugouts like it was 65–70 years ago, but we will survive. We have survived this "blockade" in the conditions of the financial crisis. And today I have to thank not mother Russia, our native Russia. Whom should we thank? I'll put it in quotes – "our enemies": the IMF, Europe, and the West. They gave us these billions for the country to survive. THEY have supported us."

Speaking at the IV All Belarusian People's Assembly, Lukashenko kept the emphasis on the foreign policy which had been identified in the address to parliament. "Europe" as a "standard of the quality of life" was a background for the discussion about the achievements of the Belarusian model in all spheres. Belarus/the Belarusian model of development, which has the status of "crossroads" and that is implementing a multi-vector policy, does not involve a choice between the EU and Russia, and is focused on the strategy of "equal closeness" to the East and the West. The message of the speech specifically emphasized that "the work of the European Union does not mean" moving away "from Russia" while there is still a negative assessment of the policy pursued by the Russian government. "And when we were slapped on the head and they closed the market in Russia to our products, today, no matter how uncomfortable and shameful it was because of the politics, we have to thank the European Union for behaving in a different manner. Today, we trade more with Europe than with Russia. But once we used to sell 85% of our produce to Russia. Who would have thought that we, when we were pushed out of Russia, would find these markets in other countries. We found them. We are grateful to Europe for that."

9 It should be mentioned right away that the illustrative aspect of the design of the image of Belarus and Europe was not actually used as the main attention was paid to the verbal text.

10 For more details see: Rolyonok A. Kriticheskaja teorija Evropy // Materialy Mezhdunarodnogo molodjozhnogo nauchnogo foruma "LOMONOSOV-2011" / Otv. red. A.I. Andreev, A.V. Andrianov, E.A. Antipov, M.V. Chistyakova. Moscow: MAKS Press, 2011. [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: http://conf.msu.ru/archive/Lomonosov_2011/1330/35851_a6b6.pdf

11 We should say that the dominant discourse of the "Belarusian model" was preserved in the journal throughout the whole IBS history (i.e., from 2003 to 2010.).

12 Other experts (e.g., V. Pinigin, Deputy Director of Scientific Affairs, Scientific Research Economic Institute of the Ministry of Economics of Belarus) identified the negative balance, planned targets for the GDP, a shortage of qualified personnel and technology, and the rigid and inertia nature of the Belarusian economic model as the main causes of the economic crisis. Some (for example, the dean of the BSU (Belarusian State University) Faculty of Economics Kovalev) mainly speak about the imbalance in labor productivity and wages, increased imports and government debt, and a crisis of trust (but not the economic crisis).

13 V. Gigin described this in more detail in another article: V. Gigin. Palitychnyja rezervy // Belaruskaja dumka. 2011. Number 7. P. 18.

14 It is interesting that the article was published just prior to the terrorist attack in the Minsk underground (11.04.2011) in a special issue (№ 3 in 2011) dedicated to the discussion of "The National Security Concept of the Republic of Belarus" adopted at the end of 2010.

15 In the Minister's opinion the Western world brings us an ultimatum: "Either we meekly accept the model imposed upon us where our place is on the outskirts of the civilization, or we defend the legal right to be a sovereign subject of international integration processes" (Proleskovsky, O. Protivodejstvie tehnologijam manipulirovainja // Belaruskaja dumka. 2011. № 3. P. 49).

16 Peter Luchak, the journalist representing "Junge Welt" (Germany), believes that the Belarusian model provides an alternative to neo-liberal capitalism, and that such a model is a true endorsement of Europe: "In fact, the program of changes carried out in your country was initially very dangerous for Western capitalists as an alternative to neo-liberal concepts." <...> Progressive forces in Europe support your path to independence, which is an alternative to neo-liberal capitalism. "Luc Michel, the President of the European People's Communitarian Party (Belgium) also evaluates the Belarusian model ("market socialism") as a successful alternative to globalization and imperialism: "Belarus is a socially oriented country with a strong central government. This is a feature of the Belarusian model. In such circumstances, the free market is just a tool. That is why the Belarusian model, despite all its temporary difficulties, is still a successful model. And this scares the representatives of neo-liberal ruling circles in the West" (Belarus – ES: v poiskah vzaimoponimanija // Belaruskaja dumka. 2011. № 6. P. 74).

17 Compared to the previously proposed Constitution, the Reform Treaty gives national parliaments eight instead of six weeks to study the legislative initiatives proposed by the European Commission, and to make a decision about whether to send their recommendations of non-compliance with these initiatives to the principle of subsidiarity" (Yu. Makeychik. Novye realii integratsii. Prakticheskie shagi modernizatsii politicheskogo ustrojstva ES // Belaruskaja dumka. 2011. № 2. P. 109–110).

18 This idea was articulated by President A.G. Lukashenko during the annual "Address to the people of Belarus and the National Assembly" (21.04.2011): "It is therefore necessary to address the issues of strengthening our civil society in a more substantial manner. Unfortunately, the West has got a flawed belief that – only the opposition parties and informal organizations define the term "civil society in Belarus" (Osnova uspeha zalozhena v nas samih. Iz Poslanija Prezidenta Respubliki Belarus A.G. Lukashenko belorusskomu i Natsionalnomu Sobraniju Respubliki Belarus, 21 aprelya 2011 // Belaruskaja dumka. 2011. № 5).

19 "Accordingly, if you do not take measures to regulate the flow of information coming to the digital channels, in terms of their content and country of origin, the national identity of the consumer audience will be offset" (Tolstik, I. Analogovoe TV ili tsifrovoe? // Belaruskaja dumka. 2011. № 1. P. 107).

20 A. Tur, the Deputy Minister of Economics said, "Directive № 4 "On the development of entrepreneurship and stimulating business activity in Belarus" was called "Directive on liberalization even before its adoption". <...> The general approach here is the following: there should be competition wherever possible and governmental regulation wherever needed." (Belaruskaja dumka. 2011. № 3. P. 96).

21 When discussing the topic in another article the director of the Center for International Studies of BSU B. Ulakhovich said: "In the decisions of the summit of Crete in 1994, Europeans already acknowledged that over 25% of the country's dependence on energy supplies from a single source is a critical exponent. What can be said about our situation?" (Kredo gosudarstva // Belaruskaja dumka. 2011. № 3. P. 90).

22 The Minister also points out that "today the EU is the second biggest trade partner of our country after Russia". According to the end of the year results we have registered positive dynamics of the goods turnover in spite of the "complications" in the political and diplomatic relations.

23 However, judging by the references and dates of access to the Internet sources identified in the text itself, we can conclude that the article was submitted to the editor before the presidential elections. This explains the different tonality in the evaluation of the EU's security policy.

Alexey Bratochkin

THE "SOVIET PAST" IN TEXTBOOKS AND TUTORIALS IN POST-SOVIET BELARUS: PROBLEMS OF DESCRIPTION

Abstract

Twenty years have passed since the dissolution of the USSR, but the problem of the "Soviet past" description persists in Belarus. The main strategy is "normalization" and "neutralization" of the Soviet past and its traumatic periods. This article considers textbooks that are used in Belarusian institutions of higher education and describe the Soviet period of our history. Having analyzed these materials, the author drew a conclusion that the tradition of the Soviet historiography based on Marxist paradigm still influences work of historians. The absence of new theoretical approaches hinders the studying of the Soviet past in Belarus. For example, new approaches towards such phenomena as "power", "nation", and "nationalism" are not presented. Little attention is paid to the problem of social stratification in the Soviet society. Besides, historical policy influences the work of historians in Belarus and this is mostly represented by State's meddling in the content of textbooks.

Keywords: Soviet past, Soviet and post-Soviet historiography, Marxist paradigm, "normalization" of history, historical policy.

More than twenty years have passed since the disintegration of the USSR, and, thus, it is possible to assume that the opinions about the "Soviet past" in post-Soviet Belarus should have evolved. But how differently do we speak today about our past?[1]

The choice of the historical period is not accidental with several reasons accounting for that. First of all, the "Soviet past" itself with all its accompanying events, became a starting point for discussions about the state of historical science in Belarus in the early 90s in the XX century. In their turn those discussions were caused by what could be called the "stress of historical heritage" if one is to use D. Lowen-

thal's definition. "Traumatic" periods of the Soviet history are imposed on the "successes" of the Soviet modernization leading to polemics about what "Soviet" meant for Byelorussians and what can be said about it today. Secondly, in today's Belarus the reference to the Soviet past often takes the form of attempts to use its separate elements as a basis to construct the models of collective identity (Lastovsky 2010). Thirdly, some Belarusian researchers believe that today's discussion of the Soviet past unlike the period of the early 90s of the XX century takes place against the background of an intensive process of "its forgetting", "fragmentation", and "disintegration" (Kazakevich 2011).

The historiography of the "Soviet period" of Belarus's history is quite extensive but this research deals with textbooks used in higher educational establishments which address the issue of the "Soviet past". This choice is based on the assumption that educational literature to some extent should contain "traces" of academic history, but not just didactic constructions, hence, textbooks can show the level of development that the historical science of Belarus has reached today. The textbooks in the Belarusian context also serve as a means to present masses with examples of collective identity. Consequently, one can find the presence of "historical policy" and how the state (or other actors) tries to affect the content of historical education and mass opinions. It seems interesting to consider the following issues: do these textbooks besides the "ideological order" or other similar inquiries contain something else; can one find in them the ideas and opinions including those about "the Soviet past" which will still be in these textbooks even then when such an order is minimized or when it will be regulated by actors other than the state. In other words, we have to deal with today's essence of the "description problem" of the Soviet past. We also have to see whether the discussion of the "Soviet past" depends on the state of historical science itself, on the influence of "historical policy" or on something else.

The choice of textbooks used in higher educational establishments is also conditioned by the fact that there was an analysis of the content of the secondary school educational literature conducted in Belarus that revealed certain problems arising when dealing with the "Soviet past". Thus, the analysis of the textbooks used in higher educational establishments could provide a new material for the discussion (Ostrovskaja 2010).

Thus, the desirable result of this research could help answer a number of questions: what changes in Belarus's historical science can be identified on the basis of the analysis of the educational literature considering the problem of the "Soviet past"; whether the description problem of the "Soviet past" is caused by the state of the Belarusian historical science and how this problem is connected to a wider context, be it political, social or some other context.

"Forgetting" the past as a natural process and as a regulated practice

First of all, we should start with an already defined thesis that today we are becoming witnesses of the natural process of forgetting the "Soviet past". How "natural" is this process? Is it caused by the fact that today we are actually moving away from the events that took place in the XX century in Belarus, or whether in this case we are dealing with some

practices of regulating this "naturalness" in the Belarusian context? If one is to answer these questions then one should look at what is happening in Russia today where the "Soviet past" is just as significant as it is in Belarus ("significant" at least in terms of the time period which this past occupied in Russian history).

In his article ("Nostalgicheskaja modernizatsia: Sovetskoe proshloe kak istoricheskij gorizont" ("Nostalgic Modernization: Soviet Past as Historical Horizon") Ilya Kalinin identifies quite a well-formed tendency of how to "work" with the "Soviet past" in modern Russia. In his opinion, "over the past years we have become witnesses of a quite consistent state project (supported by the loyal part of the cultural elite) that consists not so much of the restoration but of the neutralization of the Soviet past as a specific object of positive or negative identification. The essence of this project is to overcome former historical debates splitting the Russian society starting with the perestroika epoch. The "Soviet" consistently loses its historical specificity as some ideological, political and social experience as well as a political and economic alternative to capitalism. It ceases to be perceived as a whole referring to some special historical context and turns into an organic part of the historical past of the Russian statehood and national tradition. In such a de- and re-semantized form the Soviet past stops to be the moment of the actual ideological choice leading to political demarcation, and becomes a basis for public consensus digesting any and all differences and overcoming any ruptures" (Kalinin 2010).

In our opinion, this described new "project" of the work with the "Soviet past" being carried out in Russia, is appreciably similar to what was done and is being done to the Soviet past in today's Belarus, though of course, adjusted to local conditions. If one is to track the dynamics of the attitude to the "Soviet past" from "the state" in independent Belarus then one can see that attempts to attach some negative context to the Soviet past (since the late 1980s and up to the mid-1990s) turn into attempts to "restore" it including, among others, specific political and other practices (since 1994, after Lukashenko's coming to power, and prior to the beginning of the 2000s when the project of "Belarusian statehood ideology" emerged in 2003). Then throughout the 2000s we could observe in Belarus the phenomenon of the "normalization" of the Soviet past (in particular, its "traumatic periods") and what I. Kalinin identifies as its "neutralization".[2] The general orientation of the process of such past "processing" in Belarus does not differ much from the processing in Russia except for one specific feature, namely, the rethinking of the "Soviet past" in Russia was based on its being the "center" of the former empire of nations while Belarus accordingly was its "periphery" (in the early 1990s it was said that it was a "colony"). Based on this assumption, the "Soviet past" was even symbolically divided as Russia, in fact, turned into the USSR (even in everyday conversations) and inherited a lion's share of its "achievements" and historical events while Belarus had to be content with a "partial" participation in those events and "achievements" without claiming something more significant. It is specifically this "postcolonial perspective" that should be considered when speaking about what happened to the "Soviet past" in Belarus though with a number of restrictions which will be discussed in more details later.

We also find important the thesis that the "forgetting" of the Soviet past in Belarus nevertheless is not a completely "natural" process. More likely, the natural process of forgetting the past has considerably facilitated and disguised the practices of its regulation leading to the general neutralization of the "Soviet past". Besides, in our opinion, the "forgetting" of the Soviet past or the practices of regulating it cannot be considered if we analyze only those conditions in which it occurs today. The present "neutralization" of the Soviet past and its "forgetting" can be analyzed retrospectively, based on how the Soviet Union's own past was treated in the Soviet Union itself. The idea is that today we have to deal with such features of the historical past treatment which even though they are affected by the present political and other conditions actually in many respects are still connected with a certain "tradition" of treating the past that was developed in the Soviet epoch.

How the past was "being forgotten" in the USSR itself

One of the most essential features of the emergence of the "Soviet project" is the declaration of a radical rupture with the past while the events of October, 1917 became the date defining that rupture. A new "Soviet reality" had to be completely new, having nothing in common with what existed earlier.

This symbolical rupture found its expression not only in the implementation of Lenin's plan of monumental propaganda and other similar practices. It was postulated theoretically, having entered into an ordinary lexicon in the form of a well-known concept of "vestiges of the past" frequently used throughout the whole Soviet history. If one is to use the widely spread definition, then "vestiges of the past" in the Soviet context are "the remnants of former social and economic relations inherited from the old society as well as opinions, ideas, customs, and traditions. Under socialism the question of dealing with and overcoming the vestiges of the past (Vp) is especially acute as all of them (bourgeois, patriarchal, feudal and bai ones) are a product of socioeconomic structures based on the domination of private property and exploitation and, therefore, these vestiges are in an irreconcilable conflict with socialist public relations and socialist ideology". Moreover, it was claimed that "in the socialist society social structure the bearers are usually not classes but rather individuals or groups of people. Most distinctly vestiges of the past are found in antisocial behavior, in the infringement of norms of socialist law and communist morals such as an indifference to interests of society (nihilism, lack of principles, narrow-mindedness, a disinterested attitude to public duty), an infringement of norms of public life (bureaucratism, careerism, neglect of interests of the collective or an individual, indiscipline, irresponsibility, etc.), and direct hostility (criminality of all forms, parasitism).[3]

In other words, it was believed that "vestiges of the past" could not be some institutional forms of this past which in this or that way are present in the Soviet reality; such their presence is denied. Criticism of the Soviet reality based on the idea of a better "pre-Soviet" past or that the Soviet reality is similar to what it actually denies could be quite easily treated as a "crime" and was punished. Or, otherwise, a frequent forgetting of the

past was one of the essential strategies of people wishing to feel comfortable in the Soviet society.

The standard evaluation of the "pre-Soviet" past can be made with the help of the Soviet ideology relying on Marxism-Leninism. This ideology, in its different variations, as well as a normative evaluation of the past, evolved and was used to assess one's own "past" already within the limits of Soviet history. Khrushchev's reforms were an act of distancing from "Stalinism" and "personality cult" while Gorbachev's reforms were an act of the same "distancing" from the previous epoch, but all that "distancing" did not include the radical revision of the bases of the developed system and played a tool role thus ensuring the system longevity. The issue of evaluating the past never reached extreme limits. If a question arose why everything (already in Soviet history) developed the way it had developed it was always possible to address one more theoretical thesis, specifically, the idea of "historical necessity". It, in its turn, could be used as a convenient answer stating that "relentless laws of history" forced Soviet leaders including even Stalin to behave the way they did even though, of course, it was a pity that it turned out the way it had turned out.

The Soviet "tradition" of treating the past (already inside Soviet history itself), thus, in our opinion, included the following important ideas.

The past is significant only as a reference point for a new "social order". However, at the same time what can be defined as a "continuity" of institutional forms of any sort including repressive practices and violence (for example, "manageable de-Stalinization" (N.Vert 2003) during Khrushchev's epoch was the period when political transformations were carried out by those who had been involved in "Stalin" crimes) is often ignored.

It is not the past itself that can be a "crime" but rather its wrong "assessment" or "analysis" from the point of view of the present political necessity. The whole Stalin's epoch, for instance, cannot be considered a crime; the crime is localized in different ways, with the help of the "personality cult" thesis; the crime cannot be made "universal" in order not to endanger the existing system. Criticism of Stalin is possible but criticism of the system is not possible as it will be treated as a "crime".

The state monopoly of the normative evaluation of the past and its treatment (based on the existing ideology) was being formed. Both the evaluation and the treatment had an instrumental and utilitarian character that, in turn, actually meant the absence of the intellectual tradition within the framework of which the evaluation of the past could move beyond the borders set by the state. The only area in which such a tradition was possible was the Soviet "literature" certain representatives of which could define their ethical attitude to what happened in the "past" but that ethical attitude did not turn into institutionalized "norms" shared by the whole society.

From "forgetting" the past in the USSR to the present situation

When the USSR disintegrated and new "national states" were formed the revision of its history began and various models of "culture of memory" including the attitude to

the "Soviet past" were generated. In the Baltic States, for example, a feeling of "consensus about the fact that the communist regime was imposed on them from the outside and was both "alien" in general and ethnically alien" arose. In Belarus "'the new' elite did not simply emerge from the 'old', communist one, it remains in a close union with it, i.e. there is a continuity of the authoritarian structures observed today and they have not separated from the communistic practice of domination"; Belarus went through the process which could be characterized in the following way, "instead of de-Sovietization … there was only a repainting of the Soviet cultural norm in national or regional colors" (Tryobst 2004).

The reason for this is not only the absence of the change of the elite. We believe that after 1991 the Soviet "tradition" of treating the past in the manner described above determined much of what began to take place in Belarusian society. Actually, neither in the early nineties, nor later the work with the "Soviet past" allowing moving radically beyond that "tradition" was carried out though it was already happening in new conditions.

What are the signs of the influence of this "tradition"? If one remembers the events of the late 1980s – early 1990s, then the whole discourse of the condemnation of the past was based mainly on the necessity to give this period some moral assessment. The only source of the moral evaluation was Belarusian intelligentsia trying to extend the ethical evaluation of the past to a wider range of people. We should mention such names as V. Bykov, A. Adamovich and others, who were the participants of the discussions in those days and who referred among others to the norms of Christianity due to lack of other norms when evaluating the past. Later they were joined by historians, politicians, etc. But all this polemic disappears after a while for various reasons (including political ones) from public discourse, without having turned into what it has turned, for example, in Germany which had gone through de-nazification. All that activity did not turn into the institutionalized forms of work with the past which should have included (and this is essential) such ways of understanding which could move beyond the frame of a simple "ethical evaluation" usually present in a literary plot. The problem of the past in case with Germany viewed from the point of view of "fault" and "responsibility" is discussed within the framework of intellectual discourses of a different order as works of K. Jaspers, T. Adorno and other intellectuals lay the foundation of "normativeness" in the evaluation of the historical past accepted even by the political elite.

The situation described above and that has developed in Belarus is not unique. In fact, it was typical for Eastern European countries for there "post-socialist intellectuals" did not choose "institutionalized forms of work with the past" or the "discourse outlined attitude to facts but their moral evaluation". It was due to the fact that during the preceding period their stories were faced with how the state relied on "forms of purposeful and operated … misinformation and propaganda" created by them and what those intellectuals wanted now was to "be distanced from them" as far as possible (Langenol 2004). In Belarus the intellectuals stopping working with the past in that manner coincided with the fact that their place was now again occupied by the state that was implementing its own policy rather than following the intentions of intellectuals.

In post-Soviet Belarus the state maintained its monopoly of the normative evaluation of the past which still had its instrumental and utilitarian character (evident in the changes in the content of the same textbooks which described the "Soviet past" subject to the influence of political factors). The "normative" evaluation almost completely misses the ethical component as it would limit the possibilities of an instrumental and utilitarian use of such "normativeness" by the state. The "Soviet past" itself was not "criminalized", rather, on the contrary, the treatment of the "Soviet past" in a new context which did not suit the "state" was considered to be a crime. We should mention the idea frequently used even by President A. Lukashenko that "we will not give the victory in the Great Patriotic War to anyone" and the corresponding "historical policy". Besides, after 1991 the Belarusian state has in many respects maintained institutional forms which emerged during the Soviet epoch, and that institutional heritage was not considered to be something that required a thorough reforming as some time ago it was used as a basis for repressive and other practices applied in the past (one of the examples is the preservation of the KGB in Belarus both in the form of the institution and the name).

Thus, the "forgetting" of the Soviet past and the practices related to its "regulation" in today's Belarus can be treated on the basis of how the attitude to the past was formed during the Soviet epoch and not just on the basis of what happened in Belarus after 1991. In our opinion, such an approach offers wider opportunities for the explanation of some phenomena which one can face when reading textbooks used by higher educational establishments in Belarus and which present different pictures of the "Soviet past".

History textbook as a source of "objective truth"

Everything described above allows imagining what exactly will be absent in the educational literature including the description of the "Soviet past": what we will see there will have no relation to the result of "overcoming the past" from the point of view of "de-Sovietization". It will be such a form of "narrative" that will allow to "explain" the Soviet past, having set, among others, the purpose of its "neutralization".

One of the prominent features of history textbooks in Belarus is exactly the preservation of a "narrative" structure which should not be treated as a didactic method only. Criticism of the historical "narrative" in the Belarusian context has not spread; consequently, the "narrative" being created in the Belarusian history textbooks, possesses a number of specific features. One of them is "factuality" with minimum generalizations. The narrative is designed not by means of theoretical constructions but is based on "factuality" that is used to serve the role of the main supporting construction. Or these "facts" as it will be shown later implicitly contain the "theory" that is not mentioned, namely, pieces of Marxist-Leninist methodology used during the Soviet epoch.

The "facts" mentioned in the "narrative" of Belarusian history textbooks have a "positivist" value as they show the "objectivity" of what is told. One of the textbooks already at the very beginning of the description of the Soviet history period states that, "Following

the precept of great historian Leopold Ranke, we will try to understand and accept what actually took place" (Treshchenok 2005: 5). There is another example of the same sort, concerning a different aspect of the late Soviet history, "The time has come to tell the truth and dispel the myths created during the perestroika period that the market in its essence is humane, that it encourages the development of economy, and provides people with wealth and happiness" (Novik, Martsul 2003: 415).

We cannot say that teaching materials completely lack theoretical constructions when dealing with the "Soviet past". One can extract such notions as "modernization" or "totalitarianism" and "authoritarianism" from what is defined as theoretical approaches. However, these discoursive constructions neither get contextualized, nor are described from the point of view of their emergence, development and applicability to the Soviet epoch or we have to deal with their specific contextualization. One of such examples is the treatment of the concept "totalitarianism".

One textbook offers the following contextualization of the notion "totalitarianism": "Soviet totalitarianism is in many respects a myth composed during the political and as it is more and more frequently said intercivilizational opposition East – West". The same textbook defines "totalitarianism" through the principal idea of state control of all spheres of society's life, while, in the opinion of the textbook's authors this control, in turn, is typical for all states, including democratic ones. Thus, the acts of Stalin's People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the activity of McCarthy's commission in the USA" are quite comparable. The authors connect the sources of totalitarianism with the "history of old Russia", its communal character and the dominating role of the state (even though the text deals with the Belarusian context, the authors perhaps still identifies the history of Belarus with the history of Russia). The theoretical conclusion states that in the world "there is one thing that remains invariable: as soon as there is a serious threat to the interests of the forces dominating in the given society, they will stop at nothing to protect them. All fancy words about freedom and democracy are rejected away as unnecessary rags and the direct – total – violence rules following the principle "who will beat who". History knows no exceptions." Such a conclusion reminds us of the ideologized schemes of the historical narrative that existed during the Soviet epoch. It is also claimed that "totalitarianism signs were undoubtedly inherent in the Soviet society. But it is also unquestionable that that they did not serve as the main distinction from Western bourgeois societies where similar displays, even on a smaller scale, were observed too" (Treshchenok 2005: 7–14). Another textbook simply states the "fact" that in the late 1920s in the USSR and BSSR "the regime of democratic centralism turned into a regime of authoritarian centralism", while when dealing with the early 1930s we should speak about the presence "of all features of a totalitarian regime" (Novik, Martsul 2003: 143).

What is the reason for such treatment of theoretical concepts except for "the ideological" order needed to "normalize" Soviet history? On the one hand, here we can observe a common tendency characteristic of the Eastern European region and the "post-socialist" description of history. In this region "in the late 1980s Marxist-socialist models of the

historical process were severely criticized and almost completely disappeared from the discursive stage" while a unique "post-socialist prospect" of history description is being formed. If "post-colonial research" was focused on the research of history as "models of the historical process" including criticism of those models which "had been imposed by the West" in the "post-socialist prospect" "one discovers the tendency to treat history as a cause and effect chain of events that led to the current state of affairs that is endured exclusively in the light of the problems of the transition period. Therefore, the center of the evaluation of the past in post-socialist countries is occupied not so much by the principles of constructing history as a discourse but rather by the relations of causality in history as a process" (Langenol 2004). On the other hand, we believe, that the specificity of the Belarusian situation is due to the fact that the Marxist-socialist model of the historical process has not been reflected on thoroughly and continues to be implicitly present in the "narrative" of a significant number of Belarusian textbooks (one can see that, for instance, when one looks at the conceptual device that is still being used). Besides, it is possible to ascertain that the implementation of theoretical approaches which could become an alternative to this "implicit" inclusion of the Marxist-socialist model of the historical process into the description of Belarusian history did not take place.

"Class approach" today

During their discussion in the early 1990s historians spoke about the necessity to stop using the "class approach" so typical of Marxist-Leninist methodology. Throughout the subsequent period one could observe the disappearance of former theoretical and rhetorical constructions connected with the "class approach" in its Soviet version of the history description but today this process is far from being finished.

To some extent it can be explained if we look at the "language" of the historical description. For example, one of the most widely used textbooks states that "the victory of the October revolution, the first revolutionary changes evoked strong resistance of the overthrown class" (Novik, Martsul 2003: 38). Most widespread concepts related to the problem of social stratification of the Soviet society in the educational literature include "workers", "office workers", "collective farmers", "peasants", "prosperous peasants", "masses", "working people", "population", "Belarusian people", etc.

If one is to move beyond textbooks and to address more academic publications then the situation does not seem to be much better, for instance, the Soviet society in the 1970s–1980s is described as consisting of "workers", "peasants", "intelligentsia" and "interclass social groups" including "housewives", "pensioners", "individuals engaged in personal agriculture", etc.[4] It is obvious that not just textbooks but even academic publications have a problem describing the social stratification of the Soviet society and defining the criteria. Earlier used ideas about what "class" is have not been revised. Thus, today we can see the remainders of former opinions that are still present in the historical "narrative". Sometimes we can even see them reproduced. Thus, we have to deal, first of all, with the interpretation

of the issues related to the functioning of the Soviet society which earlier was considered from the point of view of the "absence of antagonisms" inside the society. Today the Soviet society conflicts still have not been thoroughly analyzed as "structural" conflicts.

"Authority" and "society", "collective" and "individual": mechanical model of interaction

The very functioning of the Soviet society (in the Belarusian context) and the problem of "authority" ("power") are mainly considered within the framework of the mechanical interaction model characteristic of the former "Marxist" approach with its concept of basis and superstructure. Earlier, within the frame of the formation approach, the functioning of society was explained exactly in that manner. Then, when in the early 1990s it was declared that it was time to use a "civilized approach" the explanation model did not change. Rather, it was "improved" as changes in the social reality began to be treated with the consideration of a great number of factors including the "human one". In other words, the classical oppositions in social sciences due to which we "look at the social world from the point of view of dichotomies" "material/ideal", "objective/subjective" or "individual/collective" (Corcuff 2002: 11–12) were not overcome.

This problem finds its clear reflection in educational texts connected with the Soviet period of Belarusian history. In the best case, another model used to explain the relations between "authorities" ("power") and "society" as a dichotomy is created in the educational material where the power carries out repressions while the society thus looks like space reacting only to these "external" influences. Thus, the relations between the "authority" and "society" do not become problematized from the point of view of "authority microphysics", i.e. those practices and strategies which are frequently "implicit" and which were also used to carry out that type of the political or other domination so characteristic of the Soviet epoch. Moreover, during the Soviet epoch the concepts "state" and "society" were not differentiated. Today we are facing a similar situation as frequently the "state" is not defined precisely or not defined at all as a concept that could have an instrumental character and that would allow separating "society" from "state". In this sense a certain negative impact was produced by the idea developed immediately after 1991. One of the opinions that became widely spread was the idea that the history of Belarus should be told as a history of the "national statehood" which eventually turned into a simple "state" history where the state is understood as a "country" or "society" but not as a set of certain institutes and practices. The Soviet period of history is also depicted from the point of view of what "leaders" did though such an explanation already seems to be quite archaic as it is impossible to explain everything that occurred, for example, in the 30s of the XX century relying only on "Stalin's intentions".

Problem of "subject" and concept of "nation"

Today courses of Belarusian history taught in higher educational establishments (including those courses which describe the Soviet period) are designed according to "the standardized program". They rely on the assumption that "a student should know basic theories of social development, features of formation and civilization approaches applied to the studying of the history of Belarus; main stages of the forming of the Belarusian people during various historical periods, historical models of the modernization of the state and society, the Soviet experience of the modernization and civilization development of the Belarusian society, main achievements in the development of material and spiritual culture and cultural and historical heritage of the Belarusian people, main stages of the establishing of forms of statehood on the territory of Belarus, the Belarusian statehood and the state sovereignty of Belarus, the place and role of Belarusian lands in the geopolitical processes during various historical periods, the contribution of the Belarusian people to the victory over fascism, and the importance and place of sovereign Belarus in the modern world". The later version of the standardized program intended for a narrower specialization already describes the "main stages of the formation of the Belarusian ethnos during various historical periods".

Proceeding from these priorities, it is quite difficult to define what or who is the "subject" of the historical process be it "Belarusian people", "society", "statehood forms", "ethnos", or something else. All these concepts in such a context possess some uncertainty including a specifically treated concept "state". But in any case one can easily notice the "absence" of the problematization of the concept "nation" popular in historical discussions in the early 1990s and which is still actively used in Belarus outside the frame of courses taught. The mentioned variants of the curricula use the concept "nation" when discussing the period of the Belarusian history covering the second half of the XIX – the beginning of the XX centuries as a period of "nation formation" but later this concept is no longer problematized as the process of the nation forming "is completed". The same structure of presenting the material is also used in educational literature. "Nation" as a "collective subject", however, could become quite the subject of what students including those studying the period of the Soviet history should know provided that their knowledge will include at least some acquaintance with "primordial" and "constructivist" and other approaches. Nevertheless, today students are not burdened with the studying of these approaches.[5] There are several reasons for this. First of all, it is partially due to those not completely "politically neutral" representations about "nation" and "nationalism" which existed during the Soviet epoch, and which, already in the post-Soviet times, have been used in Belarus by the power discourse to substantiate the views of the political regime opponents in the country since the second half of the 1990s. Traces of these ideas are found in educational literature when "historical continuity" began to be built between "nationalists" of the beginning of the XX century, "collaborators" using the national revival slogans during the Second World War, and "nationalists" impeding the establishment of a new political order in the first half of

the 1990s (Treshchenok 2005: 30, 149–151, 294). For this reason one can choose to ignore the concept "nation" in the context of the studying of the Soviet period of history as something that destroys this whole rhetoric and forces to reflect on what kind of "nation" is being created in Belarus today. Though at the same time there are more moderate textbooks. They use notions such as "national policy" and "national factor" in the Soviet history context and apply the concept "Russification" indirectly specifying some problems connected with the concept "nation".

Secondly, it probably has to do with the fact that on the whole during the post-Soviet epoch there emerges a problem of constructing "collective subjectness" in Belarusian history. The problematization of the concept "nation" in the Soviet context as a problem of constructing one's own "subjectness" could lead to the situation described by Sergey Ushakin in his article "V poiskah mesta mezhdu Stalinym i Gitlerom: O postkolonialnyh istorijah sotsializma" ("In search of a place between Stalin and Hitler: about post-colonial histories of socialism"). In Belarus, in addition to everything else, there emerge various practices of "distancing, alienation" from its own past generated by the unwillingness and "impossibility" to present itself as "the oppressed" (Ushakin 2011). In this sense if one looks at the problematization of the concept "nation" against the Soviet history background one again will have to face questions which still have no answers, for example, what the Soviet period of history meant for Belarusians as a "nation".

Official historiography including educational literature identifies the "Soviet period" as a period when Belarusians were trying to find their main characteristic "subjectness", "statehood" (in the form of the BSSR), or, in other words, what the "most important" issue among all others, even most gloomiest events of the Soviet (Belarusian) history is.[6] In his article Sergey Bogdan claims that Byelorussians (Belarusians) as a "modern nation" were formed during the Soviet epoch (Bogdan 2009). This matching of the non-official and official fields should immediately alert or, at least, force to reflect on what the discourse "nation" means for Belarusians today and what role it plays in their ideas about their own history. Should the "national prospect" be the only way "to tell" history or rather should we consider other things including the expansion of this "national" prospect (for example, the "subjectness" in other dimensions including the development of civil and other rights and freedoms, institutes of civil society, ethical evaluation of events, etc.)?

"Historical necessity" as the main method of history "explanation"

The example of using the concept "nation" in the Belarusian context can help to choose the strategy that can be applied if one is to explain history that exists outside of textbooks and other teaching materials. In the above mentioned article Sergey Ushakin draws attention to the fact that the attempts made in Belarus to construct the country's own history are reduced to "strategic immoralism" relying on the idea that Belarusians could not really choose any other type of behavior rather than their simple participation in the events depending on their "external" logic. As a result, for instance, "instead of forming an alterna-

tive to the moral ambivalence of Soviet socialism" only a historical justification of moral relativism is offered" (Ushakin 2011).

This idea takes us back to what has already been said, namely, to the problem of "norms" existing in society and to "standard rationality" in historical research. During the Soviet epoch these "norms" and "standard rationality" were constructed on the basis of a very simple idea that everything that occurs in the USSR on the whole is "good" because it corresponds to "history laws". As a matter of fact, the ethical evaluation of events in the conditions of such "normativeness" was substituted for quite convenient "instrumental" ethics depending on the political will of the elite and not related to ethics as such the norms of which even though they are not "eternal" are nevertheless based on wider conventions. Undoubtedly, the Soviet political elite operated according to such a "historical necessity".

Should it be mentioned that the explanation of the Soviet period of history in post-Soviet Belarus still includes the thesis of "historical necessity"? Though today this "historical necessity" has not just already been reduced to showing the working of "history laws" but to demonstrating how factors of history in their "unique combination" create such an "event" that removes any questions about trying to evaluate it from any other perspective rather than the logic of this "necessity" (for example, the victory of the USSR during the Second World War is caused by the success of Stalin's modernization carried out "right before"). This is how the "traumatic periods" of the Soviet history are explained in most cases nowadays.

The heritage of this Soviet logic of "historical necessity" can be seen even in how they try to construct the "national history" in Belarus today where the very concept "nation" (fetishism of "nation") eliminates all possible questions forcing one to think about the content of this concept and some "features" of nation constructing connected among others with the practices of inclusion and exclusion during such constructing in today's Belarus. With reference to the Soviet epoch it works the way it has been described above as the Soviet epoch starts to be evaluated from the point of view of the fact that the "nation" was formed "despite everything" while the main thing is not to put into the concept of the "nation" something that would force one to think about quite a specific content of these processes.

The problem of the "Soviet past" description: possible solutions

The problem of the description of the "Soviet past" in Belarusian context, thus, has some dimensions which should be considered. The process of its natural forgetting even though it has been going on quite intensively is actually also caused by a number of certain categories which set the frame of this "forgetting" and which emerged during the Soviet epoch. The logic of "historical necessity" in its different variations, inherited from the Soviet epoch, interferes with the formation of public norms in which the ethical evaluation of the past on the collective level rather than on the individual level could be included.

In this sense one of the problems to deal with is the struggle against this logic of "historical necessity" which could engage not only historians but also other specialists.

In this case we should use an interdisciplinary approach taking into consideration the fact that "normativeness" is studied within the frames of philosophy, sociology and other disciplines. In their application to historical research it, first of all, means the expansion of the prospect. Consequently, Soviet history cannot be studied only through the prism of the concept "Belarusian statehood" or through the prism of the concept "nation" (as a most widespread alternative to power discourse). "Anthropological prospects" as well as other "prospects" are needed as well. The greatest difficulty is to find some kind of balance between the "instrumental rationality" (a habit to write "causal history" without going beyond the "facts" and in every possible way showing its impartiality) and "standard rationality" (attempts to create such a "narrative" that would not completely eliminate ethical and other evaluations). For this purpose it is necessary, at least, to speak directly about the reasons of one's own work, maintaining academic standards and without being engaged in the latent propagation of different value systems.

The description of the "Soviet past" in Belarus went through its evolution during the post-Soviet epoch. If we speak about educational literature, then we can see in it what could be conditionally called the emergence of a "differentiating narrative" when instead of the "formation approach" they began to apply the "civilization" one and the history of the Soviet period suddenly began to be filled with a large number of new facts "unknown" earlier. Though the "formation approach" itself did not disappear now it is present in an "implicit" form, having stopped to be, however, a complete and unique concept used to explain history. At the same time we could say that these approaches have not been changed yet by those theories which could help to get rid of the former dichotomy "basis and superstructure" and to present newly open facts of Soviet history in a different perspective. The implementation of these theories is going slowly and with a great difficulty. It is a set of ideas and theories related, first of all, to the "social theory" and its constructivist versions connected with the features of the historical science development in Belarus after 1991. The disputes about the foundations of history as a science that were widely spread outside of Belarus in the 1980s–1990s were completely ignored in Belarus at both theoretical and practical (applied) levels.

Consequently, there are constant claims for "objectivity" in teaching materials and a "narrative" character of its presentation. This "narrativeness" forms an archaic image of history, including the Soviet one as history involving several "political characters" and "people" and where "battles" and other events are presented in a chronological order. The "novelty" of this narrative is guaranteed by new facts mentioned above but their emergence does not really promote the birth of new ideas and concepts. We believe such an archaic nature of the narrative describing the Soviet epoch is not really connected to the political situation in Belarus; rather it is caused by the developed habits of historians. After all, it is important not only to fight with the content which historical policy puts into the historical narrative but also to invent a new form for a new content, thereby, "having complicated" the manipulation of history. Even if we admit that today there are no "analytical or other frameworks" for the description of the Soviet past (not only in Belarus) then we

should at least try to search for these frameworks preserving all our questions concerning our own past.

The problem of the description of the "Soviet past", thus, is also a problem of how we specifically construct history as a science. In Belarus we have got a situation where the historical description is found between two other "prospects", namely, "post-colonial" (Belarus as a conditional "colony" and a part of the "empire of nations") and "post-socialist" (Belarus as a former part of the "socialist project" with its own logic of history). So far these prospects have not been thoroughly analyzed. Moreover, the content of our opinions is affected by "historical policy" in its Belarusian variant as well as by other social and political circumstances.

Coming back to the problem of "forgetting" the Soviet past, we find it important to look at it from another perspective by presenting this process more differently than just as a "cycle of the symbolical study of the past (negation/protection – development/recycling – forgetting)" which most likely "is gradually approaching the end" (Kazakevich 2011). We would like to refer to the concepts introduced by Paul Ricoeur including his chain "held memory – manipulated memory – due memory» (Ricoeur 2004). Within the frame of this scheme it becomes clear why we should "not forget" the Soviet past the way it is happening today and why the cycle of "oblivion", nevertheless, has not been completed yet. Because the manipulation of memory about this past with the help of different "ideologies" and the absence of "due memory" make our identity "fragile" (Ricoeur 2004). This creates an intellectual problem different from simply registering the external signs of "forgetting" the Soviet past, namely, the problem of correlating this process with moral and other problematics related not only to our past but also to our present and our future.

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Notes

[1] This article is a part of the collective research of the transformation of humanitarian knowledge in Belarus after 1991 (examples taken from philosophy, sociology, and history) under the editorship of Olga Shparaga; the research was conducted with the support of CASE.

[2] Various aspects of this process are described in my article: Bratochkin, A. Genezis, osnovnye problemy i evropejskoe izmerenie "istoricheskoj politiki" v Belarusi // Puti evropeizatsii Belarusi: mezhdu politikoj i konstruirovaniem identichnosti (1991–2010) / Pod red. O. Shparagi. Minsk: I.P. Logvinov, 2011. P. 155–198.

[3] Such a formulation of the concept "vestiges of the past" can be found in many publications connected with the description of the basics of "scientific communism". In this case we used the example of the entry from "The Philosophical Dictionary" edited by I.T. Frolov and published in 1981 (actually at the end of the Soviet epoch); it underwent several editions.

[4] This model of the Soviet society stratification is offered in the recently published 6 volume "Gistoryja Belarusi" prepared, among others, by the collective of authors from the Institute of History of the NAS of Belarus (Gistoryja Belarusi u 6 ch. T. 6. Belarus u 1946–2009. Minsk: Sovremennaja shkola, Ekoperspektiva, 2011. P. 447–454: the section about the stratification of the Soviet society). It is obvious that historians are still reconstructing this stratification while relying mainly on the data of the censuses conducted in the USSR, and are slightly correcting these sources.

[5] Actually, modern theories of nation and nationalism have not been spreading in the Belarusian academic context for too long, since the end of the 1990s–2000s but they still have not been incorporated properly into educational literature.

[6] This idea is repeatedly used in the already quoted textbook by J.I. Treshchenok as well as in other textbooks on the history of Belarus not only in higher educational institutions but also in schools.

Olga Nikolaenko

POLISH WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN SOUTHWESTERN PROVINCES OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE IN THE EARLY XX CENTURY

Abstract

This article describes the features of the start-up and emergence of the Polish women's movement in the right-Bank Ukraine. The basis of archival sources was concentrated on several areas of public activity of women: traditional philanthropy, cultural-educational activity, and the emergence of mutual aid societies. Under the influence of the women's movement in Poland and Russia, the first organization that was intended to protect the rights of women was opened in Kiev, and shows the spread of feminist ideas.

Keywords: social movement, women's movement, the Polish population, gender history, southwestern province of the Russian Empire.

The questions of the origin and spread of the women's movement in the Russian empire have been studied quite thoroughly in historiography (Pavljuchenko 1988; Tishkin, Jukina, Pietrov-Enker). Moreover, with the development of the gender research on the post-Soviet territory the issues of national women's movements became the object of attention of historians (Smoljar 1998; Bogachevska-Khomyak 1995). However, there is hardly any research devoted to Polish women.[1] How could one explain such a blank in historiography?

The history of Polish kressy, i.e. those living on the outskirts (kressy) of Rzeczpospolita remains timely and demanded. In Russia, Ukraine and Poland historians study the problems of mutual relations of three ethnoses in the XIX century; stereotypes and their influence on the historical memory; questions of power and submission, domination and marginalization; issues of daily practices and identity formation. At the same time the female half of the Polish society remains as though "outside" history, rejected by the research conducted by men.

The history of the life of the Polish women on the outskirts has not been and is not studied by gender historians of Poland.[2] Perhaps, even the stating of the problem is too controversial. The Polish women of southwestern provinces of Russia living at the borders of territories, cultures, and times, did not become "local" for the local dominating ethnos and/or for compatriots from the Polish Kingdom. Their history cannot be written from the positions of traditional history but should be based on the methodology used by gender approach and principles of postcolonial research while considering the role of national projects. All of this makes the problem of the study of the Polish women's movement much more complicated. However, it is specifically this way of stating the problem that arouses interest in those women who by will of destiny found themselves at the border of ethnoses, civilizations, cultures, and their experience of uniting and struggling allows to discover new sides of history.

In this article the women's movement is considered in a broad sense of the word, as a public activity of women directed at the change of the existing situation (Grishin 1978; Tjomkina). Socialist and people's will organizations are not the object of this research due to their international character and the fact that the social and class identity was more important for Polish female members of organizations than the national or gender identity. Those organizations which did not set as their goal the fight for the rights of women but which at the same time tried to improve their fate, life, and household duties will be analyzed as components of the women's movement structure.

The main question of this research could be formulated in the following way: was the public activity of the Polish women caused by the national oppression or discrimination on the basis of gender? What discourse, namely, gender or national, was the leading one in the women's movement and why it was so? It should be remembered though that "Polish women" is used as a code name for women who realized their national identity. Quite frequently the motive of the national unity or, more specifically, its distinguishing characteristics such as the commonness of religion, language, and origin, was used as the basis for the creation of organizations.

If one is to answer these questions one needs to characterize women's organizations created by the Polish women, to look at the preconditions of their emergence and features, to analyze the parity of purposes, motives and actions of the identified associations while also revealing dominating discourses.

For this purpose the materials of the Ukrainian archives including the Central state historical archive in Kiev and regional historical archives were used. Much data about women's organizations can be gathered from the Polish press published in Ukraine including such newspapers as "Kraj" and "Kresy".

The main methodological concepts used to analyze the Polish women's movement, include theories of nationalism and feminism and postcolonial research. The researcher of the women's movement in Ukraine M. Bogachevska-Khomyak believes that in societies where modernization has begun but which still have no national independence, one should apply the term "pragmatical feminism" to the women's movement. In her opinion, it is a social

movement that is typical of pre-modern societies in which women exercising their civil activity dictated by the pressing needs of society, serve the movement hardly thinking about ideological programs and feminist issues (Bogachevska-Khomyak 1995: 27–30).

M. Bogachevska-Khomyak claims that it was characteristic of the women's movement in Ukraine not to use the concept "feminism" and its slogans. The movement was more likely to use traditional symbolical female functions while it did not have a clear ideological base as the majority of participants were inspired by the notions of daily injustice without thinking about the precise structure of their purposes. Thus, the feeling of discrimination on the basis of gender was not the dominant one in comparison with the oppression experienced by societies that were parts of the empire and that were deprived of independence.

I. Zherebkina applies psychoanalysis to the explanation of the absence of the purposes of gender equality and feminist ideas in colonial consciousness. Colonial identity becomes visible only in case of repressions when the presence of the Other arouses a desire and a need serving as an impulse for some political action. But as the *female* political discourse is already the Other it gets into a situation when in its policy of representation the "particularity" of the "unique" remains on the side of the "female" while the sphere of the national remains general" (Zherebkina 2002: 144). Thus, we face a paradox when a female special discourse cannot correspond to the national one and the transition to the national discourse subordinates the language of women transforming it into the man's language. This original rupture or splitting should be taken into consideration when analyzing the practices of the public activity of the Polish women in the realization of national projects.

However, both projects of emancipation as well as movements protecting women's rights emerged in the environment of colonial societies. What was their emergence and formation connected with? Why were the voices of women heard amongst the chorus of voices demanding justice at a certain stage?

Traditionally, women's activities consisted of creating and running organizations of cultural and educational nature. One of the features of the Polish women's movement in this respect was its interaction with the Ukrainian one. A well-known Ukrainian writer O. Pchilka invited to her literary and art evenings both Ukrainian art people and representatives of Polish theatre, readers and singers (Kraj 1905: № 26). The experience of submission united women simultaneously placing them in the service of another social expectation such as the reproduction of the cultural and national identity.

From the moment when the national societies in southwestern provinces were officially allowed there began to emerge Polish societies of charitable and national and cultural nature. Moderate youth associations legalized their activity. These organizations aspired to educate their members and Poles living in the cities, to open children's shelters, to create musical and theatrical circles as well as to provide charitable aid to hospitals, etc. Women were active participants of many of them; women were also initiators of various civil actions. However, the women's dominating goals did not include the change of the status or position of women.

The first associations of the Polish women were societies of mutual aid. In 1907 the Society of Christian female servants for the sake of St. Zita was founded in Zhitomir. Such societies in honour of St. Zita, the patroness of servants, began to appear in the Polish Kingdom after the encyclic of Pope Leon XIII in 1891. They appealed to national Christian values in counterbalance to the spread of socialist, feminist and other ideologies causing the concern of the church and authorities.

The charter identified the following tasks of this organization: to cultivate in servants devotion, diligence and thrift, Christian love for the neighbor, as well as a responsible performance of their duties (TSGIAUK. F. 442. Op. 632. D. 647. Ch II.: 135).

The founders of the organizations were not women doing house work but rather their employers. The last goal mentioned in the charter was probably especially important for those to whom the obedient and hardworking house labor was a necessity.

The discourse-analysis of the named charter sets an example of the Polish society heterogeneity. A bourgeois society with its class division and experience of being a part of a multinational empire hindered the project of the creation of a uniform national identity. In skilful hands of enterprising women the game that uses a national, religious, language unity turned out to be of help for a profitable enterprise.

Besides, all of the above-named ideals correspond to female cleanliness and are a part of dichotomies such as devotion/godlessness, diligence/laziness, and love/hatred. Such a discourse correlates with certain strategies (described by M. Tsimbalist Rosaldo) when women acquired their status through the negation of their sexuality. Such a "snow white pure" society distinguishing them from the surrounding "dirty, unscrupulous" world can be used "as a basis of female solidarity and value" (Tsimbalist Rosaldo 2003: 128).

Along with moral ideas the organization was supposed to assist servants in case of their losing their job by placing them in shelters and sending them to a free bureau of job search; the organization also provided support to servants if they received an inappropriate remuneration (Buravsky 2004: 103).

The main motive of the association of women is the religious unity and protection of the rights of certain groups of the population, namely, house servants. At the same time the organization served as a new means of women's submission. The association built into the structure of the capitalist society and representing resistance and protection of the population rights, in fact turned out to be another system forming initiative of the authorities. It is difficult to call this society an actual mutual aid society. Similar associations should probably be called patronages as they assume functions of guardianship and protection of lower classes.

The goals and objectives of the organization allow to see that their female founders were subjects while their members became activity objects. Women who joined the organization found themselves in the epicenter of such centrifugal forces as an aspiration to positive subjectness and an ability to acquire it independently along with the participation/resistance and submission to the benefactors. This splitting is also characteristic of colonial subjects.

Another organization for females was created in 1907 in Zhitomir. It was a Christian Catholic society of working women called "Dzvignja". For the purpose of the intellectual and moral development of its members the society as it was specified in the charter, was going to organize public lectures and readings, to create a library and set up mutual aid cash desks, to open workshops, and promote vocational training. Society members could also open co-operative enterprises, mutual aid cash desks, and summer colonies (TSGIAUK. F. 442. Op. 632. D. 647. Ch II: 44).

Despite its clerical name, the organization, in fact, pursued specifically secular motives of activity. There are no names of Catholic priests among society founders. Noblewomen and female bourgeoisie of Zhitomir initiated the creation of the society. The name of the society was probably used to purposefully hide its national character and structure. It also seems probable that the emphasis placed on the word "Christian" in many respects led to the presumption of non-participation in various political movements. For a conservative-minded Polish society such a name was associated with traditional female values which among others also included religiousness. Here we face an ambiguous role of Catholic Church in the women's movement development. On the one hand, the ideology of Catholicism actually hindered the development of female consciousness having assigned to women the role of a mother, a mistress, and a wife obedient to the will of God, father, and husband. On the other, as it was specified by P. Shtompka, the associations uniting people according to a religious or ethnic criterion accelerate the mobilization and involvement of new individuals and groups in social movements (Shtompka 1996: 251). The above identified organizations of the Polish women demonstrating a religious character but very different in the purposes of their activity, prove that religion served as an important factor of their creation and legalisation.

In 1908 the Society of Catholic women "Trud" ("Labor") was founded in Kamenets-Podolsk. It was another charitable and educational organization. It opened a school of sewing for forty Catholic girls and collected funds for the opening of a shelter and a garden. The head of the organization M. Dunin-Borkovskaja was also an organizer of various cultural activities. For example, in 1908 she organized an exhibition of folk products collected mainly in rich houses in Podolia and Bessarabia. About 350 pieces were exhibited (Epsztejn 1999: 195).

The Podolsk society of the Polish women was opened in Vinnitsa the same year. Its purpose was to teach the population the Polish language. Illegal teaching was usually hidden behind a school of some handicrafts. It should be mentioned that the founder of the society, Ya.S. Jaroshinskaja, was the wife of a rich land owner. She was also a co-chairman of the handicraft branch of the Podolsk agricultural society. Necessary equipment was purchased for this branch and soon workshops for the manufacturing of baskets and pottery as well as embroidery courses were opened (Kolesnik 2007: 64, 68). Workshops provided a cover allowing to educate children. In reality, the mutual aid society united women who were not right protectors but rather patriots aspiring to support the national culture. The emergence of charitable and cultural and educational organizations is connected with the

activity of vigorous women-leaders who took upon themselves the care about the organizations' functioning.

The above-named organizations opened during a period of certain democratization during the revolution years of 1905–1907 show more than just an aspiration of women to increase the intellectual level and to unite according to their professional interests. The intensification of the economic life led to the understanding of the need for an association that would give a chance to compete on the labor market and protect women's interests. It is easy to see that the main work directions include the work for the well-being of society, mutual aid as well as an improvement of the intellectual or professional level.

The above mentioned examples of the public activity of the Polish women should be viewed as specific civil initiatives having their peculiarities. The main distinctive feature and the radical difference between the women's movement in Russia and its Western variant called suffragism is a fight for granting voting rights to women. It was not just women who had no rights in the Russian empire with its absolutist regime. Men had no rights either. That equaled men and women and, certainly, served as a factor forcing people to join revolutionary organizations.

The Polish women from the literate layers of society such as nobility, intelligentsia, middle and upper bourgeoisie were under the influence of both, the all-Russian women's movement as it had been demonstrated earlier, and the Polish one as well. Connections with the Polish Kingdom were diverse and multisided. Due to the specificity of the perception of the Russian as alien and the Polish as native and congenial the Polish women's movement was often the example that the Polish women of the southwestern area aspired to correspond with.

The beginning of the Polish women's movement is by right considered to be the movement of enthusiasts in the early XIX century. Coming from rich families those women aspired to self-realization creating the so called circles where they could discuss important public issues, literature, etc. (Nikolaenko 2007).

The new stage in the women's movement began after the defeat of the national liberation revolt of 1863-1864 and is connected with the spread of the ideology of Polish positivism. Ideologists of the direction including A. Sventohovsky, E. Prondzinsky, and E. Ozheshkova supported the granting of equal rights to women in education and employment spheres. As a matter of fact, the demands of women in Poland coincided with those of Russian women. However, on the way to the achievement of rights Polish women had to face the problem of national oppression.

The Union of equality of Polish women created in Warsaw in 1907 became the first feminist organization. Its founder was a well-known public figure P. Kuchalskaja-Rejnshmit. The edition "Ster" became the Union's publication. Public views of the Union founders strikingly differed from any camp of political thought, first of all, because their primary interest was gender equality (Walczewska 2000). Ideas to create an independent Polish state or establish a general welfare and social justice were secondary problems for the Union in comparison with the necessity to overcome the existing discrimination of women.

Thus, the women's movement in Poland in the early XX century had its peculiar features. E. Ozheshkova, M. Konopnitskaja along with other public women-activists saw as primary the problems of national liberation and granting of national rights as they believed that then in their independent country they would be able to promote slogans of equality of women (Gornicka-Boratynska 2001). Other simultaneously developed ideas included gender equality identifying the transition of the women's movement to a qualitatively new stage.

The Russian and Polish women's movements at the end of the XIX – beginning of the XX century had a lot in common, namely, similar goals (the achievement of equal rights in the social and economic sphere), forms of activity that found their expression in the fight for the right to obtain higher education and access to various professions as well as in the activity of societies of self-education, mutual aid, and charity.

The above-mentioned examples of female organizations' activity indicate the insignificance of the spread of the Polish women's movement and women's associating according to a national/religious criterion as well as its subordination to class interests. Having analyzed the sources and research devoted to the history of the women's movement, we will try to identify the factors which have affected the features of the Polish women's movement in the region under analysis. As the researcher of the history of women N.L. Pushkareva correctly stated, both in Western Europe and in Russia the founders of the women's movement were women from rich or prosperous social classes (Pushkareva 2001). They, being like-minded, created circles, artels, and societies which united women from impoverished layers, commoners, and city dwellers engaged in some industrial activity.

The prosperous Polish nobility residing in southwestern provinces lived in their manors where the circle of contacts was strictly defined. Their neighbors, friends, and acquaintances occupied similar positions in the social hierarchy and were equal in terms of property. As a matter of fact, Polish noblemen did not know about the life of big cities with their striking property inequality. The noblemen's trips to Kiev were limited only to a few months and the visits were tightly scheduled (Iwaszkiewiczowa: 72, 78; Krauzowa 1979: 65). That is why the Polish women from the upper class did not become active initiators of the women's movement while very few of them became founders of the organizations of a cultural and educational and more national character.

The Russian women-activists wanted to set up enterprises for women to help women; however, such an idea probably never crossed the mind of the Polish prosperous circles. Many researchers of the life of the Polish nobility in Russia's Western provinces believe that the Polish society was too separated. The marginalized noblemen "did not belong". They could find sympathy but they would not be given help or be allowed to enter a circle of contacts (Bovua 1998: 288). It was seen as sufficient to provide work in a manor or present small gifts from the manor. The social conflict turned out to be more significant than the issue of national solidarity.

The Polish city dwellers probably did not expect any support. Life in multiethnic cities and Russification tendencies led to a gradual loss of the national identity by Poles.

Its preservation was connected with religion (Catholicism) and Polish as the language of family communication that was prohibited in establishments and educational institutions. The understanding of class conflicts led to the spread of revolutionary ideology while the aspiration to preserve religion and language made national projects popular. The female discourse was not the focus of attention of either the society elite or the social bottom as it was moved out by social utopias and national propaganda.

The emergence of the women's movement in Russia is often connected with large industrial empire centers such as Moscow and Petersburg where there was a high concentration of female proletariat. In provincial towns such as Zhitomir, Uman, Vinnitsa, Kamenets where the Polish petty-bourgeois population and intelligentsia were concentrated and where everyone was visible and under the control of the authorities, the creation of women's organizations was accompanied by great institutionalization difficulties.

Moreover, activists had to fight not so much with legislative restrictions but with the stagnancy of the public opinion (Pushkareva 2001). The public opinion condemned the independence of women and religion (in this case Catholicism), defining the position and mission of the woman in the world making it practically impossible to escape the set borders.

Ideological instructions, religious propaganda, traditional views saw women as the bearers of the national identity which was realized mainly in the private sphere of the family. Actually the woman played the leading part not only in the biological, but also cultural reproduction of the nation (Yuval-Davis, Anthias 1986).

However, in the early XX century the first Polish organization appears articulating the women's point of view and speaking on behalf of not some professional, religious or class group, but on behalf of all women. At the initiative of the Polish noblewomen J. Orlovskaja, M. Komarnitskaja and G. Knol in 1907 the Kiev female circle – Kolo kobiet polskich Kijowa[3] – was created. The goal of the circle was to assist cultural, moral and economic achievements of the Polish people. In order to do this the society organized lectures for women and tried to improve the system of education for females having adapted it to modern requirements in terms of salaries; the circle supported female crafts and served as a mediator in job search for women. Women were also supposed to open joint shops and cash desks to reduce family expenses. The organization planned to create possibilities of vocational training for poor women as well as to prevent them from "moral degradation" (Kresy. 1907. № 26). One of the organization's features was its aspiration "to stay away from any political directions, to profess the freedom of thought" (TSGIAUK. F. 442. Op. 632. D. 647. Ch II.: 100–106).

However, one notices the discrepancy between the purpose of the organization aspiring to improve the life of all "Polish people" and the goals connected exclusively with the female population. Accordingly, we could speak about the emergence of the consciousness capable of separating women as a special social group which needs rallying and mutual aid. Unlike the previous Polish women's associations created on the basis of some commonality (be it religious – Christian or professional – servants) in this case the organiza-

tion worked with all women. The goals of the association were not only educational or charitable; they also represented an attempt "to reduce expenses for family provision" and this shows that there was understanding of the connection between the emancipation of a woman, family and professional employment.

Realizing its isolation from the women's movement in the countries of Western Europe members of the circle invited activists of the women's movement from Warsaw. Gabriela Knol became the head of the organization. Yanina Orlovskaja ran the self-education section while Romualda Hoetskaja headed the agricultural sector. The city branch headed by Alina Zvolinskaja regularly organized conversations, public lectures, and amateur theatrical performances. In 1908 the Society held a secret congress of the Polish women of southwestern provinces attended by the representatives of different women's organizations of three provinces.

The organization opened some branches in provinces, in particular, in Uman and Belotserkovsk. The reports of Kiev gendarmes stated that the organization's members cooperated with charitable societies as well as with a society of children's colonies, opening schools and conducting lectures. The organization also opened a cheap dining room for students and female course attendants (TSGIAUK. F. 442. Op. 89. D. 2. Ch. 2: 141).

The absence of sources does not allow to describe the activity of the Society of the Polish women in more detail; however, even the limited data available says a lot revealing the desire of the Polish women not to be torn away from the general women's movement and to work for the good of their female compatriots. Besides the already traditional slogans about mutual aid common at the beginning of the XX century the Society's charter introduces a clause about the freedom of thought demonstrating the intention of the Polish women's movement to keep away from various political activities of Poles and to become an organization that specifically tries to improve the life of women. The attention paid to the improvement and increase of the level of the development of female crafts which were believed to be low-status and low-paid is just as important. As a matter of fact, we could say that the Society of Polish the women became the first organization defending the interests of women as a separate social group. Though the Society did not promote political issues like, for example, suffragettes, its goals show its understanding of the essence of women's emancipation, its many-sided nature and dependence on many factors.

At the same time the Society aimed at associating women of one national group (Polish). Their communication with female compatriots from the Polish Kingdom shows the importance of the national discourse for the organization's members. It was an answer to the more active Russian women's movement and could be treated as an attempt to oppose the empire. However, the activity of the Society of the Polish women serves as an example of how in colonial societies the process of understanding gender inequality was developing and how the need to protect women's rights led to the emergence of gender discourse and its gradual adoption as the dominating one.

The Polish women's movement began to emerge in the southwestern provinces of the Russian empire only in the early XX century. Its institutional registration showed that the

Polish women already had a certain experience of public work accumulated in the XIX century. This experience was received through women's participation in various charitable, cultural and educational and revolutionary organizations. The civil activity of the Polish women was determined by a number of different economic and symbolic factors.

Only in the early XX century the Polish women without going over the borders of the national discourse came to accept a new collective identity on the basis of gender. And though the issues of civil equality and all-round overcoming of the oppressed position of women were not initiated by them the overcoming of the national or class position in the women's movement became a prominent aspect.

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Notes

1 Only some new research dealing with the history of Poles in southwestern provinces looks at some aspects of the history of women. See, for example, sections about the family and women in the books Ustrzycki, 2006; Epsztejn, 1998.

2 In the series "Historia kobiet polskich w XIX wieku" published by the Polish historical institute only individual articles mention the issues of the history of the Polish women living on the kressy (outskirts). See: Sikorska-Kulesza, 1995.

3 While translating the name of this organization one can have difficulties as sometimes it is called the Society of the Polish women or Kiev women's circle of Polish females.

Alla Pigalskaya

HISTORY OF DESIGN AND POLITICS OF EVERYDAY PRACTICES: RECONSTRUCTING HISTORY OF GRAPHIC DESIGN OF BELARUS

Abstract

The article is intended to approach the issue of constructing the narrative of graphic design history during the Soviet period in Belarus. It means that it cannot be constructed on the basis of aesthetic criterion as it is usually done in design and art history. The articles proposes to consider graphic design within the context of everyday practices. The methodology of analysis of everyday practices by Michel de Certeau was considered as an optics for graphic design analysis. Thus, it is proposed to study not only the objects but also the practices of its production, consumption and use called secondary production by de Certeau. This allows considering the object of graphic design at the junction of rules and regulations governing the production and consumption, as well as their application. Thus, it is shown in the article how the meaning of graphic design objects during the production and use/secondary production is changing. The meanings the graphic design object obtained during different stages could be considered a basis for graphic design history.

Keywords: design history, Soviet everyday culture, visual representation, visual propaganda, typefaces.

Design history is constructed around political history. According to Jonathan Woodham[1], an English historian of design, by the middle of the 19th century achievements in the industry and manufacture of goods were considered to be elements of national identity. Having agreed with such an approach to the constructing of the design history narrative Peter Betts[2] shows that meanings which objects are filled with in the process of consumption, considerably change as a result of the change of the political regime while their manufacture in Germany remains invariable in the 1930s–1950s and is not at all

connected with a political context. Betts makes a conclusion that the historicity of the design object is not exhausted by those meanings which it is vested with during consumption. The meanings constructed in the course of production are just as important. The inclusion into the historical narrative of not only meanings that a thing obtains in the course of social interactions, but also of those meanings that the thing acquires throughout the whole life cycle, is especially fruitful in those contexts in which the political and national history due to certain reasons is often reconsidered. Such is the situation in Belarus where in the last few centuries the political border changed repeatedly and where one finds a number of competing narratives defining different variants of national identity. This led to the situation of uncertainty of those semantic co-ordinates in which the objects of design are vested with meanings, and, possibly, this could explain a limited amount of publications about the history of design of Belarus[3] and its fragmented representation. It is quite symptomatic that there are few monograph publications devoted to the history of Belarusian design and those which do exist basically follow the paradigm traditionally used in Russian-speaking literature. From an institutional respect the history of design has not been formed as there are no educational programs which could prepare specialists in the area of design history; the course of design history is taught by historians of art, and consequently the research in the field is carried out within the paradigm of art criticism. Almost all monographs on the history of Belarusian design are published as manuals, for example Ya. Lensu and M. Borozny's manual. The most problematic part of the identified manuals is the absence of illustrative material and limited actual information about Belarusian design. Certain difficulties are observed in the positioning of Belarusian design in relation to Russian or European one[4] proved by the borrowing of the periodization and a more detailed description of the history of European and Russian design.

The "right of the first publication" is an essential obstacle when dealing with the history of Belarusian design. For instance, the National art museum has quite an extensive collection of Belarusian posters which cannot be used for research purposes until they are published by the institution to which the collection belongs. It is quite remarkable that the permanent exposition of the National art museum does include posters as a separate exposition; they are presented along with easel works of art in the hall devoted to the art of the 20th century. The exposition also includes social and realistic paintings and sculpture together with authors' posters of the 1990s–2000s. Thus, graphic design is present in the museum space but it is fragmentary. It should be noted that the Union of designers gathered quite a big collection of Belarusian posters of different periods allowing to organize exhibitions of posters of the perestroika period in several countries. In the absence of a specialized exhibition space even a fragmentary exposition of the works of graphic design belonging to different historical periods is of great importance.

Due to the circumstances set forth above it is rather difficult to find a complete narrative about the history of Belarusian design. The monthly publication "Mastatstva Belarusi" ("Art of Belarus") provides the fullest picture. L. Nalivajko, V. Shmatov, E. Atrahovich, P. Shamshur began publishing articles devoted to Belarusian graphic design already in the

first edition of the journal and have been doing this since then. Their particular attention was drawn to the poster. An attempt to study the Belarusian poster was undertaken by E. Atrahovich in the doctor's thesis "Tendencies of development of the Belarusian poster in the 1960s–1980s".[5] The paper offers a rather detailed analysis of artistic and expressive means used in Belarusian posters printed in the 1960s–1980s. A special emphasis is placed on the cultural function of the poster that undergoes changes in the 1960s–1980s. The author suggests considering changes in the genres and formal decisions of posters as impulses and reactions to changes in the cultural and political situation. For instance, the period of a wide spread of radio and TV in Belarus in the late seventies is rather significant resulting in the change of problems facing the poster genre while the character of messages changes as well: the poster switches from pressing questions and problems to such "long-term" issues as philanthropy, self-sacrifice, motherhood and so forth. Communication means change along with the displacement of theme messages from direct addresses and edifications to the use of metaphors as well as the new forms such as a "poster-reflection" and a "poster-dialogue" (according to E. Atrahovich). We could use the titles of the articles published in the journal "Mastatstva Belarusi" as an example as there the poster is positioned as a "plakat-zmagar" ("poster-fighter")[6], "prapagandyst, agitator, vyhavatel'" ("propagandist, agitator, savior").[7]

Fonts and font graphic have been outside of the attention of authors of articles and monographs dealing with the history of design of Belarus in spite of the fact that fonts were widely used in poster drawing throughout the whole 20th century.

A font is a complex system of graphic forms with high quality demands which have been forming since the spread of printing technologies. In Europe and the USA the designing and production of fonts was a separate industry with a high competition level so consequently, the requirements to font quality are very high. Special techniques and technologies of drawing fonts and their drawing on posters "were invented" in the Soviet Belarus.[8] Memories of the artists who used to work in the industrial drawing sphere made it possible to restore the following sequence of actions needed to draw texts on posters: at first the fonts taken from the European catalogues and magazines were photographed, then they were scaled to get the necessary size by means of a photographic enlarger, then the fonts were cyrillicized using the same photographic enlarger and photo printing, and then the clichés were produced on the basis of the received pictures or the needed text was glued out from the received letters.[9] At the same time, the biggest part of texts on posters was drawn as the drawn text practically always reproduced the formal characteristics of the type-setting text, i.e., the text printed by a machine, as well as the signs of the mechanized process of the drawing of the text on posters.

Font drawing is an integral part of graphic design (during the Soviet period it was called industrial drawing). The fact that in posters the original, developed accidental fonts are not used to a great extent problematizes the historization of graphic design and font drawing of the Soviet period but is not the reason to exclude the whole Soviet period from the historical narration. An attempt to understand the reasons of discrepancy of the made

efforts and the results when writing text information, the aspiration of artists to simulate a machine set led to the idea of studying fonts and texts on posters as a form of representation of processes which specifically defined such an algorithm of text writing. The reconstruction of the logic of processes according to which such font drawing was perceived as a norm, will allow mapping a way for the historization of the Belarusian graphic design of the Soviet period. This historization will not use the aesthetic qualities of the object as the basis for vesting it with meaning. Instead, it will allow to include those meanings which a graphic object receives upon its creation, designing and use in posters of visual propaganda.

The studying of the graphic design of Belarus in the context of everyday practices will allow to expose those cultural and social processes which determine it and are also reproduced by it. In the historical research of the school "Annaly" the concept of everyday practices can be treated as a method10 because it allowed to reconsider the time optics of historians. It found its reflection in the thematization of "big continuances" and the emphasis on the processes which are slow to change. The concept of "big continuances" was one of the key concepts in the formation of the methodology of research of everyday practices. Michel de Certeau in the optics of "big continuances" suggests considering everyday practices in the context of oral and written types of communications as two paradigms defining the way of realization (mode d'operation) of numerous everyday practices.[11] He believes that oral and written paradigms exist simultaneously (synchronously) and the character of domination of one of the communications types defines peculiar features of the social and cultural context along with a way of realizing everyday practices. Michel de Certeau suggests describing a specific configuration of oral and written paradigms in terms of strategy and tactics. Strategies are discursively issued, are fixed in time and space, as a rule are articulated in writing and consequently are defined as a written paradigm. Tactics are spontaneous, mobile and not articulated practices which are carried out on the basis of a concrete situation and needs of those who carry them out; tactics are defined as an oral paradigm. In the research of everyday practices Michel de Certeau attempts to make visible the dynamics and pressure which arise between the dominating order, norms, regulations and spontaneous practices of the use of possibilities of the dominating order to reach the goals defined by specific circumstances and needs of participants. Michel де Certeau develops the idea of Henri Lefebvre that everyday practices are not stiffened structures; rather it is a field of resistance to the dominating forms of social relations, i.e. "strategies". When studying the practices realized in the city environment, cookery and when reading Michel de Certeau analyzes the processes of production and consumption carried out within the logics of strategy and uses as tactics. Michel de Certeau draws attention to the fact that the use can be treated as a secondary production because it is frequently carried out outside of the framework defined by the producer, is defined by concrete circumstances and actual needs of users, i.e. practices of use do not always coincide with how it is seen by manufacturers. Such an approach allows revealing the dynamics of meanings of the object which can change throughout the whole life cycle.

This research makes an attempt to apply the methodology developed by Michel de Certeau. It is the methodology of the analysis of everyday practices in order to study practices connected with graphic design in the course of which graphic design objects acquire their meanings. Such an approach allows treating objects of design within the co-ordinates of the meanings defined by oral and written paradigms. The advantage of such an approach is the possibility to reveal the historicity of the design object articulated through techniques and practices of production, consumption and use, instead of entering them into political history.

The application of this approach to the analysis of graphic design objects seems to be beneficial in relation to the Soviet period as it allows to distance oneself from the analysis of graphic design as a way of a direct reproduction of ideological ideas of the Soviet state, decisions of parties and so forth that seems to be natural if one is to look at the plots of the posters. The research of the Soviet everyday practices conducted by A. Chistikova and N. Lebin, E. Degot, M. Ryklin showed that the relations between the decisions of the party and state bodies and their realization do not keep within a simple linear logic, and acquire unexpected forms. Therefore, the visual representation of the decisions of parties and central bodies of the executive power realized in posters also has its peculiar features. This approach allows to look at the production of graphic design objects of the Soviet period not only as practices of the performance of the social order generated by the administrative centre but also as practices of resistance or evasion or their secondary production. Thus, the object of graphic design can be treated as the fixing of a certain configuration of strategy and tactics. As such logic is not exclusive for the creation of industrial drawing and agitprop then it seems sensible to consider them not separately but within the context of everyday practices of writing.

Within the limits of the research of everyday practices writing is thematized as rules, norms, techniques and instructions, as well as the practice of their application. In graphic design practices of writing can also be viewed as hand writing, the process of font creation, technics and technologies of their inclusion into agitprop and used technologies of duplicating. Strategies can be reconstructed using the materials of manuals teaching writing, creating of fonts and recommendations for drawing of texts on various carriers as examples. Tactics are reconstructed during the analysis of practices of writing and ways of drawing fonts on posters. Offsets and shifts revealed upon the comparison of rules and recommendations concerning the drawing of texts and practices of their application in posters will be considered as a form of representation of everyday practices.

The specificity of teaching writing in the Soviet culture lies in the context of techniques used to teach writing in the second half of the 19^{th} century both in Russia and in Europe. There were ongoing discussions concerning the expediency of teaching children writing with an inclination. The reason for that was the observation that when teaching slant writing the majority had great difficulties mastering the correct seating habits and the optimum distance from eyes to a school desk, or a table. The consequences were the curvature of the backbone and short-sightedness. At the same time it was noticed that

there were no such difficulties when pupils were taught direct writing. In 1875 the manual of Zenkin devoted to teaching round writing was published. It had more than one hundred reprintings in four years in Germany. In 1882 the German edition of Zenkin's writing-books was used to print exercise books with samples in words in a round font and in 1883 the commission of the Pedagogical museum of Russia came to the conclusion that direct writing and a round font are easier and more natural than slanting and they are more convenient for the position of the hand, exercise book and eyes.[12] Teaching writing in pre-revolutionary Russia was mainly carried out using the technique of Gerbach, "Experiences, however, soon showed that the round font, almost irreplaceable for inscriptions on drawings, plans, cards and for fair business correspondence, is inconvenient for an ordinary accurate cursive writing which is necessary for everyone in life as when writing with blunt feathers there is no ease of movement and connection between letters which is so necessary for a cursive writing, and thus they began teaching direct writing with ordinary feathers, having preserved the character of letters of slant writing".[13] The author of the manual notices that in Russia many confuse a round font and direct writing while it is crucial to know the difference between them[14] because two types were taught, namely, direct writing with a wide-end feather, and direct writing with the graphics of letters more typical for inclined writing. In the first decade of the USSR existence teaching writing was done using pre-revolutionary techniques.

The story "Serafim" by Shalamov has got a peculiar observation concerning the style of writing, "Serafim imagined his lines, the handwriting of the wife, the handwriting with an inclination to the left: such handwriting allowed to guess the age as in the twenties at schools they did not teach to write with an inclination to the right, everybody wrote the way he wanted".[15] Despite all hygienic advantages of direct writing the publications of the Soviet methodical manuals and exercise books with samples in words from the end of the 1920s[16] were focused on teaching slanting writing and thus it is possible to draw a conclusion that teaching aimed at teaching only slanting writing. It is remarkable that in the USSR they chose the technique that guaranteed the least successful mastering of writing and that was fraught with physiological pathologies. Slanting writing in comparison with the direct one is more difficult due to a more complicated coordination of the body and the writing tool. That type of writing also required big efforts and discipline if one was to master the skill of writing. Thus, the Soviet culture combined several things including teaching everyone writing and spelling and the technique that is difficult to master and causes pathologies in the form of short-sightedness and a backbone curvature. It was also aggravated by the common involvement into the practices of writing through the process of the creation of visual propaganda along with the mastering of the technologies of font writing.

The description of the methodology of teaching writing in the Soviet state can provide a significant contribution to understanding the character of writing production.

In his "Book about letters from A to Ya" Yu. Gordon17 after studying Soviet manuscripts notices that the Soviet exercise books with samples in words (the analyzed sample

was published in 1959) are very similar to those used in 1913. Both variants of exercise books are made using the same principle: the sample for copying is offered, and then space for reproduction by pupils is provided. A hardly noticeable but essential difference between the two variants is that during the pre-revolution time the sample was written by hand, while in the Soviet times it was constructed with the help of drawing tools. Yu. Gordon, combining similar elements of letters, finds that there is a full coincidence of elements impossible to reach if letters are written by hand.[18] The author tried to restore the technology of the creation of the drawn letters which were intended for seven-year old children though even a very skilled calligrapher would not be able to reproduce the letters. In fact, a child could not succeed in learning how to write. It led to a noticeably changed handwriting of the majority of pupils after their leaving elementary school while some chidlren's handwriting kept changing throughout the whole life.[19] So, in the 1950s – 1960s methodical recommendations how to correct the handwriting of schoolchildren were developed.

We can state that it differed greatly from the method of teaching writing in Europe offered by R. Sasun and conceptualized by M. Foucault[20]. The technique (recommendations about the seating position, the way of keeping the feather, etc.) is aimed, first of all, at the effective development of a new skill. In methodical recommendations the process of learning writing is broken into discrete units. Instead of mastering one difficult process the pupil is offered to master a set of elementary operations. With the introduction of this technique it was no longer so important whether the pupil was capable of learning writing as such an approach assumes that this skill can be mastered by everyone. The essence of the basic principle of the discipline is to form an obedient individual through the successful development of base skills. In the Soviet culture an outwardly similar technique is used, namely, the genetic method[21] of learning how to write elements of letters as well as learning the proper body position for writing that would cause the least tiredness. However, this method did not presuppose a successful mastering of writing skills as it was not possible to copy examples in exercise books with samples in words. Yu. Gordon believes that that was a way to bring up an obedient individual for whom the ideal always remained unattainable. If we consider this method in the context of interpretation of disciplinary mechanisms of M. Foucault then due to the unattainability of the ideal the trainee cannot form trust in this technique, and, accordingly, obedience as a necessary effect becomes problematic. At the same time a basic algorithm of teaching how to write, specifically, through copying which found its wide application in professional art activity, in particular, the production of visual propaganda, is created.

The institutional logic of the circulation of visual propaganda was that its production and consumption somewhat coincided as the people involved in the production of visual propaganda were also its consumers.

Posters were developed as an element of visual propaganda; however the Soviet poster should not be treated only as a self-sufficient aesthetic object. Visual propaganda is a complex phenomenon, and during different periods its structure varies and includes all or some of the below presented components such as a slogan; a slogan-toast; a poster;

an illustration (a popular print in the 1930s); a panel; diagrams; headers; screens of socialist competition where the plan, obligations of a worker or a brigade, the actual performance of the performance standard, the quality factor, the amount of earnings and so forth are presented. The components also included wall newspapers – "lightnings", "congratulations on a labor victory"; stands and photoshow-windows – "They dishonor our collective", "We are ashamed of you", "Photocharge" where by means of satirical expressive means the information about negative facts and phenomena and the taken measures is provided. There was also "Wall of fame with sound" where by means of a tape recording the story about the achievements of exceptional workers is told.[22] In the 1930s a special emphasis is placed on oral activity round visual propaganda, while in the 1960s the quality of the workmanship of designs for agitprop becomes more important.[23] As it is apparent from the presented list, posters are used as a separate element of an extensive program of visual propaganda.

By the middle of the 1960s a strictly defined thematic hierarchy was formed and registered. It was to be used during the creation and organization of visual propaganda reproduced in various editions with a bigger or smaller detailed elaboration from 3 to 12 points. The general outline remains invariable. The most significant kind of propaganda used to set a perception context for other components of propaganda is the display of the supervising role of the CPSU in building communism and socialism and significant decisions of the party during a set interval of time. It is offered to give the most significant place to this segment of visual propaganda and, as a rule, it is recommended to establish stationary constructions using professional artists and experts. One can frequently find citations from the leaders' speeches in this kind of propaganda. A separate segment in this group of visual propaganda is Lenin's figure as the key in the organization of the CPSU and the Soviet state. The second segment of visual propaganda is the information about socialist competitions and performance of plans for five-year periods. The third group is the propaganda directed at the formation of communist ethics and morals, and the responsibility of each individual for building communism and registering achievements of socialism. These are the materials devoted to culture, atheism, sports; satirical publications such as a "lightning", a "fighting leaflet", and a wall newspaper.[24] It is suggested that labor collectives should get involved in the creation of materials of the second and third groups to make sure information is up-to-date as well as to guarantee the individualized character of visual propaganda.[25]

Centralized publishing houses of Moscow produced visual propaganda for the whole country according to the thematic hierarchy. Circulations totaled hundreds thousands while the obligatory copies were dispatched to enterprises and organizations.[26] There were also publishing houses in the capitals of the union republics. For example, in the BSSR it was the publishing house "Belarus" that printed thousands of copies for the whole republic. In 1966 an art and industrial complex was set up to print publications with the circulation of 300–1000 copies on topics dealing with the local context. Each enterprise and organization was to release wall newspapers. As a rule, it was carried out manually and

it was just a single copy. To promote the release of wall newspapers at enterprises the central publishing houses printed forms for wall newspapers and special constructing posters separate elements of which could be used for wall newspapers for various topics. Special manuals to aid the copywriters and designers of visual propaganda were produced as well. It was a way to prevent the biasness of creators and consumers of visual culture and thus the mechanism of the realization of the active life modus was formed. At the same time the idea of totality of the Soviet culture thematized in the works of B. Grois was spread.

When analyzing the ways of including posters into everyday life it is important to keep in mind that in the USSR both professional and nonprofessional artists were involved in the creation of visual propaganda. This fact is mentioned in a number of publications in specialized editions and methodical recommendations but it is not always formulated as a problem. However, during the period of the institutional formation of designers the coexistence in one field of both professionals and nonprofessionals is thought to be problematic. It could be due to the creation in the late sixties of the VNIITE (the All-Russian Research Institute of Technical Aesthetics) with branches in several republics. This situation is described in the introductory article of the editor of the magazine "Decorative Art of the USSR":

> "Will the director of the enterprise really issue the order: to thank officially fireman Ivanov or handyman Petrov for good work on visual propaganda? No, I haven't made a bad break, the artists working at our industrial enterprises are deprived of their professional rank and in most cases they are employed as wall painters by the "wise men" responsible for the staff list... Tragicomic manipulations with artists are perfectly known to auditors of all ranks and positions... What does the designer at the enterprise do? Does he have his own workshop? More commonly his work place is a fenced off corner of the shop where it is possible to speak using only gestures as one cannot hear anything because of the roar; or the designer's office is a crude cellar, and at best it is the premise of an empty Red corner. His working day, like that of any creative specialist, is unlimited, especially before holidays. His duties include writing appeals, copying posters, drawing portraits of distinguished people, producing another "lightning", checking how the carpentry shop is assembling the Wall of Fame, running to the store because maybe brushes have been delivered (after all you will not find them in every city). At the same time he also needs to tint some sculpture of an unknown master with aluminum and all these things need to be done urgently, quickly, and immediately. There is no time to think, try and put together. What saves is a long-term numbed standard and scissors for cutting out from posters, magazines, and books of "fragments" of labels under the "growth curve" or above it. The figures from the quarterly report of the chairman of the enterprise committee, prisoners in uncountable schemes and testifying to industrial successes so ripple, dazzle and jump before the spectator that nobody ever reads them except maybe for the committeemen who came to check the state of "visual propaganda" at the factory and who may

> look at them... Not all factory artists have vocational training. Many, very many artists at enterprises are self-educated persons, the now common name for amateur artists. A biennial seminar for the improvement of professional skills of our younger art companions is organized at the city house of party enlightenment. Probably, it should not be done only in Moscow... such measure... does not remove the problem of opening special educational faculties at our higher educational institutions."[27]

In the situation when the manufacture of visual production coincides with its consumption professional art activity in the applied sphere is in doubt as it does not find substantiation in the existing ideological construct. It is symptomatic that with all the importance of the role visual propaganda was given in the Soviet cultural space, its founders hid behind the names of trades for workers, and the question about a specialized vocational training was raised only in the 1960s. That fact that the staff list did not contain the position of the artist of visual propaganda, was supposed to show that its production is based on the enthusiasm of the working collective instead of duty functions. This can also help to further explain that the institutional organization of professional work in the USSR was formed quite late and under the influence of external impulses. The decision to open the All-Union scientific research institute of industrial art is made after the exhibition of the achievements of the national economy of the USA in Moscow. At the exhibition of the achievements of American industry, the American National Exhibition, in 1959 Nixon presented to Khrushchev various home appliances, showing the advantages of the American post-war industry.[28] At a similar exhibition of the achievements of the USSR industry in New York the products of the military and space branch were presented. The purpose of the VNIITE creation was (at least, at the level of declarations) the improvement of the quality and the expansion of the assortment of consumer goods as well as the optimization of the disproportion in the manufacture of consumer and industrial goods. The creation of the VNIITE consequently led to the legitimation of the position of the artist at enterprises but it should be taken into account that the position of the artist at the enterprise was subject to be made redundant first during the transition to self-financing during perestroika times while a considerable part of VNIITE projects did not find their application in the industry. When considering the problematic status of the professional work of the artist in applied spheres (industrial drawing, art designing), it is important to take into consideration the practices which were used to solve practical problems. Thus, in the context of strategies art practices viewed as a version of writing practices were invisible or insufficient (they had no wide circulation just like the VNIITE production that was turned into samples that could not be reproduced because of the specific organization of the industry[29]) while the most unexpected and different decisions were realized "in places" depending on specific circumstances.

For example, in the context of general recommendations about the organization of the visual propaganda production methodology manuals underline that it could be used for some other purposes. Methodical publications on visual propaganda from 1932 to 1982

mentioned the same problem such as the unreasoned, accidental and unsystematic placing of materials of visual propaganda which also includes posters:

> "Mass art production is used in a diverse and unsystematic manner. Continuous placing of posters and "popular prints" on walls without any analysis … the poster as a picture for cutting out and as the subject of the "art" exposition forms the framework for "cultural" and political work with the material of mass art production. It allows claiming that we do not know how to use poster and popular print. … The habit of buying and hanging up a poster on the basis that there is some campaign going on and that it is necessary "to decorate" the premise and that mass art production is cheap, should be got rid of."[30]

Similar observations were published 50 years later,

> "It is necessary to radically stop formalist interest in visualness, attempts to turn political propaganda into decorations. … One can quite often observe an abundance of various means of propaganda in clubs, red corners, and propaganda centers. At times they fill all free wall area. The thematic diversity and inappropriate closeness of political appeals and posters dealing with safety precautions, reflecting the specificity of the production technology, etc., considerably reduce its influence on the individual. … The feeling of disappointment is caused by attempts to conceal by using expressive means flaws in the surrounding environment such as to place a panel, slogans and posters on unattractive and shabby buildings."[31]

Such publications make it possible to speak about tactics of the inclusion of posters into everyday practices which to a certain degree were authorized as they were frequently registered, even though with condemnation in the recommendations dealing with the organization of visual propaganda. The measures taken to abolish unfair performance of the program on visual propaganda such as contests and competitions, the publication of the guidebook and manual on the organization of visual propaganda can hardly be called effective when correcting the attitude to visual propaganda. Another indicator is the fact that the same drawbacks are observed both in the 1930s and in the 1970s.

If one is to reconstruct peculiar features of the realization of writing practices in art activity and the meanings practices produced during the Soviet period in Belarus, then one has to reconstruct the logic according to which the fonts were created and used. Just like with the production and consumption of goods[32] one could observe two parallel processes going on in the field of the font creation and use; the processes were realized following the logic of strategies and tactics. Fonts were produced institutionally, i.e., it was a professional working out of a font accompanied by research in the area making fonts convenient for reading and providing positive perception of the font drawing, but at the same time due to

a narrow assortment of professionally developed fonts (only 40 sets were developed by the scientific research institute Poligrafmash) extended practices of their independent drawing and copying as required and depending on requirements were spread. This type of font drawing can be viewed as its usage or secondary production and was used in the creation of posters and title pages of books. Just like in visual propaganda, there develops a hierarchical structure in the font production. Prior to the Second World War fonts in the USSR were developed by the font laboratory of the scientific research institute of the Association of the state book and magazine publishing houses. Later the laboratory was transferred to the department of the Scientific research institute of polygraphic mechanical engineering as a Department of new fonts. The department mainly developed text fonts for typographical machines. In the 1920s the letterpress printing was carried out on the equipment and with fonts left from the pre-revolutionary printing houses, in particular, those of Revilon, Leman and Bertgold [Bolshakov, Shitsgal] which had a wide spectrum of text and decorative fonts. Typographical editions of the 1920s are characterized by the use of a great range of fonts as well as by an extensive use of the accidental set including ornaments. New fonts were developed in constructivist stylistics described in Pisarevsky's publication[33] and catalogues of Belarusian printing houses of the 1920s–1930s.

Obraztsy shriftov i ornamentov tipografii Borgorkombinata (Samples of fonts and ornaments of the printing house of Borgorkombinat). Borisov, B.g. 20 s., 2 s. l of samples (published not earlier than 1926–1933).

The book contains samples of the following fonts: Korina and Latin as text fonts and a considerable number of examples of accidental inscriptions: grotesque, a color font, Italian, some variants of a cursive with a different inclination, with elements referring to decadence; there is also an example of a Gothic font (texture) and italics. The whole text is given in Russian, except for the last page in the appendix that provides a typing example in Yiddish, and the Polish and German languages. It presents quite a wide assortment of elements of the accidental set such as frameworks and an ornament.

Uzory shryftou (Samples of fonts) / Druk. Gaz. "Zvyazda". Minsk, 1930. [7] l.

Each page of the brochure shows examples of various fonts typed by means of different sizes of the type. The brochure presents examples of the texts typed with such fonts as Hermes, Italics, set Grotesque, Color, Renat, Academic, Shaggy, Herald, Massive, Hermes, Geisha (Yiddish stylization), Latin, Massiv, Egyptian, Oak, italics Academic. The whole text is in Russian, in spite of the fact that the text on the cover is in the Belarusian language.

It includes fonts not only from the pre-revolutionary set but also the fonts developed in the 1930s in the laboratory of the ASBMPH such as italics Academic and Latin.

Uzoy shryftou drukarni "Kamintern" (Samples of fonts of the publishing house "Kamintern"). Vitebsk, 1933. 23 s.

This brochure contains a note, "The text presented in the Russian language does not have Belarusian letters". The biggest part of the text in this brochure is typed in the Belarusian language. There is an example of the set typed with the following fonts: Academic, Latin, Ancient, Concordia (modernist style), Renat, Hermes, "Zetsesion", Decadent, Korina, Elzevir, Egyptian, Eten, Palmira, Oak, Washington, Herald, Wide, Hansa, Karola, Calligraphical, and Italics. There are fonts of several sets in the Polish language. The brochure shows elements of the accidental set along with a text in Yiddish. Pages 19 through 23 show examples of fonts intended for the press with a large size of the type, presumably for posters and headlines of newspapers. The majority of these fonts follow the modern style (decadence).

Obraztsy shriftov: … v sootvetstvii s obshchesojuz. standartom (Samples of fonts: according to the All-Union standard) (OST-1937) / GUGSK NKVD SSSR, 9 kartogr. f-ka. Minsk, 1936. 38 l. (For internal use).

In 1938 the range of fonts offered in printing houses was considerably narrowed and included such fonts as Latin, Accident Grotesque, Grand piano-grotesque, Korina, Ordinary, Aldine, Academic, Ancient, Hermes, Grotesque, and Wooden (poster) font. One third (six) of presented fonts contains no Belarusian letters. Handwritten Rondo is still present.

At the beginning of the 1930s the decision to order fonts for a typographical set was made and most pre-revolutionary fonts were withdrawn from use (destroyed).

In 1957 there was a standard approved[34] that contained 39 sets developed by the Department of new fonts of the scientific research institute Poligrafmash using popular European fonts and "critical rethinking" of the pre-revolutionary heritage. "National" alphabets and fonts were created according to the sets approved by the state standards organization GOST (Bannik, literary, "Ladoga", etc.). F. Tagirov and A. Shitsgal wrote that "national" fonts were created in two stages: 1) on the basis of the Latin type, "Initially it was offered to use a Latinized alphabet", 2) on the basis of the "Cyrillic" alphabet. "Already in 1936 many allied and autonomous republics drew the attention to the question of a big practical expediency of transfer of writing from Latinized alphabets to the Russian graphic basis... By 1972 in ten union republics the system of writing was organized using the Russian graphic basis, in three of them it was the Latin system, and two republics used special graphic forms."[35] The creation of typographical fonts took into consideration traditions and customary elements of handwritten fonts if the nationality had developed writing by the time of the arrival of the Soviet power: "As illiteracy could not be liquidated without writing, writing could not exist without type-setting fonts […] Georgia, Armenia and Ukraine created their own word-making manufacture while other allied and autonomous republics and regions were provided with the fonts by the Leningrad letter-foundry named after the III International and the letter-foundry of the printing house of the Tsentrizdat (the Central Publishing House) of the people of the USSR in Moscow."[36] So, writing was being revived in Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia on the basis of the civil form of alphabets while in the North Cau-

casus and suburbs national alphabets arose basically through the reform of the old ones which were frequently connected with religion.[37]

The emergence of fonts for the typesetting in national languages with fonts having no connection to the history of the people and its traditions of writing was the result of the centralized policy of font development. Therefore, one remark comes to mind, "In the languages using writings of Russian or Latin graphic bases such as Ukrainian, Belarus, Uzbek, Kazakh, Lithuanian, Turkmen, Tatar, Chuvash, Dagestan (Avarian, Lezghin, Dargin, etc.), Tuva, Adygea, Nanaian, Mansi, Koryak and many other things, it is possible to typeset using almost all sets of fonts used to type literature in Russian."[38] It includes such sets as Bannikov, literary, journal, Latin, ordinary, academic, school, minced journal, new newspaper, Ladoga[39], etc.

This tendency is well reflected in the catalogues of the Belarusian printing houses which no longer contained fonts for Yiddish and the Polish language while their stylistics was unified:

Obraztsy shrivtov dlya rajonnyh i politotdelskih gazet (Samples of fonts for regional newspapers and newspapers of political departments). Minsk, 1951. 20, [1] s. 1000 copies.

Latin, Korina, Academic, Ancient, Accident-grotesque, Hermes-grotesque.

Minsky poligraficheskij kombinat imeni Ya Kolasa (Ya. Kolas Minsk polygraphic industrial complex). *Obraztsy shriftov, znakov, lineek i ukrashenij* (Samples of fonts, signs, rulers and ornaments) / Polygraficheskij kombinat im. Ya. Kolasa Gosudarstvennogo komiteta Soveta Ministrov BSSR po pechati. Minsk: [b. i.], 1963. 167 s.: il.; 22 sm.

This catalogue presents fonts developed by the department of new fonts of the scientific research institute Poligrafmash of the USSR, with new names including Literary, Academic, School, Ordinary, Elizavetin, Bannikov, Korina, Palmira, Rubleny (minced), Ancient, Poster, Advertising, and Calligraphical. It also shows much more modest elements of borders and rulers.

Katalog mashinnyh i ruchnyh shriftov (Catalogue of machine and manual fonts) / Tip. im. Frantsiska (Georgia) Skoriny. Minsk, 1971. 104 s.

Hermes and Grotesque are added to the standard set of fonts (Literary, Academic, School, Ordinary, Elizavetin, Bannikov, Korina, Palmira, Rubleny (minced), Ancient, Poster, Advertising, and Calligraphical developed in the 1950s.

One of the consequences of the text font standardization was the rejection of the accidental set widely spread in the 1920s and that was connected with pre-revolutionary aesthetics and technology of printing and constructivist stylistics. Instead of the accidental set in the early 1930s there began a regular development of fonts for drawing, i.e. re-drawing or copying from catalogues. According to A. Shitsgal, "Many samples of drawn fonts created during the Soviet period, were developed on the basis of critical mastering of classical

samples of the past."[40] The importance of this citation is its emphasis on the development of drawn fonts as drawn fonts simulating a typographical set are widely used in book and poster graphics.[41] Since the 1930s covers for books (the area where the accidental set is in most demand) and fonts for the text on posters were copied from catalogues. Telingater and Kaplan write in their "Art of Accidental Set" that in spite of the fact that the accidental set was widely spread in pre-revolutionary Russia it was still not in use in the Soviet printing houses in 1964.[42] In his article in 1974 Tagirov also drew attention to the following fact,

"As it is known, publishing houses are reluctant to move from drawn covers and titles to the type-setting ones justifying this by the need to preserve the art quality of the design as well as the lack of title variants that could correspond to text fonts. Therefore, new projects of standards also provide a wide range of title variants of fonts."[43]

The dynamics in the adaptation of national ornaments to the requirements of the Soviet polygraphy is similar. The ornament is one of the elements of the accidental set and consequently it starts to disappear from book pages in the 1930s. The ornament "Suite of 15 Union republics" based on national motives was created to solve polygraph problems. This unique type-setting ornament has the same basis as "national" fonts. Ahistorism identified by B. Grois as a typological characteristic of socialist realism, is consistently used in font drawing withdrawing from the press any elements of the typographical set that could refer one to the national tradition and history.

The place of cursives is reconsidered along with the ornament. Despite its wide use in the design of book covers and poster drawing, the cursive is not considered a font by the standard. In his article "Nekotorye voprosy…" ("Some questions…") (1974) F.S. Tagirov's describes the polemic around the principles of font classification and only "English and German classifications consider cursives variants of the typographical forms of fonts".[44] This approach actually bewilders Tagirov as "a uniform principle of classification is applied to essentially different variants of fonts". Partly it could be due to the fact that the technology used in image printing was also used to draw and print cover pages and posters which predominantly relied on the use of the cursive. The idea was to introduce an additional group in the Soviet classification of fonts "which should include a group of imitating fonts the drawings of which are developed imitating non-typographical forms of a font (handwritten, typewritten, etc.). The earlier standard fonts such as Calligraphical and Typewritten sets could be included into that group. However, considering that these sets most of all gravitate towards ornamented fonts instead of widely spread typographical ones these fonts were not included into the standard.[45]

We should also keep in mind that the fonts developed by the Department of new fonts were reproduced in literature and periodical press actively published in the USSR, therefore, they could hardly be used as accidental. Recommendations about the production of visual propaganda suggested copying fonts from those which were developed by the Department of new fonts, or to write and build fonts independently.[46]

Considering the necessity of placing a significant amount of texts[47] on posters, slogans and other forms of visual propaganda and an extremely limited set of developed fonts at-

tempts were made to "invent" a way of drawing and placing the font which would allow solving on a situational basis the problem of the deficiency of accidental fonts. Memoirs of Belarusian artists who were involved in the production of posters let us reconstruct the following sequence of the font production for a poster[48] where a poster artist redrew the font from the catalogue, scaled it using accessible means and made a cliché that was used to fill the text. The source for copying and redrawing for students was G.F. Klikushin's book of fonts[49] criticized by industrial artists as most fonts were drawn regardless of rules and norms and thus are considered a bad example for copying. Professional artists tried to copy fonts from catalogues and magazines published in European countries. Catalogues of German fonts were available in the library of the VNIITE Byelorussian branch. By the end of the 1970s–1980s artists created the text for posters using photography. Fonts from catalogues were photographed, they could be scaled to necessary sizes by means of a photographic enlarger and then the required text was made out of the letters printed on photographic paper. The Cyrillization of the Latin font was carried out in a very elementary way as the letter "Я" was a mirror reflection of the Latin letter "R" while the Cyrillic "И" was a reflection of the Latin "N" (though in the latter case the thickness of the main and additional strokes differs) etc. The artist created a collection of photos of letters which could then be used to make up the text for the poster. As photographic paper was of an appreciable thickness then the text glued out in the necessary size was retouched and photographed anew. Later there appeared catalogues of fonts published by the French company "Lettreset" and the letters were cut on a glued film, however, because the fonts presented were mainly for Latin alphabets, French catalogues were used for copying and independent Cyrillization. In 1988 in the journal "Reklama" ("Advertising") the artist from the department of type-setting fonts of the scientific production association "Poligrafmash" criticizes this widespread method of spontaneous Cyrillization calling such specialists "cold shoemakers" who transfer Latin sets from foreign catalogues to suit the Russian standard.[50] That method was widely practiced up until the spread of computers that allowed to use computer fonts. The citation from the journal "Reklama" ("Advertising") serves as a proof.


Thus, despite the presence of 40 original sets, developed by the Department of new fonts, the most widespread are the practices of copying fonts from European catalogues and spontaneous Cyrillization of Latin types most frequently used in posters, as well as in the production of other objects of visual propaganda. Such an approach is in contrast with the situation in Europe where commercial companies produce a wide assortment of fonts taking into account features of perception and convenience for reading depending on the purpose, be it outdoor advertising or printed matter. Typographics, the sphere of font production, employs most highly-qualified designers who in addition to everything else were engaged in the improving of text fonts which were already widely used. For example, the well-known font Helvetika was designed as an improved version of the font Franklin Gothic which had been used in advertising for decades. In the USSR when designing visual propaganda artists were engaged, mainly, in copying, instead of creating new or improving already existing fonts. In professional art practices the copying technique received a wide

circulation similar to that of teaching writing. Artists had to spend a huge amount of time redrawing, copying, and text scaling. The copying of the drawn font in exercise books with samples in words, the copying of fonts by hand was a widespread practice. It is not surprising then that book covers kept reproducing one and the same scheme of text configuration (static and aligned verticals). Posters had a similar almost invariable text configuration as the text was put either behind the image framework or over the image in a separate plane that was caused among other reasons by the volume of work involved in the process of copying, font Cyrillizing and drawing of text information. It is quite remarkable that at font drawing signs of machine typing were continually reproduced including the line after line text drawing, text alignment (to the right, to the left, in the center or according to the width of the line), and the standardized line spacing (il. 1, 1A, 2, 2A). This concerns text drawing using antique, grotesque fonts and text drawing using the cursive. Such text presentation is opposed to individualized writing and handwritten texts without a mimicry simulating the machine set. Individualized writing is seen as an attribute of negative characters or satirical plots, for instance, the signature of a bureaucrat and bribe-taker or illegal amendments to reports of plan performance and so forth. The signature of a bureaucrat and A bribe-taker on some satirical poster possesses all characteristics of an individual handwriting as the thickness of lines changes, letters differ in height and proportions (il. 3). Posters promoting the elections to local Councils contain a hand-written text without the characteristics of an individual handwriting where the thickness of lines does not change, the height of letters remains the same, and the proportions of letters do not change either. As Gordon notes, letters are drawn but not written (il. 4). The imitation of the machine set just like using text fonts when writing and when using cursives could be a form of representation of the processes of modernization and work mechanization while the signs of individualization represented its hindrance. As a hand-written text to a great degree referred one to the individual practices of writing it becomes clear why cursives were basically excluded from the GOST standards, i.e. were not considered fonts but an ornament.

A wide use of the technique of copying when teaching writing and in professional art activity (in production of visual propaganda) led to unsatisfactory results. One's handwriting had to be corrected in everyday writing while in art practices one had to "invent" techniques and technologies of copying fonts called by artists themselves "cold shoemaking" as the text was not always qualitative or produced an expected result. As written recommendations about the production of visual propaganda did not presuppose such a production process it is possible to assume that norms and rules focused not so much on the regulation of the production process of visual propaganda and broadcasting of messages of the party and local authorities as they created the space for the "invention" of ways to demonstrate the modernization of the Soviet way of life and the mechanization of production. All artists' energy was directed not to the production of an individual handwriting or style (in this case it is a question of the font creation while the situation with the image is somewhat different) but to the reproduction, or, more likely, imitation of the signs of modernization of everyday practices and the mechanization of production.


At the same time the logic of using fonts presents ways of interaction of written norms and regulations and practices of their execution which are frequently carried out as "escaping" or only as a visible submission. Practices of copying fonts from European catalogues can be interpreted as escaping the imposed monotony and totality of the Soviet culture which was realized among other things through the working out of a limited quantity font set for the whole variety of the printed matter in the BSSR (at the same time one needs to keep in mind that the Soviet people had a reputation of being the most active readers). Practices of escaping the monotonous totality of the Soviet culture can be defined as a "secondary" production of fonts treated as a version of practices of writing.

Thus, when considering fonts as an object of graphic design within the optics of everyday practices one can see not only those senses which were legitimized by the dominating order, or, in Michel de Certeau's words, strategy but also the meanings which are produced in the course of "submission" to strategies in practice and which are frequently carried out as the "escaping" from imposed norms and rules. This approach is especially productive when constructing the narrative of history of Belarusian design as it allows seeing the explanatory logic of such phenomena as a repeated reproduction in a drawn text of the signs of the machine set.





Illustrations 1, 1A. Nam zhyt', pratsavat', smyajatstsa... (We should live, work, laugh). A propaganda poster. 1979 (artist V. Kreidik, text by N. Butkevich, editor N. Gutiev)






Illustration 2, 2A. Sjonnya vuchan – zautra rabochy (Today you are a pupil, tomorrow you are a worker). A propaganda poster. 1974 (artist T. Ignatenko, editor L. Osetsky)



Illustration 3. Byla u rajon kamandirouka (There was a business trip to the district). A propaganda poster. 1973. (artist V. Shmatov, text by P. Prihodko, N. Butkevich).



Illustration 4. Rabochy gonar berazhy (Take care of your work dignity). A propaganda poster. 1970 (artist L. Zamah, editor N. Gutiev)

Notes

1 Woodham, J. Design and National Identity//Woodham, J. TWENTIETH – Century Design. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. P. 87–109.

2 Betts, P. The Authority of Everyday Objects. A Cultural History of West German Industrial Design. Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2004.

3 Monographs: Lensu, Ya.Yu. Gistoryja belaruskaga dyzajnu: vuchebnaja raspratsouka "Gistoryj dyzajnu" (dlya studentau dyzajnerskih addzyalennyau vyshejshyh navuchalnyh ustanou).

Minsk: Vydavetstva MIK, 2008; Lensu, Ya.Yu. O polze krasoty veshchej: iz istorii Belorusskogo, sovetskogo i mirovogo dizajna. Minsk: Belarus, 2008.

4 Ibid.

5 Atrakhovich, E.I. Tendentsii razvitija belorusskogo plakata v 1960 – 1980h godah [Mikroforma]. Minsk, 1987.

6 Atrakhovich, E. Plakat-zmagar // Mastatstva Belarusi. 1987. № 11. P. 24–27.

7 Ignatsenka, T., Shmatau, V. Prapagandyst, agitatar, vyhavatsel // Mastatstva Belarusi. 1984. № 8. P. 54–56.

8 Conversations made it clear that for graphic designers from Switzerland and the Netherlands the "imperfection" of fonts on Soviet posters is almost the brightest element of the "revolutionary nature" of Soviet design.

9 The Cyrillic letter "Я" turned out to be a mirror reflection of the Latin letter "R", Cyrillic "И" was a mirror reflection of Latin "N" while the letter "Ю" was produced from the combination of Latin letters "I" and "O" and the connecting element was added during the use of clichés etc.

10 As it defines research optics instead of presupposing the use of a toolkit traditionally used by historians in their research of life and household.

11 De Certeau, M. L'invention du quotidien. Vol. 1, Arts de Faire. Union general d'edition. 1980.

12 It was soon noticed that when teaching a round writing with basic strokes going perpendicularly to the line pupils sit incomparably better than when learning a slanted writing as pupils sit straight and are farther from their notebooks. Due to its mathematically correct construction of letters, beauty, clearness, and convenience of performance if obtuse feathers are used the round font is easier to master by pupils; the learning process goes quicker while students do not encounter many difficulties. Thus, this kind of writing was soon taught at schools instead of an ordinary slanting writing. Gerbach, V.S. Metodicheskoe rukovodstvo k obucheniju pismu: Posobie dlya roditelej, uchitelej, uchitelsk. in-tov i seminarij / Sost. V.Gerbach. 16 ispr. i znach. dop. izd. SPb.: tip. V. Bezobrazova i K, 1899. P. 5.

13 Gerbach, V.S. Metodicheskoe rukovodstvo k obucheniju pismu. P. 105.

14 In Germany two fonts "Rundschrift" and "Steilschrift" are strictly distinguished. When using the round font basic strokes should be strictly perpendicular to letter lines, in the samples provided this font is shown on a checkered sheet where the width and height of the letter is multiple to cells. "Steilschrift" has an inclined stroke; alphabetic connections are executed as in a cursive writing". Gerbach, V.S. Metodicheskoe rukovodstvo obuchenija pismu. P. 105.

15 Shalamov, V. "Serafim" // Kolymskie rasskazy. [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: http://shalamov.ru/library/2/25.html.

16 Pisarevsky, D.A. Obuchenie pismu: Dopushcheno NKP RSFSR: Metod. posobie dlya uchitelej nachalnyh shkol. Izd. 2. ispr. i dop. M.: Uchpedgiz, 1938; Pisarevsky, D.A. … Ispravlenie pocherka: 60 praktik. uprazhnenij. L.: izd. Avt., 1926; Kof-Lajf, P.I. Anglijskaja kalligrafija: Posobie dlya uchitelej angl. Jaz. M.: Uchpedgiz, 1959; Bogolyubov, N.N. Metodika chistopisanija: Ucheb. Posobie dlya ped. uchilishch. Izd. 4, pererabot. L.: Uchpedgiz, Leningr. otd-nie, 1963.

17 Gordon, J. Kniga pro bukvy ot A do Ya. M.: Izdatelstvo Artemija Lebedeva, 2006. P. 84.

18 Ibid. Similar ideas are described in the blog "Sovetskie propisi – ne 'obrazets napisanija bukv'" ("Soviet exercise books with samples in words are 'not an example of how to write letters'"). The letters are not written like a pre-revolutionary prototype but drawn. The main thing, i.e., the movement of the hand when writing, is lost. They are inconvenientfor reproduction. Therefore, EVERYBODY who had to deal with them, had serious problems mastering them".

It is not only similar letters that coincide. Even the turned details accurately fit the appropriate places of the "construction set". Straight lines are ideally equal; the inclination is always sustained. It is only the points on stroke ends that do not coincide completely while the leaving ends of strokes are not always cut off equally. The conclusion: at first the details were drawn with a pencil. Then they were copied, likely, through the tracing-paper. Then each letter was filled in with ink, a drawing pen (straight lines) and a feather and a brush (curves). Originals were very large, about 8–10 centimeters to make it easier to fill in thin strokes and to smooth whitewash joints. It seems to me that each letter of the alphabet was drawn separately, instead of being glued out from ready blocks; otherwise all details would have coincided ideally. The inscription "Moscow..." is also made using the tracing-paper instead of being put together from letters as there the details do not coincide. [Electronic resource]. Mode of access mode: http://yurigordon.livejournal.com/180255.html.

19 One of the most important criteria of efficiency of teaching writing in England in the first half of the XX century was how much handwriting changed while at school and then in professional life.

20 In his treatment of the discipline Foucault recognizes that individuals reproduce disciplinary mechanisms using reasons of efficiency; the effect of that is the interiorization of the supervision thereby providing for the total coverage of disciplinary forms of relations.

21 At first simple elements of writing should be mastered, and then letters are made of those elements.

22 Sostojanie i nekotorye problemy sovershenstvovanija naglyadnoj agitatsii. Propagandistskij vestnik. Minsk: Belarus, 1982.

23 Publications of the BF VNIITE of the 1970s in detail explain variants of constructive decisions for different types of visual propaganda mentioning fonts as a component in passing. Such a redistribution of emphasis can confirm the thesis that the course of production is accompanied by the simultaneous consumption of visual propaganda products. The production of static and mobile designs in itself does not bear an ideological component but attracting experts of a wide spectrum, possibly, led to the creation of the effect active modus of reproduction of visual propaganda and those ideas which it is supposed to spread.

24 Three groups were allocated according to the published materials: Sostojanie i nekotorye problemy sovershenstvovanija naglyadnoj agitatsyi. Propagandistskij vestnik. Minsk: Belarus, 1982; Naglyadnaja agitatsyja. Minsk: the VNIITE Byelorussian branch, 1968; Naglyadnaja agitatsija. Minsk: the VNIITE Byelorussian branch, 1974.

25 Already in 1921 it was recommended to specify in every possible way the names of the collective participants to increase personal interest, for example, how to organize and conduct the oral newspaper in the Red Army club, "It is necessary to give all names in messages, stories, feuilletons, etc. of local content".

26 Copies were kept in libraries with a signature stamp of group reception, i.e. there was no separate registration for each copy of production.

27 Ladur, M.F. Zametki redaktora. O vysokom prizvanii zavodskogo hudozhnika // Dekorativnoe iskusstvo SSSR. 1966. № 4. P. 1.

28 Whitening, C. A taste for pop: pop art, gender, and consumer culture. Cambridge University Press, 1997. P. 54.

[29] This problematic is studied in the article of the author of this paper "Strukturnaja "nehvatka" dizaina ili Ded Moroz za Belarus // Belorusskij format: nevidimaja realnost. Sbornik nauchnyh trudov / otv. red. A.R. Usmanova. Vilnius: EHU, 2008. P. 200–230.

[30] Gertsenberg, V. Plakat v politprosvetrabote. M.; L.: OGIZ-IZOGIZ, 1932. P. 62–69.

[31] Sostojanie i nekotorye problemy sovershenstvovanija naglyadnoj agitatsyi. Propagandistskij vestnik. Minsk: Belarus, 1982. P. 13.

[32] Along with quality propagation of things made in the USSR, there was a permanent column in such magazines as "Nauka i zhizn" about how to bring a thing to a functional condition, to prolong its life, and make it more convenient to use. The analysis of the column texts can be found in works of Lebina, N.B., Chistikov, A.N. Obyvatel i reformy. Kartiny povsednevnoj zhizni gorozhan v gody nepa i Khruschevskogo desyatiletija. SPb., 2003; Djogot, E. Ot tovara k tovarishchu. K estetike nerynochnogo predmeta // Logos. 2000. № 5–6; Orlova, G. Apologija strannoj veshchi: "malenkie hitrosti" sovetskogo cheloveka // Neprikosnovennyj zapas. 2004. № 2 (34). [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2004/34/orl10.html.

[33] Pisarevsky, D.A. Shrifty i ih postroenie. L., 1927.

[34] According to Shitsgal and Tagirov, the first font standard appeared in 1930. It included 12 sets of fonts originally designed by Leman's and Bertgold's firms. The fourth standard was approved in 1957 and included 39 sets uniting 7 groups. These groups did not include the cursive.

[35] Shitsgal, A.G., Tagirov, F.Sh. Multinatsionalnaja shriftovaja kultura // Polygrafija. 1972. № 12. P. 44.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] The font Ladoga in the Byelorussian language was developed by artist Schukin, an illustration for the article by Tagirov, F.Sh. Multinatsionalnaja shriftovaja kultura // Polygrafija. 1972. № 12.

[40] Shitsgal, A.G. Russkij risovannyj knizhnyj shrift sovetskih hudozhnikov: Albom obraztsov / Vsesojuz. nauch.-issled. in-t. poligr. prom-sti i techniki Glavizdata M-va kultury SSSR. M.: Iskusstvo, 1953. P. XIII.

[41] Also it is important that past fonts do not get simply adapted according to the appropriate printing technologies but "are critically comprehended". In terms of socialist realism such an approach to the past can be viewed as utilitarian.

[42] Telingater, S.B. Iskusstvo aktsidentnogo nabora. M.: Kniga, 1965. P. 24.

[43] Tagirov, V.Sh. Nekotorye voprosy standartizatsii typografskih shriftov // Voprosy razrabotki novyh shriftov dlya russkogo i latinskogo alfavitov: Trudy / Vsesojuz. nauch.-issled. in-t oborudovanija dlya pech. izd.kartonnoj i bum. tary. M., 1974. P. 20.

[44] Ibid. P. 14.

[45] Ibid. P.17.

[46] For example, Bolshakov in his book "Knizhnyj shrift" ("Book font") published in 1964 pays a lot of attention to the designing of fonts. He offers a technique of constructing a flame like element. "In order to easily master the construction of it [flame like] element one should keep in mind that a parallelogram, a trapeze or an extended quadrangle serves as the basis. Using it, it is possible to find a lot of different forms of a flame like element" (P. 146). "From a constructive point of view a sable like element can be seen as an origin of a flame like element" (P. 148). Many recommendations about the organization of visual propaganda mention this book as one of the most authoritative sources.

[47] Quite often it is whole quatrains, especially on satirical posters.
[48] T. Gradashnikova, Yu. Toreev, and D. Sursky were interviewed.
[49] Dekorativnye shrifty dlya hudozhestvenno-oformitelskih rabot [Izomaterial] / [sost. G.F. Klikushin]. Minsk: Polymya, 1987; Shrifty: [Teorija shrifta i praktika shriftovoj grafiki / Sost. G.F. Klikushin. Minsk: Vysh. shk., 1964.
[50] Etot staryj novyj shrift. Intervju s hudozhnikom otdela nabornyh shriftov NPO "Poligrafmash" V. Efimovym // Reklama. Teorija i praktika.1988. № 3 (104). P. 13.

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Center for Advanced Studies and Education (CASE) on Social Transformation in the Western Eurasia Border Region – Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine

The Center for Advanced Studies and Education (CASE) on Social Transformation in the Western Eurasian Border Region was established in 2003 with funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York to American Councils for International Education. CASE is a vital research center which works to strengthen research on social transformation in the region, improve the system of higher education in social science and the humanities, and form effective networks of university academics and scholars. CASE is affiliated with the European Humanities University (EHU), but is open to participation by eligible scholars throughout the three-nation region Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine.

The CASE mission is to promote and foster research on the transformational processes of the western Eurasia border region in the post-Soviet period. The key elements of the CASE project mission are the following:

– Develop professional networks within the western Eurasia border region;
– Raise the level of professionalism in social science scholarship;
– Promote interdisciplinary collaboration;
– Strengthen vital partnerships with affinity organizations;
– Disseminate and popularize the results of the study of social transformation processes in the region.

CASE intends to achieve these objectives through a range of complementary activities:

– Providing collective and individual research grants;
– Organizing international seminars and conferences;
– Publishing the scholarly journal *Perekrestki*;
– Publishing the volume of the English language digest;
– Publishing the scholarly monographs;
– Maintaining the library of resources for scholars
– Introducing intensive short-term seminars on social sciences methods.

The main topics proposed by CASE include, but are not limited to:

– The border region in between the East Partnership and post-imperial Russia;
– Energy issues in international relations in the West Eurasia Region;
– The world economic crisis as a political force on the regional scale;
– Old and new minorities and the practices of official identity; and
– Language, identity, and education in an era of transformation.